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Abstract
Exchange rate crises in Latin America recently put a spotlight on the perils of
Exchange Rate-Based Stabilizations (ERBS), which use the nominal exchange
rate as the main policy target for stabilizing inflation. This dissertation do-
cuments the effects of ERBS in high inflation economies and develops models
to explain these stylized facts.
The first chapter assesses the empirical regularities associated with ERBS.
Based on a sample of 13 stabilization episodes, typical real and monetary dy-
namics are investigated in Burns-Mitchell diagrams. Stylized facts of ERBS
are the initial increases in consumption and GDP, the real appreciation and
the current account deterioration. Moreover, consumption and output are
found to follow a boom-slowdown cycle, where slowdown means reduced or
zero growth if the ERBS is still in effect, and negative growth rates for failed
ERBS. Capital inflows follow a similar boom-bust cycle: Their increase at
the stabilization’s inception is followed by a sharp reversal three to six years
later, very often coinciding with the program’s collapse. This transitoriness
of ERBS constitutes an additional stylized fact: 70 % of the programs under
consideration failed within 10 years after their implementation.
The origin of the initial real exchange rate appreciation during ERBS has
been subject to controversy: Most models assume an increase in the relative
price of non-traded goods. Empirical findings, in contrast, emphasize the
contribution of traded goods’ cross-country prices. Chapter 2 sheds light on
this issue by applying Engel’s (1995) method of variance decomposition on
Brazilian-US real exchange rate fluctuations. The results confirm both the
models and the empirical findings: When considering the full sample (from
January 1981 to May 2001), changes in traded goods’ prices and the nomi-
nal exchange rate account for almost all of the observed real exchange rate
movements. During periods of pegged exchange rates, however, non-traded
goods’ prices are equally important for real exchange rate fluctuations. Thus,
changes in relative non-tradables’ prices are incorporated as a determinant of
real exchange rate fluctuations during ERBS in the theoretical frameworks
presented in chapters 3 and 4. These explain the stylized facts in models
of small, open economies populated by a utility-maximizing representative
agent endowed with perfect foresight. Money matters due to cash-in-advance
constraints. Further important features are the existence of market imperfec-
tions – price stickiness or imperfect capital mobility – and the stabilization’s
deficient credibility. In chapter 3, the latter is due to the anticipation of
a Krugman (1979)-style currency crisis. The initial real appreciation during
ERBS can then be explained with forward-looking price setting by monop-
olistic non-tradable goods’ producers: These are subject to staggered price
setting and incorporate the peg’s anticipated termination – i.e. higher future
devaluation rates – by increasing their current prices. As tradables’ prices are
determined by the law of one price, this implies higher relative non-tradables’
prices and thus a real exchange rate appreciation. Furthermore, due to inter-
temporal consumption substitution, the observed initial consumption boom is
reproduced. Econometric evidence confirms the proposed price setting mech-
anism: Using the Mexican-US interest rate differential as an indicator for
devaluation rate expectations, OLS regressions with monthly Mexican data
find a significant positive relation between relative non-tradables’ prices and
the interest rate spread during periods of pegged exchange rates.
In the previous model, the stabilization effort collapses due to a fundamen-
tal inconsistency between the exchange rate target and government finance.
Chapter 4 shows that the collapse can also result from self-fulfilling expec-
tations. This is achieved by introducing partial international capital mobility.
Given this constraint, both the initial consumption boom and the stabiliza-
tion’s collapse can be shown to result from expectations about the duration
of the peg and post-stabilization monetary policy.
In conclusion, the dissertation points to the perils of ERBS in high in-
flation countries: Contrary to what is commonly believed, even relatively
successful and long-lived exchange rate pegs are associated with a late slow-
down; only very few ERBS are successful at stabilizing inflation rates in the
medium and long run. The models show that stabilizations’ deficient credibil-
ity – regardless if justified by fundamentals or not – engenders real dynamics
which distort economic activity and jeopardize the stabilization effort: The
miracle of ERBS turns into a mirage.
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Zusammenfassung
Die lateinamerikanischen Wa¨hrungskrisen lenkten erst ku¨rzlich wieder das
Augenmerk auf die Gefahren wechselkursbasierter Stabilisierungen (WKBS).
Dies sind Inflationsstabilisierungsprogramme, die den nominalen Wechselkurs
als vorrangiges geldpolitisches Instrument einsetzen. Die vorliegende Disser-
tation dokumentiert die Wirkung der Stabilisierungen und pra¨sentiert Er-
kla¨rungsmodelle fu¨r deren stilisierte Fakten.
Das erste Kapitel untersucht anhand von Burns-Mitchell-Diagrammen
typische reale und moneta¨re Effekte von 13 Stabilisierungsepisoden. Der an-
fa¨ngliche Anstieg des Konsums und des BIPs, die reale Aufwertung und die
Verschlechterung der Leistungsbilanz sind dabei die auffa¨lligsten stilisierten
Fakten. Auf die Expansion folgt eine wirtschaftliche Abschwa¨chung, d. h.
niedrigeres oder Nullwachstum, falls die Stabilisierung noch andauert, und
negative Wachstumsraten, falls das Programm bereits aufgegeben wurde. Die
Kapitalimporte folgen einem a¨hnlichen Zyklus: Dem Anstieg zu Beginn der
Stabilisierung folgt drei bis sechs Jahre spa¨ter eine drastische Umkehr, die
ha¨ufig mit dem Zusammenbruch des Programms einhergeht. Die Kurzlebig-
keit von WKBS ist ein weiterer stilisierter Fakt: 70 % der betrachteten Sta-
bilisierungen scheiterten innerhalb von 10 Jahren.
Die anfa¨ngliche reale Aufwertung wa¨hrend WKBS wird meist als Anstieg
des relativen Preises nicht-handelbarer Gu¨ter modelliert; empirische Ergebnis-
se hingegen unterstreichen die Bedeutung der internationalen Preisunterschie-
de handelbarer Gu¨ter.Kapitel 2 untersucht diese Ursachen durch die Anwen-
dung von Engels Methode der Varianzzerlegung auf den realen Wechselkurs
zwischen Brasilien und den USA. Die Ergebnisse besta¨tigen dabei sowohl
die Modelle als auch den empirischen Befund: Bei Betrachtung der gesamten
Stichprobe (von Januar 1981 bis Mai 2001) bestimmen Vera¨nderungen der
Preise handelbarer Gu¨ter und des nominalenWechselkurses nahezu die gesam-
ten Bewegungen des realen Wechselkurses. Wa¨hrend Perioden fester Wechsel-
kurse hingegen sind die Preise nicht-handelbarer Gu¨ter von a¨hnlicher Bedeu-
tung. Aufgrund dieses Ergebnisses wird in den in Kapitel 3 und 4 pra¨sentierten
Modellen der reale Wechselkurs in Abha¨ngigkeit des relativen Preises nicht-
handelbarer Gu¨ter dargestellt. Diese Modelle bilden kleine, offene Volkswirt-
schaften ab, die von nutzenmaximierenden repra¨sentativen Agenten mit per-
fekter Voraussicht bevo¨lkert sind. Moneta¨re Gro¨ßen sind aufgrund von cash-
in-advance- Beschra¨nkungen von Bedeutung. Weitere wichtige Modellelemen-
te sind die Existenz von Marktimperfektionen (Preisstarrheiten und unvoll-
sta¨ndige Kapitalmobilita¨t) sowie die mangelnde Glaubwu¨rdigkeit der Stabili-
sierung. In Kapitel 3 ist diese durch die Antizipation einer Wa¨hrungskrise a`
la Krugman (1979) begru¨ndet. Die reale Aufwertung kann dann mit voraus-
blickender Preissetzung der monopolistischen Produzenten nicht-handelbarer
Gu¨ter erkla¨rt werden: Aufgrund von Preisstarrheiten erho¨hen diese ihre Prei-
se in Erwartung der Wa¨hrungsabwertung. Da die Preise handelbarer Gu¨ter
durch das Gesetz des einheitlichen Preises bestimmt werden, folgt daraus ein
Anstieg des relativen Preises nicht-handelbarer Gu¨ter und eine reale Auf-
wertung. Zudem wird aufgrund intertemporaler Konsumsubstitution der an-
fa¨ngliche Konsumboom reproduziert. O¨konometrische Evidenz besta¨tigt den
Preissetzungsmechanismus: KQ-Scha¨tzungen mit monatlichen mexikanischen
Daten zeigen fu¨r Perioden fester Wechselkurse einen signifikanten positiven
Zusammenhang zwischen dem relativen Preis nicht-handelbarer Gu¨ter und
dem mexikanisch-US-amerikanischen Zinsdifferential als Approximation der
Abwertungserwartung.
Wa¨hrend das Ende der Stabilisierung in obigen Modell durch eine fun-
damentale Inkonsistenz von Wechselkursziel und Staatsausgaben bedingt ist,
zeigt Kapitel 4, daß der Zusammenbruch auch aus sich-selbst-erfu¨llenden
Erwartungen resultieren kann. Ein wesentliches Element ist dabei die Be-
grenzung der internationalen Kapitalmobilita¨t. Diese erlaubt es, sowohl den
anfa¨nglichen Konsumboom als auch das Ende der Stabilisierung mit Erwar-
tungen bezu¨glich der Dauer des Pegs und der nachfolgenden Geldpolitik zu
erkla¨ren.
Zusammenfassend zeigt die Dissertation die Gefahren wechselkursbasier-
ter Stabilisierungen auf: Im Gegensatz zur herko¨mmlichen Meinung sind so-
gar relativ erfolgreiche und langlebige WKBS mittelfristig mit einer Kontrak-
tion verbunden; nur wenige Programme erzielen eine nachhaltige Redukti-
on der Inflation. Die hier pra¨sentierten Modelle zeigen, daß die mangelnde
Glaubwu¨rdigkeit der Programme – selbst wenn diese nicht durch Fundamen-
taldaten gerechtfertigt ist – zu Allokationsverzerrungen fu¨hrt und den Erfolg
der Stabilisierungsmaßnahmen gefa¨hrdet.
Schlagwo¨rter:
Wechselkursbasierte Stabilisierungen, Wa¨hrungskrisen, Inflationsstabilisierung,
Schwellenla¨nder
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Chapter 1
Exchange Rate-Based
Stabilization – The
Phenomenon to Be Explained
1.1 Introduction
Great parts of the developing world have been plagued by high and frequently
persistent inflation: Inflation rates exceeding 10 percent per annum have been
widespread, prolonged inflationary episodes with annual rates above 40 per-
cent not uncommon. In the face of this performance, policy makers did not
remain idle: Myriads of inflation stabilization programs were implemented in
developing countries. While most of these failed to achieve a sustained de-
crease in inflation, their real effects defied findings from stabilizing moderate
inflation rates: Contrary to conventional wisdom1, many exchange rate-based
inflation stabilizations (ERBS) in developing countries were followed by in-
creases in consumption and output. Systematic research on this phenomenon
started in the mid eighties, motivated by the pronounced consumption boom
witnessed in the initial stages of exchange rate-based inflation stabilizations
in Latin America and Israel. At about the same time, research on historic
hyperinflations and their stabilization indicated that high inflation can be
halted at little or no output cost.2 Thus, two independent strands of empir-
ical research evinced that reducing high inflation engenders dynamics which
are different to those of stabilizing moderate inflation, and opened the road
1See Gordon (1982), Ball (1994) for inflation stabilizations in general, and Detragiache
and Hamann (1999) for evidence on the recessionary nature of exchange- rate based stabi-
lizations in industrialized countries.
2See for example Sargent (1982a) and Dornbusch and Fischer (1986).
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2for research on the real effects of ERBS in high inflation countries.
This dissertation contributes to empirical and theoretical aspects of this
research. In a first step, I analyze the empirical regularities associated with
ERBS in high inflation economies. Based on a sample of 13 stabilization
episodes, typical real and monetary dynamics during stabilization are inves-
tigated. Even though this dissertation focuses on ERBS, section 1.4 presents
empirical regularities of money-based stabilizations, extracted from a sample
of nine stabilizations, as a reference case.
One stylized fact of ERBS found in the cross-country analysis is that the
real exchange rate typically appreciates during stabilization. The origin of the
real exchange rate appreciation, and generally real exchange rate fluctuations
in Brazil, is assessed in Chapter 2. In particular, the contribution of domestic
relative non-tradables’ prices to real exchange rate fluctuations is quantified.
The next step consists of explaining the observed empirical regularities:
The analysis presented in Chapter 3 proposes an explanation for the observed
real exchange rate and consumption dynamics during transitory ERBS. It is
verified empirically with Mexican data. The model presented in Chapter
4 offers a joint explanation for both the initial dynamics of ERBS and its
collapse in a currency crisis.
1.2 What Is Exchange Rate-Based Stabiliza-
tion?
This section presents definitions of technical terms and conventions recur-
rently used in this dissertation. A central term to define is ‘exchange rate-
based stabilization’. Exchange rate-based stabilization (ERBS) denotes an
inflation stabilization program which uses the nominal exchange rate (versus
a stable currency) as the main policy target. A policy alternative consists in
targeting nominal money supply directly, denoted as ‘money-based stabiliza-
tion’ (MBS).
Similarly to direct money targeting, fixed exchange rates take the power
of printing money out of the central bank’s hands: The supply of domes-
tic currency is constrained to a level compatible with the nominal exchange
rate target: The nominal exchange rate is the relative price of the foreign
currency: It states how many units of the domestic currency must be paid
in order to acquire one unit of the foreign currency.3 The relative price of
the foreign currency is determined by the demand for and the supply of the
foreign currency relative to demand for and supply of the domestic currency.
3This is based on a nominal exchange rate expressed in ‘European terms’.
3The central bank must adjust its supply of domestic and foreign currency
such that the nominal exchange rate target is met. During a fixed exchange
rate regime, that is, when the relative price of the foreign currency is set ex-
ogenously, the central bank has to supply exactly the amounts of home or of
foreign currency such that the foreign exchange market clears at the targeted
rate.
This mechanism limits the monetization of government debt, that is, the
central bank’s acquisition of government debt with newly issued money, which
is virtually always at the root of developing countries’ inflation.4
Why do policymakers recur to printing money for financing government
expenditure which must be followed by elaborate programs to stabilize the
resulting inflation rates later on?
“[G]overnments, unable or too timid or too short-sighted to secure
from loans or taxes the resources they required, have printed notes
for the balance”
is the answer provided by Keynes (1919) in the aftermath of World War
I, an answer which still contains much truth for developing countries. In
many of these, weak governments recur to printing money instead of con-
solidating the government’s budget, thus evading prolonged political battles
over the distribution of the fiscal adjustment.5 Indexation mechanisms and
backward-looking expectations then contribute to the persistence of inflation,
and temporary shocks send it off to high levels. When their toll on economic
activity becomes sufficiently large, inflation stabilization programs are imple-
mented. As described above, these are designed to tame the fiscal authority’s
grip on the central bank by putting the country’s monetary policy, in effect,
on ‘autopilot’. There is, however, some scope regarding the roughness of the
auto-piloted ride of exchange rate pegging: ERBS can consist of anything
between a ‘crawling peg’, that is, a system of pre-announced currency de-
preciation, and a currency board. The latter denotes a permanently fixed
exchange rate system in which the central bank is obliged to back the private
sector’s domestic currency holdings with a designated ‘hard’ currency.6
4Proceeds from money creation, denoted as seignorage, can be decomposed into two
sources: First, the change in the economy’s real money holdings and, second, the capital
loss inflation inflicts on holders of real monetary balances and government debt, if its value
is not inflation-indexed.
5Accounts of seignorage-finance in developing countries, the resulting inflation crises
and their stabilization can be found in Sachs (1987) and Kiguel and Neumeyer (1995).
6At least in theory. The permanency of currency board arrangements is disproved by
the recent events in Argentina. See Hanke and Schuler (1994 ) for aspects of currency
board design, and Ghosh et al. (2000 ) for an evaluation of the recent experience with
currency boards.
4Pegs can be accompanied by price and income policies, that is, legal ceil-
ings on price and wage increases. Programs making use of such controls
are denoted as ‘heterodox stabilizations’, in contrast to ‘orthodox programs’
which rely exclusively on the exchange rate anchor and monetary contraction
for stabilizing inflation (Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992).
This dissertation considers all these forms of exchange rate management as
ERBS. The term ‘managed exchange rate’ is defined to encompass all systems
of exchange rate pegs, including currency boards.
For the empirical analysis of the stylized facts of ERBS and MBS, sta-
bilization episodes must be identified. This requires two conditions to hold:
First, the inflation stabilization programs must be based on a single unequi-
vocally detectable nominal anchor. For some programs, this fails to be true:
Stabilization efforts in Turkey (1980 and 1998), the Slovak Republic (1991),
and Uruguay (1990), for example, comprised targets for both money growth
and the exchange rate. This dissertation follows the classification in the
IMF’s Economic Outlook (May 2001). Programs not considered therein are
denoted ERBS when an exchange rate peg was part of the IMF’s stabilization
package at the time the inflation rate was reduced.7 The second condition
for an empirical analysis of stabilization programs is that their beginning
and termination must be identifiable. This is the case for most ERBS, as
their start and end coincides with what is officially announced. Some pro-
grams, however, seem to be characterized by a continuum between ‘stabili-
zation’ and ‘abandonment of stabilization’. The Brazilian real stabilization,
for instance, entailed a one-to-one peg of the Brazilian real to the US dollar
(from July 1994 to February 1995), a one-time devaluation of five percent
in March 1995, and a five percent exchange rate fluctuation band thereafter.
Even though the peg was officially abandoned in January 1999, the maximum
monthly devaluation rate since March 1999 amounts to a mere five percent.
This illustrates that the anti-inflationary stance can vary considerably during
the course of an officially announced episode of ERBS and that the official
discontinuation of an exchange rate peg does not always imply the end of
stabilization-oriented monetary policy and the return of inflation. Easterly
(1996) therefore proposes a result-based approach for identifying episodes of
inflation stabilization. According to this, inflation stabilization starts when
the inflation rate falls by a specific amount, or below a particular threshold.
Analogously, the end of stabilization8 can be defined to occur when the in-
flation rate increases by a specific amount. It should be noted, however, that
7This information is taken from Hamann (2001).
8Whenever the term ‘stabilization’ is used in the following, the stabilization of high
inflation rates is referred to.
5this criterion does not distinguish between money-based, exchange rate-based
and so-called ‘populist stabilizations’ which produce lower inflation by impos-
ing legal ceilings on price increases.9 Therefore, this dissertation employs the
announcement-based definition of stabilization.
So far, the terms ‘high inflation’, ‘hyperinflation’ and ‘chronic inflation’
have not been quantified. Indeed, no precise quantitative definition exists for
these terms. Ageno`r and Montiel (1996:265) denote annual average inflation
rates exceeding 25 percent as ‘high inflation’, Easterly (1996) and Hamann
(2001) rates above 40 percent. Hyperinflation has been defined as monthly
inflation in excess of 50 percent (Cagan, 1957). The term ‘chronic inflation’
was introduced by Pazos (1972) to denote high and persistent inflation, with-
out providing an exact quantification. This dissertation follows Ageno`r and
Montiel and considers rates in excess of 25 percent p. a. as high inflation.
The term ‘moderate inflation’ is used to denote inflation rates which are high
by industrial countries’ standards, but which remain below 25 percent. The
label ‘chronic inflation’ is applied to countries which have been character-
ized by annual inflation rates in excess of the two-digit level for at least one
decade, as for example Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Turkey. While most
of the empirical research on ERBS has concentrated on the real effects of
stabilizing chronic inflation (see Calvo and Ve´gh, 1999), the focus of this
dissertation is on stabilizing high inflation in general. A crucial feature of the
models presented in chapters 3 and 4, however, is the perceived transitoriness
of stabilization, that is, agents’ belief that the reduction of inflation and de-
valuation rates is only temporary. This lack of credibility is a likely fate of
inflation stabilization efforts in chronic inflation countries, where a prolonged
fight against inflation lead to myriads of unsuccessful stabilization programs,
likely to render any additional stabilization effort ex ante non-credible.
Within the paradigm of rational expectations, two types of explanations
can be advanced why agents expect stabilization to be temporary: Agents’
expectations can be based on fundamental factors: Agents know that a sta-
ble devaluation and inflation rate can only be upheld if it is compatible with
fiscal policy in the sense that the latter does not build up pressure to increase
seignorage revenues.10 When agents observe unsustainable spending policies
during stabilization, they rightfully anticipate that the ERBS is of transitory
nature. Other models view agents’ expectations about a peg’s sustainability
as, to a certain extent, arbitrary. This is compatible with rational expecta-
9The term ‘populist stabilization’ was coined by Ageno´r and Montiel (1996:267).
10This has been shown in the seminal model by Krugman (1979); a further contribution
is due to Flood and Garber (1984). Motivated by the Asian currency crises, recent variants
focus on future government liabilities implied by implicit bailout guarantees, as for example
Krugman (1999), Corsetti et al. (1996), or Burnside et al. (2001).
6tions only if the occurrence of a devaluation crisis is itself to a certain extent
arbitrary, that is, if agents’ expectations – and not fundamental factors –
ultimately cause the currency crisis. Such mechanisms have for example been
proposed by Obstfeld (1986, 1994, 1996), Dellas and Stockman (1989), and
Cole and Kehoe (1996) .11 Whether currency crises are ultimately caused
by fundamentals or self-fulfilling elements is subject of ongoing research.12
This dissertation takes the view that both can be at the root of a currency
crisis – no crisis is identical to the next, and different crises have different ori-
gins. Therefore, chapter 3 incorporates a fundamentals-driven crisis, whereas
chapter 4 proposes a self-fulfilling variant.
The remainder of this chapter serves various purposes: It presents ‘what is
to be explained’, that is, the stylized facts of ERBS. Section 1.3 extracts these
from the relevant literature and from data analysis along the lines proposed
by Burns and Mitchell (1946). As a reference case, section 1.4 presents the
stylized facts of MBS. In a next step, existing explanations of the stylized
facts of ERBS are surveyed in section 1.5. Section 1.6 then indicates the gap
between ‘what is to be explained’ and ‘what is explained’ and motivates the
research presented in the Chapters 2 to 4 of this dissertation.
1.3 The Stylized Facts of ERBS
1.3.1 The Empirical Literature
The conventional view of contractionary inflation stabilization was challenged
in the late seventies, when major inflation stabilization programs in chronic
inflation countries were accompanied by a sharp rise in consumption and a
more moderate expansion of GDP. Subsequent research aimed at assessing
whether the consumption boom is a common pattern of ERBS and what
other stylized facts of stabilizing high inflation exist. Most contributions
in this field give qualitative accounts of how real and monetary variables
evolve during (officially announced) stabilizations of chronic inflation, as for
example Ve´gh (1992), Calvo and Ve´gh (1994a), and Kiguel and Liviatan
11Models of self-fulfilling currency crises have recently come under scrutiny, as Morris and
Shin (1998) show that when introducing imperfect information about fundamentals and
other agents’ beliefs, a currency crisis occurs at a unique level of fundamentals. However,
this result holds only under particular assumptions about each agent’s information set, and
thus does not generally disprove the idea of self-fulfilling currency crises.
12See for example Krugman (1996) for a critical review of models of self-fulfilling currency
crises.
7(1992, 1995).13 Based on 14 ERBS, namely, stabilizations in Argentina (1967,
1978, 1985), Brazil (1964, 1978), Chile (1970, 1973, 1978, 1985), Israel (1985),
Mexico (1987), Peru (1986), and Uruguay (1968, 1978), these case-studies
characterize ERBS by the following features:
1. ERBS is accompanied by an initial increase in consumption and GDP
growth, followed by below-average growth. The cyclical movements
of consumption are especially pronounced and occur regardless of the
program’s sustainability and its medium run effect on inflation.
2. The inflation rate converges only slowly to the level of the devaluation
rate, engendering an appreciation of the real exchange rate: During the
ERBS considered by Calvo and Ve´gh (1994a), for instance, the annual
inflation rate exceeds the devaluation rate by an average 20 percent in
the quarter preceding the program’s termination, that is, three to four
years after its implementation.
3. The current account deteriorates during ERBS, frequently culminating
in current account deficits of more than 4 percent.
These features have been dubbed the ‘stylized facts of ERBS’. Their ro-
bustness can be questioned on several grounds: Derived from qualitative sur-
veys of a small number of individual stabilization episodes in countries with
similar characteristics – mostly Latin American chronic inflation countries – a
sample selection bias cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the informal analysis
does not allow for testing the statistical significance of the observed dynam-
ics. The coincidence of above-mentioned real fluctuations with exchange rate
based inflation stabilization does not necessarily imply causality – the ob-
served cyclical movements might as well be due to other factors. Moreover,
data precision is deficient for many stabilization episodes.
The first of these caveats is addressed by Easterly (1996). He compiles a
larger and more heterogenous sample of inflation stabilizations by applying a
result-based criterion: Stabilization is defined to take place when an inflation
rate which exceeded 40 percent for at least two years falls below 40 percent
and remains there for a minimum of two years. This generates a sample of
28 money- and exchange rate-based inflation stabilizations. Easterly then
constructs cross-country averages for relevant variables over these stabiliza-
tion episodes.14 An informal analysis of these averages indicates that both
13A summary of these publications and the variables considered therein can be found in
appendix 1.7.3.
14He computes cross-country stabilization-time averages over each of the seven years
preceding stabilization, the year of stabilization and each of the following seven years.
8ERBS and MBS are typically followed by positive GDP growth. Likewise,
consumption rises: Average consumption growth reaches its maximum in the
second year after the start of stabilization, but remains positive throughout
the seven-year window. Thus, in contrast to the case studies, Easterly does
not find a stabilization-induced boom-recession cycle, but only the expansion.
Hamann (2001) extends Easterly’s analysis in two directions: First, he
considers a greater array of variables, and, second, he constructs separate
stabilization-time medians over episodes of ERBS and MBS.15 He finds that
the maximum of median GDP growth across his sample of 13 ERBS occurs
two years after stabilization was implemented. Median consumption growth
exceeds its stabilization-year value by almost two percent throughout the
ensuing three years. Investment, in contrast, is not found to rise. The other
results confirm the case-study literature: The current account deteriorates
– the current account deficit-to-GDP-ratio is up to four percentage points
higher than at the onset of stabilization – and the real effective exchange rate
appreciates during stabilization.
In sum, the contributions of Easterly and Hamann confirm the initial
expansion of GDP and consumption during ERBS. However, they do not find
evidence for the late recession identified by the case-study literature. Easterly
(1996:91) concludes:
“It is certainly plausible that there is a boom-recession cycle asso-
ciated with unsustainable exchange rate pegs. But in this paper’s
scheme of chronicling post-stabilization years in which inflation
remains under control, there is no evidence for a late recession or
even a growth slowdown in either exchange-rate based or money-
based stabilizations.”
This claim will be further assessed in the empirical analysis presented in
the next section.
Due to data shortages, the statistical significance of the stylized facts of
ERBS has scarcely been formally tested. An exception is the publication
by Calvo and Ve´gh (1999), who use data on a panel of four chronic inflation
countries16, and capture the effect of stabilization with an ‘early stabilization’
and a ‘late stabilization’ dummy. The ‘early stabilization’ dummy assumes
a value of one during the first three years following the peg’s implementa-
tion, the ‘late stabilization’ dummy equals one in the fourth and fifth year.
In separate regressions of GDP, private consumption, durables’ consumption,
15In contrast to Easterly, who presents arithmetic means over stabilization time, Hamann
calculates only medians and the associated 95 %-confidence intervals.
16Annual data from 1978 to 1993 for Argentina, Chile, Israel and Uruguay is employed.
9investment and public consumption on OECD countries’ GDP, the Libor rate
and the dummies, the ‘early’ dummy is found to be significant and positive in
the regressions explaining GDP, overall consumption, and durables consump-
tion growth. The ‘late’ dummy is significant and negative in regression with
the aforementioned endogenous variables and public consumption. Calvo and
Ve´gh interpret these results as a confirmation of the boom-recession cycle in
ERBS. However, the findings might be biased due to omitted variables –
the authors include few explanatory variables and do not report if the dum-
mies’ coefficients are robust when including additional regressors. Further-
more, pegs in the chronic inflation countries under consideration are typically
short-lived, such that the late recession might capture the effect of the pegs’
collapses.
Calvo and Ve´gh’s finding with regard to durables consumption confirms
De Gregorio’s et al. (1998) informal assessment of durables consumption
during seven ERBS in Latin America and Israel. While it is highly plausible
that durable goods should play an important role for the consumption boom
and current account deterioration during ERBS, publicly available data on
durables is too scarce as to quantify their importance for a broader set of
stabilizations.17
Other empirical studies underline the importance of credit to the private
sector for the post- stabilization boom. Based on a panel of Chilean, Mexican,
Argentinean and Israeli data, Khamis (1996) finds that inflation stabilization
is associated with an increase in real credit to the private sector. Copelman
(1996) presents further evidence that liquidity constraints were relaxed during
the Mexican stabilization of 1988, and, to a smaller extent, also during the
ERBS in Chile (1978) and Israel (1985).18
Some of the above-cited case study surveys additionally consider real in-
terest rate, real wage and employment dynamics during stabilization. How-
ever, these variables do not seem to follow a common stabilization-time cycle:
While real interest rates were reduced during the most crawling pegs of the
seventies,19 Ve´gh’s (1992) and my own data analyses do not find a com-
mon stabilization-time pattern during more recent episodes. Likewise, while
17Burda and Gerlach (1992) emphasize the effect of intertemporal price changes on de-
mand for durables. They find that a large fraction of the US trade deficit during the
eighties was due to imports of durable goods. Similarly, De Gregorio et al. (1998) report a
pronounced increase in sales of – typically imported – cars during ERBS in Uruguay and
Argentina.
18Furthermore, Calvo and Coricelli (1993) point out the credit contraction witnessed
in Eastern European economies during the transition from plan to market economy as a
major determinant of the output contraction.
19See for example Corbo (1985) for the Chilean case.
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most stabilizations during the sixties and seventies, as well as stabilizations
in Brazil (1992) and Mexico (1988), are characterized by real wage increases
(Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992), the currency board in Argentina (1991) was ac-
companied by falling real wages. Evidence on employment is not reported in
the literature.
Recapitulating, the following features of ERBS are widely supported by
the empirical research:
1. Inflation reduction is initially accompanied by a strong increase in con-
sumption and a more moderate rise in GDP.
2. Investment is not affected by inflation stabilization.
3. The inflation rate is slow to converge to the devaluation rate, and the
real exchange rate appreciates.
4. The current account deteriorates.
Other features have been derived from samples which are too small to
trust their robustness: We do not know if the expansion in credit to the
private sector during stabilization is really a general characteristic of ERBS,
and whether it coincides with the rise in consumption. Employment dynamics
during stabilization have hardly been assessed so far. Furthermore, lacking
data precludes an assessment of how much of the consumption boom is due
to durables consumption. Other alleged stylized facts are controversial: Is
ERBS really followed by a boom-recession cycle, or just positive output and
consumption growth? Is the late recession an exclusive characteristic of tran-
sitory stabilizations? Is the consumption boom particularly pronounced for
non-credible stabilizations, as commonly claimed?20 The next section aims
at answering some of these questions by providing additional evidence on the
real and monetary dynamics associated with ERBS.
1.3.2 The Empirical Analysis
The previous section showed that the literature on the stylized facts of ERBS
comprises case study surveys (Ve´gh, 1992; Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992, 1995;
Calvo and Ve´gh, 1994a ), cross-country averaging over stabilizations (East-
erly, 1996; Hamann, 2001) and a regression analysis for chronic inflation coun-
tries (Calvo and Ve´gh, 1999). Caveats apply to all of these approaches: Case
studies focus on a small number of stabilizations of chronic inflation and are
20See for example Velasco as cited in Easterly (1996:104), or Alfaro (1999:216) .
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thus likely to exhibit a sample selection bias. Averaging over stabilization-
time implies a significant loss of information, as large standard errors re-
veal that individual stabilizations diverge strongly from the average profile.
Vin˜als (1996:101), for instance, criticizes Easterly’s analysis of averages on
the grounds that based on an analysis of individual stabilization episodes,
“a short-run worsening of output conditions happened more often than the
means and medians presented in the figures lead us to believe”, namely, in 10
out of the 28 stabilizations considered. Similarly, regression results might be
driven by these ‘outliers’.
The analysis presented in what follows is closely related to the empirical
work by Hamann (2001). Hamann considers 13 ERBS, and presents medians
and confidence intervals for 9 variables21 during stabilization, that is, over
an interval of six years, centered around the inflation rate reduction brought
about with ERBS. To my knowledge, it constitutes the only assessment of
the stylized facts of ERBS which is based on a sample of more than 10 stabi-
lization episodes.22 However, Hamann’s investigation leaves some questions
unanswered: The 95% confidence intervals presented are very wide – for ex-
ample, they indicate a lower and upper bound for real per capita GDP growth
of -3 and +5.8 percent in the year the inflation rate is first reduced; for per
capita consumption growth 2 years after stabilization, the confidence bands
assume values of -5 and over +5 percent. As the medians are not comple-
mented by data on individual stabilization episodes, this leaves some doubt
if common empirical regularities of ERBS exist at all. Moreover, it is not
reported what happens after the three post-stabilization years, which pre-
cludes an assessment of the differences between successful and unsuccessful
stabilizations. As Hamann’s main objective is comparing the real effects of
exchange rate and money-based stabilizations, in particular their effect on
GDP growth, many variables of interest, as for example credit to the private
sector, employment and capital imports, are not considered.
My analysis follows Hamann in presenting stabilization-time medians.
These are complemented with the respective variables’ means, with data on
the individual stabilization episodes under consideration, and correlations of
relevant variables. While these approaches are not novel – and, as pointed
out, not immune to criticism – their combination renders the analysis of the
stylized facts of ERBS more transparent and provides more evidence on their
robustness. As in Easterly (1996) and Hamann (2001), central elements of
21The variables under consideration are inflation, growth of M2, central government
balance, GDP growth, consumption growth, investment growth, current account, the real
effective exchange rate, and gross international reserves.
22Recall that Easterly’s analysis does not systematically distinguish between the effects
of MBS and ERBS.
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my analysis are ‘stabilization-time diagrams’ in the spirit of the business cy-
cle profiles proposed by Burns and Mitchell (1946). I compute cross-country
means and medians over ‘stabilization time’, whereby the ‘year of stabiliza-
tion’ or ‘year 0’ is defined as the year the exchange rate peg was officially
announced (if it was implemented within the first six months of the year),
or the following year if the peg began during the last six months.23 Then,
data on a particular variable during each of the six years preceding the year
of stabilization, the year of stabilization itself, and the following seven years
is averaged across stabilization episodes. This yields the variable’s typical
‘stabilization sequence’.24
The sample under consideration includes all major ERBS during the past
25 years, except those in transition economies.25 The classification of ‘ma-
jor ERBS’ is based on two sources: The IMF’s listing of “Major Emerging
Markets Exchange-Rate and Money-Based Stabilization Programs since the
1970s” in a recent issue of the World Economic Outlook (2001:136, Table
4.4). Of the ERBS listed therein, only the programs in Turkey (1998) and
Argentina (1978) are excluded, since it is debatable if the former really con-
stituted an exchange rate-based stabilization (see Dibooglu and Kibritcioglu,
2001), and IFS data on the latter is associated with large measurement er-
rors. The second point of reference is the publication by Hamann (2001),
which identifies 51 inflation stabilization episodes, among them 13 ERBS,
by applying a data-based criterion.26 Of these, I exclude the stabilizations
prior to 1970, namely, the ERBS in Brazil, 1966, and Uruguay, 1969, and
the Nicaraguan (1990) stabilization due to a lack of reliable data, and the
reduction in the Argentinean inflation rate in 1980, since it is not mentioned
as exchange rate-based stabilization in the literature. Table 1.1 summarizes
the resulting 13 stabilization episodes of my sample.
Extracting stylized facts of ERBS from this sample complements the ex-
23Whenever the ‘mean’ is mentioned in the following, it is the arithmetic mean I refer
to. It is defined as the sum of a list of numbers, divided by the total number of numbers in
the list. The median is the ‘middle value’ of a list, the smallest number such that at least
half the numbers in the list are no greater than it. If the list has an odd number of entries,
as for this analysis of 13 stabilization episodes, the median is the middle entry in the list
after sorting the list into increasing order. If the list has an even number of entries, the
median is equal to the sum of the two middle (after sorting) numbers divided by two.
24Given the small sample size, standard error bands are not reported.
25An analysis of exchange rate regimes during transition raises general issues related to
transition strategies and their real effects which are beyond the scope of this study. The
interested reader is referred to Fischer, Sahay and Ve´gh (1996), Sachs (1996) and Sahay
and Ve´gh (1996) for an overview of transition economies’ experience.
26Stabilization is defined to occur when the inflation rate is lowered by at least 1/4 the
first year and remains below its pre-stabilization level for at least another year.
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Country Starting Date Program Design Did program end
in crisis?
Argentina
Austral
June 1985 Heterodox peg, crawling
peg
Yes (September
1987)
Argentina
Peso
1.4.1991 Currency board with one-
to-one parity to the US dol-
lar
Yes (January
2002)
Brazil
Cruzado
28.2.1986 Heterodox peg Yes (March
1987)
Brazil Real 1.6.1994 One-to-one peg to the US
dollar
Yes (January
1999)
Chile Feb. 1978 Crawling peg, peg Yes (February
1983)
Ecuador July 1992 Peg to the US dollar Yes (1998/99)
Egypt 8.10.1991 3 percent fluctuation band
vis-a´-vis the US dollar
No
Peru 1985/86 Heterodox ERBS with mul-
tiple fixed exchange rates
Yes (1987)
Iceland 1982 Crawling peg Yes (1988)
Israel July 1985 Peg, horizonal band, crawl-
ing band
No (but jump in
the devaluation
rate in 1989)
Mexico December
1987
Peg, crawling peg, widening
band
Yes (December
1994)
Uruguay October 1978 Pre-announced crawling
peg
Yes (December
1982)
Uruguay December
1990
Exchange rate band with
declining rate of devalua-
tion
Yes (July 2002)
Table 1.1: Episodes of ERBS
Notes: A crisis is defined to occur when the exchange rate devalues and central
bank reserves fall. Most crisis dates are taken from the IMF World Economic
Outlook (2001:136).
isting literature in several respects: In contrast to the case study literature,
it includes recent stabilizations, and does not exclusively focus on chronic in-
flation: The sample includes stabilizations of chronic inflation, hyperinflation
and ‘one-time-high’ inflation. Furthermore, while Easterly (1996) focuses
on successful stabilizations, my sample includes highly transitory stabiliza-
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Figure 1.1: Devaluation rates during stabilization
tions.27 All data is from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS)
database; a detailed description of the data is presented in appendix 1.7.3 to
this chapter.
Figure 1.1 presents the stabilization-time profiles of the mean and the
median devaluation rate. The devaluation rate is calculated as the annual
percentage growth of the nominal exchange rate in ‘European terms’, that is,
defined as the units of the stabilizing economy’s currency required to purchase
one US dollar. The horizontal line marks the year in which the exchange rate
peg was officially announced, that is, the ‘year 0’ in stabilization-time. On
the left of year 0, data for the six years prior to the official announcement of
stabilization are reported, on the right for the seven years after stabilization.
Both devaluation rate measures start decreasing before that year – their
maximum values are reached two years before the official start of stabiliza-
tion. The magnitude of the devaluation rate reduction is considerable: Be-
tween stabilization-time years -2 and +1, the mean devaluation rate is reduced
from 524.27 to 37.31 percent; the median devaluation rate from 131.28 to 20
percent; the decrease during the first year of stabilization amounts to 317
and 52 percentage points, respectively. The rise of the median devaluation
rate in the fifth year after the peg’s inception reflects the transitory nature of
many stabilizations – eight out of the 13 episodes under consideration have
been abandoned by that year. Differences between mean and median devalu-
ation rates are chiefly due to the ‘hyperdevaluations’ in the aftermath of the
Argentinean, Brazilian and Peruvian stabilizations of the eighties.
Figure 1.2 presents mean and median inflation rates. Their paths are sim-
27Recall that Easterly considers only episodes where the inflation rate remained below
forty percent for at least two years.
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Figure 1.2: Inflation rates during stabilization
ilar to the mean and median devaluation rate paths. Their pre-stabilization
maxima are reached in the year preceding the official announcement of ERBS.
The magnitude of the inflation decrease falls short of that of the devaluation
rate: During the years -1 through 3, the median inflation rate exceeds the
median devaluation rate (see figure 1.3). Two years after the implementa-
tion of stabilization, the difference between mean devaluation and inflation
rates still amounts to 24 percent. Even stabilizations of hyperinflations in Ar-
gentina (1991), Brazil (1994) and Nicaragua (1990) did not achieve a sudden
stop: Although inflation rates are considerably reduced during the first year
of stabilization, it takes an additional year to bring them down to around 20
percent (see table 1.2). This stands in contrast to historic episodes of stabi-
lizing hyperinflations– Dornbusch and Fischer (1986:8 ), for instance, report
on the German hyperinflation of 1923: “The reform took hold immediately.
Prices stopped rising virtually at once.”
Period Average Inflation Rate
(percent p.a.)
Pre-stabilization
(average of the 2 years preceding stabilization) 1334.09
Year of stabilization (=Year 0) 391.37
Post - stabilization short run
(average of the 2 years following year 0) 27.86
Post - stabilization long run
(average of stabilization-time years 3 and 4) 17.11
Table 1.2: Inflation rates during stabilizations of three hyperinflations
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Figure 1.3: Median devaluation and inflation rates during stabilization
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Figure 1.4: GDP growth during stabilization
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Figure 1.5: GDP growth during the individual stabilizations
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What are the real effects of inflation stabilization? Figure 1.4 confirms the
expansionary nature of ERBS: Mean and median GDP growth increase as the
devaluation rate falls, that is, before the official announcement of ERBS. Fig-
ure 1.5 confirms this pattern for each of the individual stabilization episodes:
With the exception of the 1994 stabilization in Brazil, the increase in GDP
typically coincides with the devaluation rate reduction. The data on the
individual stabilizations reveal that some stabilizations are characterized by
extremely high growth rates. GDP growth in Argentina (1991), Egypt (1992),
and Peru (1986), for example, reaches rates of almost 10 percent in the year of
stabilization. In my opinion, this is, more than anything else, a reminder that
the data quality might be deficient in the sense that reported GDP (and con-
sumption) might exceed actual outcomes in some countries.28 Furthermore,
the expansionary effect of stabilization might be overstated as entrepreneurs
and consumers move from the informal to the formal sector as the inflation
rate falls and the economy stabilizes. However, even when accounting for the
suspicion that particular numerical values might not be entirely accurate, the
data on the individual stabilizations and median GDP growth evinces that
the reduction in the devaluation rate is accompanied by an increase in GDP.
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 show that mean and median GDP follow a pronounced
boom-recession cycle, as suggested by the early literature on the stylized facts
of ERBS. Is the recession a consequence of stabilizations’ breakdown, or is
it a general feature of ERBS? As a first pass at the data, correlations of the
devaluation rate and GDP growth during stabilization-time years 1 to 4 are
computed for each individual stabilization episode. This yields an average
correlation of -0.18. A ‘naive’ interpretation of this is that a 10 percent de-
valuation rate increase reduces GDP by 1.8 percent; naive, because it neglects
that the correlation does not allow to conclude about causality: Policymak-
ers might abandon stabilizations associated with low output, such that the
recession causes the devaluation, and not vice versa. Also, the recession
and devaluation might both stem from a common third cause.29 For further
evidence, I check if the recession occurs also during the six episodes which
are not followed by a devaluation crisis within the seven post-stabilization
years under consideration. Of these, the ERBS in Argentina (1991), Chile
28The Economist (2002, No.8254:32), for instance, questions the accuracy of official
Egyptian data on GDP and the government deficit. A detailed treatment of shortcomings
of developing economies’ data measurement is presented by Heston (1994).
29That low growth causes the devaluation can be explained by models which incorpo-
rate a policy maker’s loss function which contains the inflation or devaluation rate and
output as arguments (see Obstfeld, 1994) . An example for a possible third cause is an
exogenous terms-of-trade shock, which reduces GDP through lower exports, and induces
the policymaker to devalue in order to boost the country’s international competitiveness.
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Figure 1.6: Consumption growth during stabilization
(1978), and Uruguay (1991) are accompanied by negative GDP growth in the
fourth or fifth year after stabilization;30 the Brazilian (1994), Israeli and Mex-
ican stabilizations are characterized by positive, but considerably lower GDP
and consumption growth during these years.This suggests that a (temporary)
slowdown of GDP growth four to five years after the implementation of sta-
bilization is a general characteristic of ERBS, regardless of their duration.
Figure 1.6 presents the mean and median values of consumption growth.
Consumption follows a boom-bust cycle similar to GDP and starts rising in
the year stabilization is implemented. Figure 1.7 graphs the devaluation rate
and consumption growth for each stabilization episode. With the exception
of the Chilean (1978) stabilization, the programs are associated with a pro-
nounced increase in consumption growth between periods -1 and 0 or 0 and 1.
Similarly to what was found for GDP, the data reveal extreme consumption
fluctuations and high growth rates, which suggests some data mismeasure-
ment. Kydland and Zarazaga (1997:25), for instance, point out that Argen-
tinean consumption is computed as a residual, which might account for some
of the extreme values.
Figure 1.8 presents the consumption-to-GDP ratio. As pointed out in the
literature,31 the post-stabilization increase in consumption exceeds GDP growth.
30The Uruguayan stabilization is additionally followed by negative GDP and consump-
tion growth two years after its implementation.
31For example Kiguel and Liviathan (1992), or Ve´gh (1992) .
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Figure 1.7: Consumption growth during the individual stabilizations
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Figure 1.8: The consumption-to-GDP ratio
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Figure 1.9: Investment growth during stabilization
Even though not based on systematic empirical evidence, it has been ar-
gued that ex ante non-credible stabilizations tend to be most expansionary.
As an informal test of this allegation, the rate of consumption growth is cor-
related with the spread, that is, the differential between domestic and US
nominal interest rates. Assuming simple interest rate parity to hold, the
spread should capture agents’ devaluation rate expectations and thus the
peg’s credibility.32 This yields positive correlation coefficients for seven out
of 12 stabilizations, namely, those in Mexico (0.73), Argentina (1991: 0.64),
Israel (0.44), Brazil (1985: 0.34; 1994: 0.13), Uruguay (1991: 0.30), and Chile
(0.14), whereas the average correlation merely amounts to 0.08.33 This sug-
gests that devaluation rate expectations might be particularly relevant for the
consumption boom during stabilizations in chronic inflation countries. How-
ever, the evidence is too fragile as to include it in the list of stylized facts,
particularly as the small sample size and informal derivation of devaluation
rate expectations preclude conclusions beyond conjecturing.
Gross capital formation (figure 1.9, ‘investment’ henceforth) appears to
follow an expansion-recession cycle similar to consumption.34
The investment-to-GDP ratio (figure 1.10), however, starts rising only in
32For a detailed discussion of possibilities to quantify devaluation rate expectations, the
reader is referred to Chapter 3.
33Due to lacking data on nominal interest rates, the stabilization in Egypt is excluded.
34Due to a lack of data, mean and medians exclude the stabilizations in Egypt and
Uruguay (1978).
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Figure 1.10: The investment-to-GDP ratio
the second year after the official announcement of ERBS. Moreover, the secu-
lar fall in the investment-to-GDP-ratio seems to be only temporarily reversed.
This is confirmed when comparing the rates of change in the consumption-to-
GDP and the investment-to-GDP ratios: During the stabilization-time inter-
val from -3 to 4, the former increases in years 0 and 2 to 4 (by 5.26, 1.28, 2.38
and 0.60 percent, respectively), whereas the investment-to-GDP ratio rises
only in periods -2 and 2 (by 3.35 and 4.60 percent, respectively). To assess
the robustness of the investment expansion, investment dynamics during the
individual stabilization episodes are presented in figure 1.11. This exercise
illustrates the pitfalls of averaging over stabilization episodes: ‘Eyeball econo-
metrics’ suggest that only six of 11 episodes exhibit a stabilization-associated
rise in investment,35 whereas the remaining stabilizations are either accompa-
nied by a contraction of investment or investment fluctuations which do not
appear to be systematically linked to the devaluation rate.
Figure 1.12 presents the ratio of the change in inventories to GDP.36 Its
dynamics are similar to those of the investment-to-GDP ratio.
Data on capacity utilization before and during episodes of ERBS is scarce.
35Namely, the Argentinean (1985 and 1991), Chilean, Israeli, Peruvian and Uruguayan
(1991) stabilizations.
36This average is based on stabilizations in Brazil (1994), Chile, Iceland, Israel, Mexico
and Uruguay (1991). Data on inventories is not available for the remaining episodes.
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Figure 1.11: Investment growth during individual stabilizations
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Figure 1.12: The ratio of inventories’ increase or decrease (–) to GDP
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Figure 1.13: Capacity utilization in Brazil
Figure 1.13 presents quarterly average capacity utilization rates in the Bra-
zilian manufacturing industry. The vertical line indicates the beginning of
the most recent exchange rate peg, the Real stabilization which was associ-
ated with increased capacity utilization – its maximum value of 86 percent is
reached three quarters after stabilization-time year zero.
Figure 1.14 presents the unemployment rate during stabilization. Both
mean and median unemployment rise in the year of stabilization and decrease
by considerable amounts in the ensuing year.
While the unemployment dynamics after stabilization are roughly reverse
to those of GDP growth, this is not the case before and in the year of stabiliza-
tion. However, the aggregates should be interpreted with caution, as some pe-
riods are based on few observations – due to lacking data, the averages do not
include the Chilean and the first Uruguayan stabilizations. For another nine
episodes, data was not available for the entire period under consideration.37
Figure 1.15 reports the unemployment rate and the devaluation rate for the
individual stabilizations. Most episodes are characterized by a temporary fall
in unemployment, followed by a persistent increase. This pattern seems to
occur regardless of the program’s duration, that is, it is also present during
programs where the devaluation rate remains at moderate levels throughout
37For the following episodes, data is limited to the years specified: Argentina 1984-99;
Brazil 1984-95; Ecuador 1987-98; Egypt 1989-95; Mexico 1988, 91, 93, 95; Peru 1986-93;
Uruguay 1986-98; Iceland 1985-90; Israel 1985-92.
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Figure 1.14: The unemployment rate, % p.a.
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Figure 1.15: Unemployment during the individual stabilizations
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Figure 1.16: The current account balance-to-GDP ratio
the seven post-stabilization years considered here: Unemployment dynam-
ics during the very short-lived Argentinean stabilization during the eighties,
for example, look very similar to those during the relatively extended cur-
rency board arrangement which was implemented in 1991. Only during three
episodes unemployment decreases by more than one percentage point: During
the recent stabilizations in Argentina (1991), Brazil (1994), and Ecuador, the
unemployment rate fell by an absolute amount of 2.9, 1.2, and 1.2 percentage
points (in periods 1, 0, and 2), respectively. It should be noted, however, that
the unemployment dynamics could very well reflect measures accompanying
ERBS, which often include layoffs in the public sector, and not (solely) the
effect of the devaluation rate stabilization.
Figure 1.16 graphs the current account balance-to-GDP ratio. Starting
out with a balanced (median) current account in the year preceding ERBS, a
deficit of 3.63 percent of GDP is reached two years later. The economies’ cur-
rent account deficits are financed with capital imports: The financial account
balance, which includes direct investment, classified as investment where the
investor “seeks a significant voice in the management of an enterprise” (IMF
1993:80), portfolio investment, other investment (e.g. trade credits), and re-
serve assets, moves inversely to the current account balance (see figure 1.18).38
38The financial account is defined as the capital account less receipts or payments of
capital transfers, and the acquisition or disposal of non-produced financial assets (see IMF
1993:77f).
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Figure 1.17: The current-account-to-GDP ratio for individual stabilizations
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Figure 1.18: The financial account-to-GDP ratio
The maximum (median) financial account balance of 3.61 percent of GDP is
reached two years after the official announcement of stabilization.
Figures 1.17 and 1.19 confirm that the current account deterioration and
capital inflows are characteristic of each of the individual stabilization episodes
under consideration.
To assess the importance of rather short-term and highly liquid capital
flows, figure 1.20 presents the ratio of net portfolio investment assets to GDP.
Portfolio investment includes investment in equity and debt securities other
than direct investment (IMF 1993:81). The graph shows that stabilization
is associated with a pronounced increase in short-term capital inflows to the
economy. Note, however, that the aggregates do not include the stabilizations
in Chile, Ecuador, Iceland, Uruguay and Peru. Furthermore, only Israeli
and Mexican data was available for the entire period under consideration.39
As a robustness check, the portfolio investment net foreign assets-to-GDP
ratio during these two stabilizations is presented in figure 1.21. The reversal
of capital inflows to Mexico between stabilization-time years 6 (that is, the
year 1993) and 7 (1994) captures the Mexican currency crisis in December
1994. Similarly, the pronounced reversal of capital inflows four years after
the start of the Israeli peg occurred when the devaluation rate rose from 0.2
to 19 percent between 1988 and 1989. However, the peg was not officially
39For the stabilizations in Argentina and Egypt, the data is limited to the years 1990 to
2000 and 1998 to 1999, respectively.
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Figure 1.19: The financial account-to-GDP ratio for individual stabilizations
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Figure 1.20: The ratio of net portfolio investment assets to GDP
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Figure 1.21: The ratio of net portfolio investment assets to GDP in Mexico
and Israel
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Figure 1.22: The real depreciation (+)/ appreciation (-) rate during stabili-
zation (in % p.a.)
abandoned and the devaluation rate was reduced to 5 percent in 1990. In
sum, the data on portfolio investment reveals that stabilization is associated
with a pronounced increase in capital imports, which is reversed only three
to six years after the implementation of stabilization, coinciding with the rise
in mean and median devaluation rates.
Figure 1.22 presents the percentage change in the real exchange rate. The
real exchange rate is calculated as the ratio of US to domestic consumer
prices, both expressed in domestic currency.40 Given this definition, a real
appreciation is equivalent to a negative growth rate. Figure 1.22 gives account
of a pronounced real exchange rate appreciation which starts at the same time
as the devaluation rate reduction. It is not halted until four to six years after
stabilization, when the majority of pegs have been abandoned.
Next, stabilization-time profiles of real credit and real money growth are
presented. The International Financial Statistics report overall credit, credit
to the private sector and banks’ credit to the private sector. As these three
measures turned out to follow very similar dynamics, only credit to the private
sector is reported here.
Figure 1.23 gives evidence of a credit contraction in the year of stabiliza-
tion, followed by positive growth rates in the ensuing four years. This suggests
40The real exchange rate is based on consumer prices since these are readily available.
For comparisons of international competitiveness, a wage-based real exchange rate measure
would be preferable.
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Figure 1.23: Real credit growth during stabilization (in % p.a.)
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Figure 1.24: The credit-to-GDP ratio
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Figure 1.25: The credit-to-GDP ratio during the individual stabilizations
34
that credit follows consumption and GDP with a lag. This is confirmed by the
correlations of consumption and credit growth: The correlation coefficient of
1-year lagged consumption and credit is 0.38, whereas the contemporaneous
correlation of median consumption and credit growth amounts to 0.0005, and
the correlation coefficient of consumption and 1-year lagged credit to -0.26.
This suggests that the observed rise in consumption and GDP growth cannot
be entirely attributed to a relaxation of credit constraints. However, five of the
13 stabilization episodes under consideration – namely, the ERBS in Ecuador,
Chile, Iceland, Israel and Mexico – are characterized by positive contempo-
raneous correlations of credit to the private sector and consumption, with
correlation coefficients of 0.14, 0.19, 0.46, 0.35 and 0.64, respectively. The
relatively high correlations found for Iceland, Israel and Mexico suggest that
the linkage between credit and consumption increases in financial markets’
sophistication and size.
The contemporaneous correlation of median real credit growth and the
median devaluation rate is negative with a correlation coefficient of -0.43;
for the individual stabilizations, the correlation is positive only during the
episodes in Argentina (1985, 1991) and Iceland.41 Figure 1.25 reports the
credit-to-GDP ratio and the devaluation rate for each stabilization. While
some episodes, as for example the ERBS in Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, are
clearly associated with an increase in credit relative to GDP, this does not
appear to be a general regularity.
The path of median real reserve money growth is similar to that of the
devaluation rate (see figures 1.26 and 1.27). Both variables start contract-
ing two years before the official announcement of stabilization. The jump in
reserve money growth in year 3 reflects that many programs have been aban-
doned by that date. Figure 1.28 gives evidence of the decline in the reserve
money-to-GDP ratio during the early stages of stabilization.
Lastly, the government budget is analyzed: Figure 1.29 presents the gov-
ernment surplus (or deficit)-to-GDP ratio, where deficits carry a negative
sign. ERBS is accompanied by fiscal consolidation; the ‘median government
budget’ is balanced in stabilization-time year 1. However, the data needs to
be interpreted with caution, as many countries underreport the total deficit,
for example by not including deficits of the provinces.
Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP increases in the year of
stabilization, and decreases thereafter. However, figure 1.30 does not provide
conclusive evidence if a venue of sustained consolidation is followed or not:
41With correlation coefficients of 0.50, 0.44 and 0.25, respectively. The remaining cor-
relation coefficients amount to -0.17 (Brazil 1986), -0.32 (Brazil 1994), -0.20 (Chile), -0.83
(Ecuador),-0.62 (Egypt), -0.16 (Israel), -0.75 (Mexico), -0.28 (Peru), -0.62 (Uruguay 1978),
and -0.53 (Uruguay 1991).
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Figure 1.26: Real money growth during stabilization
The development of the mean suggests that the former could be true; the
median contradicts this impression.
Government revenue (which excludes grants) to GDP rises in the year of
stabilization and decreases thereafter, see figure 1.31. The increase in rev-
enues could thus very well be due to the (temporary) stabilization-induced
increase in the tax base, namely, consumption and GDP, and not due to struc-
tural consolidation. The slight improvement of the government’s finances, as
reflected in the decreasing deficit-to-GDP ratio seems to be brought about by
a slight reduction of government spending, rather than increasing government
revenues. Note that both the government deficit and government spending
rise notably three years after the implementation of stabilization, reflecting
that many programs are abandoned at that date.
This section empirically assessed the real effects of ERBS in high inflation
economies. The analysis confirms important stylized facts of ERBS pointed
out by the literature, namely, the initial increases in consumption and GDP,
the real appreciation and the current account deterioration. Moreover, con-
sumption and output are found to follow a boom-slowdown cycle, where ‘slow-
down’ means reduced or zero growth if the ERBS is still in effect, and negative
growth for failed ERBS. In contrast to the case-studies literature, my anal-
ysis reveals that stabilization is accompanied by a moderate expansion of
investment. However, the heterogeneity of investment behavior across stabi-
lizations precludes defining an additional stylized fact. This applies in similar
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Figure 1.27: Real money growth and the devaluation rate
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Figure 1.28: The money-to-GDP ratio
37
Stabilization time
Mean Median
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
-8.3
0
%
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Figure 1.30: The government expenditure-to-GDP ratio (in %)
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Figure 1.31: The government revenue-to-GDP ratio
manner to the stabilization-time pattern of inventories. Unemployment – a
variable neglected by most previous empirical studies – falls during the first
year of stabilization, but then increases to exceed its pre-stabilization level.
An expansion of credit to the private sector appears to constitute an addi-
tional stylized fact. However, in contrast to what is commonly claimed,42 the
rise in credit occurs after the increases in output and consumption. Capital
inflows, in particular portfolio investments, rise in the year the stabilization
is officially announced, followed by a sharp reversal three to six years later. If
a fiscal consolidation is achieved, this seems to be due to increasing revenues,
rather than reduced spending. An additional empirical regularity is the pro-
grams’ collapse: Almost half the episodes analyzed in the first chapter of this
dissertation ended in a currency crisis within five years, 70 percent within ten
years after their implementation.
Although these results are certainly suggestive, the limits of this – and
most other – empirical analyses of high inflation economies should be recogni-
zed: Despite considering a greater number of stabilizations than is typically
the case in the literature, the sample is still (statistically) small, and a sam-
ple selection bias cannot be ruled out completely. Moreover, the data is
likely to vary greatly in quality, with data for the lower income economies,
and the ‘early’ stabilizations of the eighties being particularly questionable.
42For example by models which explain the consumption boom with a simultaneous rise
in credit. These will be reviewed in section 1.5.
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Stabilization-time dynamics have been presented in an informal manner with-
out controlling for shocks other than stabilization, or de-trending the data.
This research strategy was chosen since I consider an application of sophisti-
cated econometric techniques to be precluded by the scarcity of reliable data
on high inflation economies. It might even be counterproductive, as its results
would suggest a numerical exactness which cannot be sensibly assumed given
the quality of the data.
1.4 Exchange Rate versus Money-Based Sta-
bilization - Are the Real Effects Differ-
ent?
Section 1.3.2 gave account of the widespread recurrence to ERBS as a tool for
stabilizing high inflation. A policy alternative is money-based stabilization,
that is, direct targeting of the nominal money supply. In theory, ERBS and
MBS can be shown to be quite similar. In fact, if inflation stabilization does
not affect money demand, credible ERBS and MBS are identical (Fischer,
1986). If, however, lower inflation is associated with an increase in money de-
mand, a strict money target generates a more severe liquidity crunch than an
exchange rate peg: During ERBS, the central bank can – and must, in order
to avoid an appreciation of the domestic currency – increase money supply
as long as this is matched with demand for home currency in the foreign ex-
change market. During MBS, in contrast, the central bank cannot respond to
the post-stabilization increase in money demand by increasing money supply,
as this would put into jeopardy the money target (Sachs 1995:182). Given this
constraint, one would expect MBS to be less expansionary than ERBS. This
is empirically confirmed by Kiguel and Liviatan (1992), and Calvo and Ve´gh
(1994a) , who, based on samples of six and five MBS, respectively, find that
these are typically accompanied by an initial recession. Other stabilization-
time dynamics are reported as similar to those during ERBS: The inflation
rate is slow to decrease, and the real exchange rate appreciates by similar
amounts. Despite the small sample size, these findings have been generalized
to the wisdom that choosing between MBS and ERBS is equivalent to choos-
ing between ‘recession now versus recession later’ (Calvo and Ve´gh, 1994a:35)
– a claim which has been contradicted by studies based on larger samples of
stabilizations: Easterly (1996) and Hamann (2001) report stabilization of
high inflation to be expansionary regardless of which nominal anchor is used;
in fact, Easterly (1996:91) finds no statistical difference between year-by-year
mean growth during ERBS and non-ERBS.
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In view of this controversy, the main objective of this section is an assess-
ment of output movements during MBS, with the aim of providing further
evidence if these are indeed accompanied by an output expansion. A com-
prehensive comparison of money versus exchange rate targeting as a tool of
inflation stabilization is beyond the scope of this section; the reader is referred
to a contribution by Uribe (1999), who compares the programs’ welfare and
credibility effects, and to Tornell and Velasco (1995, 1998) for their effects on
fiscal discipline. Long-run considerations related to the choice of a money or
exchange rate anchor, in particular developing countries’ optimal exchange
rate arrangements, have been recently discussed by Mussa et al. (2000) and
Larrain and Velasco (2001).
The sample under consideration here consists of nine episodes of MBS,
namely, those in Bolivia (1985), Costa Rica (1982), Dominican Republic
(1990), Ghana (1982), Kenya (1991), Nigeria (1987), Peru (1991), Uganda
(1981), and Uruguay (1990). These episodes are those MBS considered by
Easterly (1996) which are actually associated with a reduction in real money
growth and for which data is publicly available.43
Given the focus on the short-run real effects of MBS, only four post-
stabilization years of data are considered. The data is compacted by averag-
ing over the two years preceding the stabilization (‘pre-stabilization period’
hereafter), the first two post- stabilization years (hereafter ‘post-stabilization
short run’), and the third and forth year after stabilization (hereafter ‘post-
stabilization long run’). ‘Stabilization’ is defined to occur in the year where
base money growth is first reduced (denoted as ‘year of stabilization’). It
should be reiterated that much of the data, particularly on the African
episodes, is contaminated by measurement errors. Furthermore, a sample
selection bias cannot be ruled out: As pointed out in section 1.3.1, Easterly’s
sample – which is the basis of mine – considers only stabilizations where
the inflation rate is actually reduced and remains at the lower level for at
least two years. In generally, MBS which do not succeed in reducing the
inflation rate tend to go by unnoticed. Therefore, the stylized facts of MBS
are rather the stylized facts of effective MBS. Furthermore, MBS have been
implemented more frequently in African than in Latin American economies,
which have been prone to implement ERBS. My sample of MBS includes four
African and four Latin American and Caribbean countries, in contrast to the
sample of ERBS, which contains no African and 10 Latin American coun-
tries. Thus, alleged differences between MBS and ERBS might also reflect
43Four of Easterly’s MBS, namely, the stabilizations in Ghana (1983), Guinea-Bissau
(1992), Iceland (1974) and Jamaica (1991), did not involve a significant stabilization of
money growth (or inflation rates).
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differences between stabilization outcomes in Africa and in Latin America.44
This (potential) bias is also present in Hamann’s analysis, whose sample of
13 ERBS consists of 11 stabilizations in Latin America and none in Africa,
whereas the MBS include 17 African stabilizations.
An additional bias might arise from the fact that the choice of money or
the exchange rate as a nominal anchor is not exogenous: The implementation
of an exchange rate peg requires the central bank to hold a certain amount
of foreign currency reserves, which suggests that a central bank which im-
plements an ERBS might be more powerful than one which implements a
MBS. On the other hand, the highly visible nominal exchange rate anchor is
often used in chronic countries in order to break with inflation inertia, that
is, in countries where the central bank’s credibility is typically low. This is
also reflected in the fact that Latin American policymakers have favored the
exchange rate over money growth as a nominal anchor, which contrasts with
stabilizations in Africa, where chronic inflation is absent and MBS predomi-
nate. My data indicates that the choice of MBS versus ERBS does not hinge
on the economic situation prior to stabilization: GDP contracts on average
by -0.8 and -1.4 percent prior to the decline in the devaluation rate achieved
through ERBS and MBS, respectively. However, as pointed out in the pre-
vious section, inflation and devaluation rates typically start to decrease (and
GDP to rise) before the official start of the exchange rate peg. Since this is
not the case in MBS, analyzing GDP movements solely around the official
starting dates might erroneously suggest that ERBS are implemented under
more favorable economic conditions than MBS.
In view of these caveats, the dynamics during ERBS and MBS are not
compared directly – this would suggest a numeric precision which cannot be
sensibly assumed given the sample and data under consideration. Instead,
tendencies during MBS will be pointed out and compared to those during
ERBS.
The first row of table 1.3 reports the percentage change in the reserve
money-to-GDP ratio before and during stabilization. The data shows that
MBS achieve a drastic decline in money growth, which is associated with a
considerable inflation rate reduction. In contrast to what was found for ERBS,
stabilization is associated with a decline in credit to the private sector, which
confirms the hypothesis of a more pronounced liquidity crunch during MBS.
Is money-based stabilization contractionary? On the basis of the above
GDP data, the answer is negative: Average GDP growth during MBS exceeds
its pre-stabilization level. The expansion occurs slightly later than during
44Comparing ERBS and MBS in Africa and Latin America separately is not feasible
here, as this would drastically reduce the sample size.
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Period Pre-
stabili-
zation
Year of
stabili-
zation
Post-
stabilization
short run
Post-
stabilization
long run
Reserve money-to-GDP ratio
(% change p.a.)
21.51 -30.07 -3.12 2.57
Credit to priv. sector-to-GDP
ratio (% change p.a.)
66.63 -14.48 1.72 7.55
Inflation rate 809.98 1412.96 49.73 30.31
Devaluation rate 615.67 1716.90 73.14 34.57
GDP growth -1.4 0.9 4.01 3.57
Consumption growth -1.77 -5.6 0.78 7.92
Consumption growth exclud-
ing Nigeria and Kenya
-5.52 -5.70 5.75 3.38
Investment growth -1.93 -12.93 6.22 0.59
Government deficit-to-GDP
ratio
-15.43 -7.16 -6.60 -4.52
Notes: ‘Pre-stabilization’ denotes the average of the 2 years preceding stabiliza-
tion, ‘post-stabilization short run’ the average of the 2 years after stabilization,
and ‘post-stabilization long run’ the average of the third and fourth year after
stabilization.
Ad reserve money and credit: Due to missing data, the average does not include
observations for Uganda in the pre-stabilization period.
Ad consumption growth: Due to missing data, the average does not include
observations for Bolivia in the pre-stabilization period, Uganda and Peru.
Ad investment growth: Due to missing data, the average does not include
observations for Bolivia in the pre-stabilization period, Ghana, Uganda and Peru.
Ad government deficit-to-GDP ratio: Due to missing data, the average does not
include observations for Uganda in the pre-stabilization period and Bolivia.
Table 1.3: Dynamics during MBS
ERBS: During most programs, the maximum growth rate of GDP is reached
two years after money growth first declined. An analysis of the individual
stabilization episodes reveals that GDP growth contracts only during the
stabilizations in Bolivia and Costa Rica. However, MBS fares badly both in
terms of short-run consumption and investment behavior: On average, both
variables exhibit a strong decrease in the year of stabilization. The reduction
in consumption growth occurs in five of the nine episodes considered, namely,
in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria. The post-stabilization
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periods, however, are characterized by positive consumption and investment
growth.
The finding that GDP expands whereas consumption and investment con-
tract in the year of stabilization is puzzling: By definition, GDP equals the
sum of spending, that is, consumption, investment, net government expendi-
ture and the primary current account balance.45 As consumption and invest-
ment account for approximately 90 percent of GDP, negative growth rates
of the magnitudes reported above are not compatible with positive GDP
growth.46 Part of the discrepancy might stem from the fact that data on
the consumption and investment is not available for all stabilizations. A fur-
ther explanation is deficient data quality. Plausibly assuming that overall
GDP is measured most accurately, consumption and investment data might
understate actual outcomes.
The above table does not report on current account dynamics, since most
of the African countries lack reliable data. Calvo and Ve´gh (1999:1554) report
that there is “no clear-cut response of the trade balance and the current
account. If anything, there seems to be a short-run improvement of the
external balances.” This is compatible with my finding that the increase
in supply exceeds demand. Similarly, Hamann (2001) finds that the median
current account of a sample of 34 episodes of MBS does not deteriorate during
stabilization.
In sum, the empirical evidence indicates that MBS is not always con-
tractionary: In terms of GDP growth, MBS is associated with a recovery,
starting in the year of stabilization. Consumption and investment contract
only during the year of stabilization and are followed by positive growth rates
thereafter. On the basis of these results, the claim that choosing between
ERBS and MBS amounts to choosing between ‘boom now, recession later’
and ‘recession now and boom later’ cannot be entirely supported. Nor can
Easterly’s finding that the initial expansions during ERBS and MBS are of
equal magnitudes be confirmed. In light of these results, the appropriate wis-
45The balance of the primary current account equals the current account balance minus
the net factor income accruing to foreigners.
46The consumption, investment and output growth rates in the year of stabilization
reported in table 1.3 imply that the sum of net government spending and net foreign
demand, weighted with their respective shares in GDP, grows at a rate exceeding six
percent, which is not compatible with the data reported in row 10. This reasoning is based
on the accounting identity Y = C+I+G+PCA, where Y, C, I, G, and PCA denote GDP,
consumption, investment, net government expenditure and the primary current account
balance, respectively. In growth rates, the identity can be written as ∆YY =
C
Y
∆C
C +
I
Y
∆I
I +
G
Y
∆G
G +
PCA
Y
∆PCA
PCA , where ∆ denotes the difference operator. Solving this for
G
Y
∆G
G +
PCA
Y
∆PCA
PCA , assuming
C
Y = 0.7 and
I
Y = 0.15 and inserting the stabilization-period
values of ∆YY ,
∆C
C and
∆I
I yields
G
Y
∆G
G +
PCA
Y
∆PCA
PCA = 6.76.
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dom seems to be that choosing between MBS and ERBS is choosing between
‘boom now, recession later’ and ‘slow recovery of GDP now, (consumption)
boom later’. It should be pointed out, however, that it might not be wise at
all to cast the diverse stabilization experiences in such few words.
1.5 Explaining the Stylized Facts of ERBS -
An Overview of the Theoretical Litera-
ture
The sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 presented the empirical regularities associated
with ERBS. This section is dedicated at reviewing the theories advanced to
explain the regularities. The initial consumption boom and output expansion
are probably the most salient of these, and their explanation is an important
feature of any model on the real effects of ERBS. A reduced-form model by
Rodriguez (1982) explains the initial expansion with inflation inertia in an en-
vironment of perfect capital mobility: Perfect international capital mobility
implies that investors’ real returns are equalized across economies. There-
fore, the domestic real interest rate can be expressed as the foreign nominal
interest rate less the difference between expected domestic inflation and deval-
uation rates.47 Rodriguez then assumes that devaluation expectations adjust
instantly to the stabilized devaluation rate’s level, whereas inflation expecta-
tions are adaptive. A perfectly credible ERBS thus generates a decrease in
real interest rates, which, given the assumed reduced-form aggregate demand
functions, raises demand. The contraction witnessed in the final stages of
stabilization is modeled to stem from the cumulative real exchange rate ap-
preciation which results when the inflation rate exceeds the devaluation rate.
Rodriguez’ model offers a simple explanation for the stabilization-induced
demand cycle. However, empirical evidence shows that stabilization is fre-
quently associated with real interest rate increases (see Ve´gh 1992). Further-
more, Calvo and Ve´gh (1994c) argue that Rodriguez’ results cannot be repro-
duced with realistic parameter values in a framework based on an utility- and
profit-maximizing representative agent. While the model can be criticized
on the grounds of its simplicity, it captures an important feature of ERBS:
sluggish adjustment of the inflation to the devaluation rate. This is neglected
by many other models on the real effects of ERBS which assume purchasing
power parity (PPP) for all goods, that is, instant equality between inflation
47Deriving the real interest rate from a simple international interest parity equation
yields r = i∗ − (pie − εe) , where r denotes the real interest rate, i∗ the nominal world
interest rate, εe the expected devaluation rate, and pie the expected inflation rate.
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and devaluation rates.48 Whenever this is assumed, the terms ‘inflation sta-
bilization’ and ‘devaluation rate stabilization’ will be used interchangeably in
what follows.
Another ‘early’ explanation, labeled the ‘temporariness hypothesis’, under-
scores the deficient credibility of ERBS, that is, the fact that private agents
might (correctly) expect the stabilization to be transitory. The focus on
credibility is natural, since it is a prominent explanation for the output cost
associated with stabilizing moderate inflation (Kydland and Prescott, 1977;
Barro and Gordon, 1983) and historic hyperinflations (Sargent, 1982a). Most
frameworks designed to explain the real effects of ERBS model non-credible
stabilization as transitory stabilization, that is, as a temporary devaluation
rate reduction whose starting date and duration is fully anticipated by the
public (Calvo,1986; Calvo and Ve´gh, 1993, 1994b). Given a cash-in-advance
constraint on consumption, temporarily lower inflation translates into a tem-
porary decrease in the cost of consumption. Utility-maximizing agents re-
spond by intertemporally substituting consumption into the low inflation pe-
riod, which produces the post-stabilization consumption boom. Talvi (1997)
extends this framework to explore the effect of temporary stabilization on
the government budget. He shows that the consumption boom due to tran-
sitory stabilization can produce an initial increase in fiscal revenues, which –
erroneously – makes stabilization appear ‘sustainable’.
Another variant of the temporariness hypothesis relies on intergenerational
wealth changes: Helpman and Razin (1987) analyze the wealth effect of tran-
sitory inflation stabilization in an overlapping generations model for which
Ricardian equivalence does not hold (see Blanchard, 1985 ). A temporary
fall in the inflation rate implies a temporary decrease in government seigno-
rage revenues. Under the assumption that inflation stabilization is not ac-
companied by reduced government spending, the present generation’s wealth
increases at the expense of future generations. This wealth increase generates
the observed consumption boom.
Recent contributions to the temporariness hypothesis – for example Calvo
and Drazen (1998) and Mendoza and Uribe (1999a,b) – incorporate uncer-
tainty about the end of stabilization. The latter embed Calvo’s idea into a
general equilibrium model where the peg ends with a publicly known, ex-
ogenous, time-variant probability. Expectations-driven nominal interest rate
fluctuations then produce the observed real movements.
An empirical verification of the temporariness hypothesis gives a mixed
account: Reinhart and Ve´gh (1995a) find that it can explain the consumption
boom during 4 out of the 7 episodes of ERBS considered.
48This follows from PPP when prices abroad are assumed to be constant.
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The ‘temporariness hypothesis’ posits that a transitory fall in the infla-
tion rate effects a transitory expansion. A third explanation applies this
mechanism to permanent stabilization. In a cash-in-advance framework, per-
manently lower inflation rates imply permanently lower seignorage revenues
for the government. In the previously reviewed models, the magnitude of
seignorage revenues did not affect private agents’ wealth, as seignorage was
assumed to be fully redistributed to the private sector via lump-sum trans-
fers. Alternatively, inflation can be modeled to reduce economy-wide wealth,
which implies that inflation stabilization effects an increase in private agents’
wealth and thus their consumption. These permanent wealth effects of infla-
tion stabilization are explored by Calvo and Ve´gh (1994b): In an economy
where home or foreign cash must be used for transacting, lower domestic
inflation reduces currency substitution and thus seignorage payments to the
foreign central bank. This increase in domestic agents’ wealth is assumed
to contribute to the observed expansion. In order to explain the magnitude
of the observed consumption boom, De Gregorio et al. (1998) additionally
introduce discrete purchases of durable goods: They model the stabilization-
induced wealth increase as resulting from reduced shopping time. The jump
in wealth effects a bunching of durables purchases. Since durables are long-
lived, the boom is followed by low spending on durables. Hence, the boom-
recession cycle is part of a welfare maximizing equilibrium.
Another strand of the literature emphasizes the supply-side effects of infla-
tion stabilization. Technically, these models are similar to those emphasizing
the effect of permanent wealth changes on consumption. Instead of con-
sumers, firms are now required to hold money for transacting, and instead
of a consumption-driven output expansion, the consumption boom now re-
sults from increased production. Money is introduced via a cash-in-advance
constraint on wage payments and investment (Roldos, 1995), or on inter-
mediate goods purchases. The latter is assumed by Uribe (1997a) within a
model of currency substitution: Firms buy intermediate goods subject to a
domestic cash-in-advance constraint, but use foreign currency as a store of
value. Changing foreign into domestic currency is associated with a fixed
cost per transaction. Lower inflation reduces the optimal number of change
transactions; these cost savings lead to increased production.
Other supply side-oriented theories focus on inflation’s impact on credit
market conditions.49 Edwards and Ve´gh (1997) and De Gregorio and Sturzen-
egger (1997) suggest possible links between inflation and credit supply. The
49Extending the analysis in this direction is natural, since parts of the literature on
monetary transmission suggest that monetary policy and real variables are linked through
liquidity and credit availability, see for example Bernanke and Blinder (1988).
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former present a representative agent, general equilibrium model in which
inflation stabilization reduces the cost of extending credit due to nominal
reserve requirements on deposits. Credit demand arises from firms’ credit-in-
advance constraint on the wage bill; a reduction in credit costs lowers input
costs and raises output. De Gregorio and Sturzenegger (1997) propose a
partial equilibrium model of asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders: Two types of firms with differing productivities must finance their
wage bill with bank credit. Banks cannot observe the firms’ productivities,
and rely on their labor demands as signals. The productivity differential –
and thus the difference between the two firms’ labor demands – is assumed
to decrease in inflation. High inflation is therefore associated with an ineffi-
cient pooling equilibrium on the credit market and low total output, whereas
inflation stabilization allows lenders to distinguish between high and low pro-
ductivity firms and thus increases efficiency and total output.
The theories reviewed so far regard the inflation reduction during ERBS
as causal for the observed real movements. Drazen and Helpman (1988), in
contrast, emphasize the fiscal policy reforms accompanying ERBS as a deter-
minant of the real expansion: Expectations of a future reduction in (unpro-
ductive) government spending increases private sector demand.50 However,
simulations by Rebelo and Ve´gh find that a fiscal contraction in isolation
cannot reproduce the main effects of ERBS.51
Finally, all but the last of the above theories have been criticized by Kyd-
land and Zarazaga (1997) on the grounds that money and nominal varia-
bles might not matter at all. Kydland and Zarazaga argue that business
cycle features of chronic inflation economies are similar to those of industri-
alized countries, and therefore explainable by standard RBC models. While
Kydland and Zarazaga rightfully point out that simultaneity does not imply
causality, their negation of the stylized facts of ERBS can be questioned on
several grounds: Their assertion is based exclusively on an informal analysis
of Argentinean data and not verified by calibrating a standard RBC model.
Furthermore, Easterly (1996) finds the output recovery after ‘growth crises’ –
defined as three consecutive years of negative per capita GDP growth – to be
significantly stronger when coupled with inflation stabilization. The regres-
sion analysis by Calvo and Ve´gh (1999) shows that the short-run expansion of
output and consumption during ERBS remains significant when controlling
for industrial countries’ interest rates and GDP. Coupled with the literature
50This is similar to Giavazzi and Pagano’s (1990) model of expansionary government
spending contractions.
51Two variants of fiscal contraction are modeled: a permanent three percent decline in
government expenditure on non-tradable goods and a permanent six percent decline in
government expenditure on tradable goods.
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surveyed in section 1.3.1 and my data analysis (section 1.3.2), this indicates
that the stylized facts of stabilizing high inflation do indeed exist.52
So far, this account has focused on explanations for the initial consumption
and output expansion. How do the theories explain the other major stylized
facts, namely, the real exchange rate appreciation and the current account
deterioration? The former is not reproduced by the early models, which
assume PPP to hold for all goods. More recent models – for example Calvo
and Ve´gh (1993), Roldo´s (1995), Uribe (1997a), and Mendoza and Uribe
(1999a,b) – regard the real appreciation as resulting from excess demand for
non-tradable goods: The stabilization-induced demand increase is combined
with temporarily inelastic supply of non-tradable goods due to sector-specific
technologies and fixed factor endowments (Rebelo and Ve´gh, 1995; Roldo´s,
1995), or adjustment costs and gestation lags in capital formation in the non-
tradables’ sector (Uribe, 1997a). Excess demand for non-tradables generates
the real appreciation via increasing relative non-tradables’ prices. Increased
demand for tradable goods, in contrast, is partially satisfied with imported
goods and thus engenders the current account deterioration.
So far, this survey has focussed on models of ERBS. The empirical evi-
dence reported in section 1.4 indicated that MBS is also associated with a
recovery of GDP. This raises the question of whether the models surveyed
in this section – and those presented in chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation
– can be equally applied to explain the output expansion during MBS. The
answer is positive for models which rely on wealth or supply side effects of
permanently lower inflation rates. Analyzing MBS in these frameworks just
requires assuming an exogenous path for nominal money growth, which, cou-
pled with money demand, then determines the devaluation rate.53 Theories
based on the intertemporal price changes associated with transitory stabili-
zation, in contrast, can only be applied to heterodox MBS which produce an
immediate fall in inflation through direct price controls. The dynamics of
non-credible, orthodox money and exchange rate-based stabilizations should
be fundamentally different: If agents doubt the success of money-based stabi-
lization, devaluation and inflation rates will remain at a high level. In ERBS,
in contrast, the devaluation rate reduction is implemented exogenously and
implies an instantaneous fall in import prices.
52More sophisticated methods for identifying the shocks which determine GDP and con-
sumption fluctuations – as for example SVAR estimations along the lines proposed by
Blanchard and Quah (1989) – cannot be sensibly applied to high inflation countries: Fre-
quently, time series data for these countries covers only relatively recent years and can
rightfully be suspected to be characterized by structural breaks.
53An analytical derivation of how these two variables are connected is presented in section
3.2.3.
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This section reviewed a wealth of possible explanations for the real effects
of ERBS. One would like to conclude this survey of the literature by final
judgements about the validity of the competing theories: Is the consumption
boom during ERBS a reflection of the wealth effects of permanently lower
inflation, or is it private agents’ shopping frenzy as they anticipate the return
of high inflation? Answering this question is crucial for determining if the
expansion is a sign of the stabilization’s virtue – or of its failure. Recapitu-
lating, two types of explanations can be distinguished: First, theories which
model the stylized facts as characteristic of stabilizations perceived to be tran-
sitory. These rely on intertemporal price changes, and view the expansion as
(mainly) consumption-driven. Second, theories which posit stabilization to
be credible and permanent, and emphasize its positive supply-side or wealth
effects. Based on this distinction, some of the above- reviewed theories can
be positioned in the following classification scheme:
Supply Consumption
Permanent
stabiliza-
tion
Roldo`s (1995), Uribe
(1997a), De Gregorio
and Sturzenegger (1997),
Edwards and Ve´gh (1997)
De Gregorio et al. (1998)
Transitory
stabiliza-
tion
Calvo (1986), Helpman and
Razin (1987), Calvo and
Ve´gh (1993, 1994b), Talvi
(1997)
Mendoza and Uribe (1999a,b)
Dissimilar modeling frameworks and degrees of abstraction preclude a
direct comparison of how different theories fare at explaining the stylized facts
of ERBS.54 Therefore, the subsequent discussion of the respective models’
merits must be conducted on an informal level. It should be pointed out that
the discussion in what follows, and the above classification scheme, neglects
Sargent’s (1982b ) critique that modern macroeconomics is ‘‘beyond demand
and supply curves” – my impression of the literature on the stylized facts of
ERBS is that many models still work within these categories.
What would one expect as the distinguishing features of a demand- versus
a supply-driven expansion during ERBS? Based on economic intuition, the
54For example, most older demand-side models assume GDP to be constant, while more
recent work endogenizes both GDP and consumption. Other differences arise from par-
ticularities in modeling the financial sector, consumer goods and the connection between
monetary and real variables.
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former should be associated with smaller increases in the capital stock, em-
ployment and inventories, a larger current account deficit and higher prices.
If non-tradables’ prices are more demand-sensitive than tradables’ prices –
which is plausible – the real appreciation should be more pronounced during
a demand-driven boom. What are the distinguishing features of a stabi-
lization effort expected to be temporary versus one considered as credible
and permanent? In light of the existence of recruitment and firing costs,
a temporary devaluation rate reduction is likely to be associated with a less
pronounced increase in employment than in permanent stabilization. Further-
more, if price setters are forward-looking, reducing the inflation rate should be
harder if stabilization is perceived to be temporary. The evidence presented
in sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 shows that ERBS is typically accompanied by (at
most) a moderate rise in investment and inventories, a sustained current ac-
count deterioration and a pronounced real appreciation. Unemployment falls
only temporarily during ERBS, also during relatively long-lived stabilizations.
Furthermore, the decrease in the unemployment rate is below one percent-
age point for most stabilizations. If the above reasoning contains some truth,
these empirical findings underline the importance of demand fluctuations and
agents’ expectations of stabilizations’ transitoriness.
The only systematic theoretical comparison of the effects of temporary
and permanent stabilization is due to Rebelo and Ve´gh (1995). They model
ERBS in a two-sector specific-factor economy55 where ‘money matters’ be-
cause of transaction costs. These increase symmetrically in consumption and
investment, decrease in real balances, and reduce economy-wide wealth. The
model is calibrated to match average values of key ratios of the Argentine
economy in the decade prior to the 1991 currency board. Then, the effects of
a permanent and 10-quarter 100 percent decline in the nominal devaluation
rate are simulated over 10 years. Before discussing the results, it should be
noted that Rebelo and Ve´gh’s framework differs from most models reviewed
in this section and the one implicitly underlying the above informal discus-
sion: Investment and consumption are modeled to be equally affected by
inflation, precluding a comparison of the supply and demand-side effects of
stabilization. Furthermore, given that the specification of transaction costs
implies that economy-wide wealth decreases in the inflation rate, both tem-
porary and permanent stabilizations are associated with permanent wealth
effects. In light of these differences, it is little surprising that Rebelo and
Ve´gh’s results are unlike those derived in above informal reasoning: Their
55In addition to labor, the production of non-tradable and of tradable goods uses land and
(tradable) capital, respectively. Labor is mobile between sectors, and investment subject
to adjustment costs.
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simulations find temporary stabilization to be accompanied by a weaker in-
crease in consumption, a stronger jump in investment, and a less pronounced
initial current account deterioration than permanent stabilization. The real
exchange rate appreciates about the same magnitude. The model’s numerical
fit is mixed: The maximum deviation of non-tradables consumption from its
pre-stabilization levels reaches 5 and 8 percent in temporary and in permanent
stabilization, respectively; those of tradables consumption 8.5 and 14 percent.
While this is in line with the data, the increase in investment greatly exceeds
what is actually observed: Its maximum deviation from the pre-stabilization
level amounts to 60 percent during temporary, and 39 percent during perma-
nent stabilization. The magnitude of the observed real appreciation cannot
be endogenously reproduced – a scenario with nominal rigidities produces re-
alistic results, but exogenously assumes the path of relative prices of tradable
goods.
What can be learned from Rebelo and Ve´gh’s exercise? From a policy
perspective, their results are disappointing: Both transitory and permanent
stabilization are found to be accompanied by similar initial dynamics, which
implies that these provide little evidence on agents’ beliefs concerning the
duration of stabilization. According to Rebelo and Ve´gh’s results, we do
not know if a policymaker witnessing an initial consumption boom during
ERBS should congratulate or sack his advisors, tax consumption or remain
idle. Rebelo and Ve´gh’s approach can be criticized along several other lines:
First, their modeling framework might not be adequate for emerging econo-
mies – Baxter (1995:175) notes that “Rebelo and Ve´gh do not tell us enough
about (...) these economies for us to be able to evaluate whether the partic-
ular specific-factors model they have chosen may be adequate for the job at
hand.” Also, one would like to see some sensitivity analysis, in particular with
respect to the parameters determining capital installation costs, transaction
costs and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Empirical estimates
for high inflation economies have produced wide ranges for these parameters,
as documented by Reinhard and Ve´gh (1995a:366) and Ageno´r and Montiel
(1996:353) for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. If slight variations
within the range of realistic parameter values produces discordant results, the
model ’s prediction are not of great help for policy makers who simply do not
know which parameter value is the right one.
Finally, Rebelo and Ve´gh’s numerical solution technique raises some is-
sues, as it involves linearizing around a steady state the economy never re-
turns to: Given the constant real interest rate, any transitory shock per-
manently changes consumption and wealth (Giavazzi and Wyplosz, 1984).
Furthermore, calibration assumes constant first moments of specific variables
or ratios. Key ratios of the Argentine economy during the high-inflation years
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from 1981 to 1991 might differ substantially from values during the prolonged
period of low inflation in the aftermath of the 1991 Convertibility Plan.56
To recapitulate: As for now, we do not know which of the theories on
the real effects of ERBS offers the ‘winning formula’. My guess is that there
simply is no single winning theory – if it had to be named, I would put
three features on the pedestal: the credibility of stabilization, the demand for
durable goods, and ‘market imperfections’, in particular on domestic goods
and labor markets and international capital markets. This last feature is
discussed in the next section.
1.6 Motivation of my Research and Overview
of the Dissertation
Despite the proliferation of theories designed to explain the real effects of infla-
tion stabilization in developing economies, the recent literature has widely ig-
nored imperfections: Most optimization-based models assume perfect goods,
factor and capital markets; cash-in-advance constraints or similar mechanisms
of introducing money are the only deviations from frictionless real economies.
This stands in contrast to what is the state of the art in open-economy macroe-
conomics, and to recent empirical findings.57 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996:606),
for example, observe:
“For anyone who looks even casually at international data (...)
the idea that nominal price rigidities are irrelevant seems difficult
to sustain.”
Similarly, Edwards (2002) argues in the context of currency crises that
“ ‘equilibrium models’ of frictionless economies are of little help to
(...) assess a country’s degree of vulnerability [to financial crises].”
The unifying feature characterizing the models presented in this thesis
is the relaxation of ‘assumptions of perfection’, namely, the assumptions of
perfect price flexibility and perfect international capital mobility. This focus
is motivated by two considerations: First, the abundant empirical evidence on
56Real variables fluctuate widely in high inflation economies: The standard deviation of
Argentine real GDP growth between January 1968 and April 1997, for instance, exceeds
average annual real GDP growth during that period by more than five times (5.16 percent
versus 0.69 percent).
57On the former, see for example Lane’s (2001) survey of the so-called ‘New Open Econ-
omy Macroeconomics’.
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these phenomena, and second, the failure of the existing optimization-based
models to explain salient features of ERBS.
With regard to price stickiness, empirical studies – for example Sheshinsky
et al. (1981), Lach and Tsiddon (1993), and Tommasini (1993) – show that
high inflation greatly increased the variability of relative prices in Argentina
and Israel. This reflects the existence of nominal rigidities in high inflation
economies – under perfect price flexibility, all individual price changes should
be perfectly synchronized with the overall inflation rate.58 Rebelo and Ve´gh
(1995), Ambler and Harb (1999), and Celasun (2000) find that assuming
exogenous price or wage stickiness greatly improves the quantitative perfor-
mance of calibrated models of ERBS. Ambler and Harb (1999), for example,
introduce stochastic partial adjustment of nominal wages into a general equi-
librium model of permanent ERBS. Their simulation results match the real
effects of heterodox ERBS, in particular consumption and real exchange rate
dynamics, better than a model without nominal rigidities. Nevertheless, little
effort has been devoted to further exploring and modeling the nature of price
stickiness. This gap in the existing research motivates the model presented
in Chapter 3. It introduces monopolistic competition and sticky prices in
a framework of transitory exchange rate targeting, in which the end of sta-
bilization is modeled as a fully anticipated devaluation rate increase. Only
the economy’s non-tradable goods sector is characterized by price stickiness:
Non-tradable final goods are assembled using a continuum of monopolistically
produced non-tradable intermediate goods. Prices of these inputs are sticky
in the sense that they can only be changed every other period. The price
stickiness allows to explain the real appreciation witnessed during transitory
ERBS with forward-looking price setting: As an expected future devaluation
rate increase is incorporated in current prices of non-tradable goods, relative
non-tradables’ prices rise and the real exchange rate appreciates during tem-
porary stabilization. Furthermore, the model is able to reproduce two other
salient stylized facts of ERBS, namely, the consumption boom and the cur-
rent account deterioration. While the former results from intertemporal price
changes and the resulting intertemporal substitution of demand (as in Calvo
1986), the latter stems both from intertemporal price level changes and the
increase in relative non-tradables’ prices. An extension of the model shows
that its main results remain valid when overlapping price contracts a` la Tay-
lor are introduced. The model’s implications for movements in the relative
price of non-tradable goods are then empirically tested and confirmed with
Mexican data: OLS estimations based on disaggregated monthly prices from
58Also, direct evidence on price stickiness in industrialized economies abounds; see for
example Blinder et al. (1998).
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August 1975 to May 2000 reveal that the relative price of non-tradable goods
actually incorporates expected devaluation rate changes, that is, an expected
devaluation rate increase is reflected in a higher relative price of non-tradable
goods.
The above framework models the real appreciation as a result of variation
in relative non-tradables’ prices. The validity of this assumption has been cast
into doubt by recent empirical evidence, which reports that the relative price
of non-tradable goods contributes very little to the observed real exchange
rate fluctuations.59 Therefore, as a first step in the analysis of real exchange
rates during ERBS – and as a further contribution to the research on its sty-
lized facts – Chapter 2 explores the origin of real exchange rate fluctuations
in Brazil. To this aim, Engel’s (1999, 2000) method of real exchange rate
variance decomposition is applied. This allows to assess what fraction of real
exchange rate fluctuation is due to relative prices of non-traded goods and
what fraction can be accounted for by exchange-rate adjusted prices of traded
goods. The analysis reveals that both components are about equally impor-
tant determinants of real exchange rate fluctuations during ERBS. When
analyzing the full sample from January 1981 to May 2001, however, changes
in traded goods’ prices and the nominal exchange rate account for almost all
of the real exchange rate movements; a result similar to what was found for
industrialized countries. An informal analysis of disaggregated non-tradables’
prices shows that their increase during ERBS is the driving force behind the
result. Coupled with Mendoza’s (2000) evidence on Mexico, the increased
contribution of relative non-tradables’ prices to the observed real exchange
rate fluctuations apparently constitutes an additional stylized fact of ERBS.
In short, Chapters 2 and 3 provide answers to the following questions:
First, do relative prices of non-tradable goods play a role for the real ex-
change rate appreciation witnessed during ERBS, and for real exchange rate
fluctuations in chronic inflation economies in general? As this first question
is affirmed by my empirical analysis, the second question is: Why do rela-
tive non-tradables’ prices change during transitory stabilizations, that is, why
does the real appreciation occur?
Chapter 4 offers an answer to the question of how the collapse of ERBS
is connected to the stabilization’s initial dynamics. The model presented in
this chapter explains both features with self-fulfilling expectations about the
duration of the peg and post-stabilization monetary policy. A crucial element
of this explanation is the assumption of partial international capital mobility,
modeled as an upper ceiling on the domestic economy’s net foreign liabilities.
59See for example Engel (1999) or Chari et al. (1998) on real exchange rates in industrial
countries, and Engel (2000 ) on Mexican real exchange rates.
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This feature is motivated by the extensive empirical evidence on imperfect in-
ternational capital mobility, in particular, on emerging economies’ restricted
access to international capital. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), for instance,
find that international borrowing by developing economies is subject to con-
straints which are stricter than implied by intertemporal solvency. Based on
a cross-section of 45 developing economies, they show that net foreign bor-
rowing increases in current output, and interpret this result as evidence for
the existence of financial constraints.60 Gelos and Werner (1999 ) report that
around 60 percent of loans in Mexico are collateralized, which implies that a
large fraction of borrowers cannot obtain credit against their future wealth –
as assumed in most macroeconomic models – but only against current wealth.
My model underlines the role of international borrowing constraints for
currency crises. This has been empirically investigated by Calvo and Reinhart
(1999), who find that currency crises are associated with major contractions
in international credit. Likewise, my empirical analysis in section 1.3.2 shows
that devaluation crises in the aftermath of stabilizations are accompanied by a
pronounced reduction in portfolio investment inflows. Edwards (2002) finds a
positive correlation between the current account deficit and the probability of
a currency crisis for a large sample of industrialized and developing economies.
As current account deficits are, per definition, associated with reserve losses
or capital account surpluses, these increase the probability of currency crises.
My own cursory data analysis suggests that the collapse of ERBS is associated
with debt-to-GDP ratios in excess of 40 percent: The Argentinean currency
board collapsed when foreign liabilities reached 48 percent of GDP; prior crises
in Argentina (in 1982 and 1987) and Brazil (in 1987) were associated with
debt-to-GDP ratios of 52, 53 and 41 percent, respectively. Turkish foreign
debt amounted to around 80 percent of its GDP when the exchange rate peg
was abandoned in February 2001.61 Furthermore, rules of thumb for debt
sustainability (see for example Williamson 1993 ) suggest the existence of an
upper limit of foreign indebtedness.
The model presented in Chapter 4 incorporates a borrowing constraint
which imposes an exogenous upper ceiling on the ratio of foreign debt to
GDP. This constraint is added to a standard model of a small, open economy
in which agents consume and produce a single homogenous good subject to
cash-in-advance constraints. The model allows to show that both the initial
expansion during ERBS and the stabilization’s temporariness can result from
self-fulfilling expectations about the peg’s duration and post-stabilization
60Particularly as this evidence stands in contrast to their finding for industrialized econ-
omies, where the relation between output and the net foreign asset position is positive.
61The ratios are based on data from the Word Bank, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(28.12.01), and The Economist.
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monetary policy: If agents expect the ERBS to be temporary, they take
advantage of temporarily lower cash prices by increasing consumption in ex-
cess of output. The resulting current account deficits – which are financed
with capital imports – imply that the upper bound of foreign debt is even-
tually reached. Further current account deficits then engender a reduction
in central bank reserves, which eventually culminates in the peg’s collapse.
This does not occur if agents judge the stabilization as credible and expect
inflation and devaluation rates to remain permanently at the lower levels.
Given these expectations, agents consume and produce a constant amount
each period, which implies that the economy’s borrowing constraint does not
become binding and the peg can be upheld indefinitely. The chapter’s novelty
is that it offers a link between the initial dynamics of ERBS and their col-
lapse. Despite the overwhelming empirical evidence on the transitory nature
of ERBS, the existing literature is silent on its connection with the initial real
dynamics.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes by pointing out some policy implications
which can be drawn from this dissertation.
To summarize, the topic of this dissertation is the role of price stickiness
and partial capital mobility in generating the real dynamics associated with
non-credible ERBS and their (self-fulfilling) termination. The analyses are
conducted in deterministic optimization-based, representative agent models of
small open economies. The models’ implications are derived analytically, thus
evading the pitfalls of calibrating models of open high inflation economies.
The theoretical analysis is complemented by empirical assessments of the
determinants of real exchange rates and relative non-tradables’ prices during
ERBS.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Summary of the Empirical Literature on the Sty-
lized Facts of ERBS
If not specified otherwise, the ERBS considered in the publications summa-
rized below stem from the sample of stabilizations in Argentina (1967, 1978,
1985), Brazil (1964, 1978), Chile (1970, 1973, 1978, 1985), Israel (1985), Mex-
ico (1987), Peru (1986), and Uruguay (1968, 1978).
Publication Programs Findings
Case studies surveys
Ageno`r
and Mon-
tiel (1996)
7 ERBS and
MBS in Latin
America and
Israel
Boom-bust cycle for both hetero-
dox and orthodox ERBS
Initial recession and improvement
of external balances for orthodox
MBS
Ve´gh
(1992)
10 ERBS in
Latin America
and Israel
Increase of real activity at begin-
ning of program, later contraction
Slow convergence of inflation rate
to rate of devaluation
Real appreciation
Current account deterioration
continued on next page
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Publication Programs Findings
Calvo
and Ve´gh
(1994a)
11 ERBS in
Latin America
and Israel, 5
MBS in Latin
America
ERBS: Consumption boom in first year of stabi-
lization
Slow convergence of inflation rate to rate of deval-
uation
Real appreciation
Current account deterioration
Real interest movements heterogenous
MBS: Decrease of consumption in first year of sta-
bilization
Slow convergence of inflation rate: Rate of money
growth in last quarter of stabilization for most pro-
grams higher than inflation rate
Real appreciation
Constant or improvement of current account bal-
ance
Sharp increase in real interest rates
Kiguel and
Liviatan
(1992)
12 ERBS in
Latin America
and Israel
Rise in GDP in first year of stabilization
Current account deterioration
Real exchange rate appreciation
Effects on real wages heterogenous
Cross-country averages (based on relatively large samples)
Easterly
(1996)
Pooled sample
of 18 MBS (of
which 5 Latin
America, 7
Africa) and 9
ERBS (7 Latin
America)
For both MBS and ERBS: Positive growth of real
GDP and consumption after stabilization
Supply side: First increased capacity utilization
and productivity increases, later on rise in invest-
ment
Hamann
2001
21 MBS, 13
ERBS
See section 1.3.1
continued on next page
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Publication Programs Findings
Fischer et
al. (1996)
26 Transition
economies
Cumulative output loss greater in MBS than dur-
ing ERBS
Studies focussing on one particular variable
Focus on durable goods
De Grego-
rio et al.
1998
7 ERBS: Ar-
gentina (1978,
1991), Chile
(1978), Israel
(1985), Uruguay
(1978, 1990),
and Mexico
(1987)
Boom in durables consumption in 3 years follow-
ing stabilization; decline of durables consumption
growth in years 4 and 5, with negative growth rates
for failed programs.
Focus on credit
Copelman
(1996)
ERBS in Chile
(1978), Israel
(1985), Mexico
(1987)
Credit expansion during stabilization
Khamis
(1996)
ERBS in Ar-
gentina (1978),
Chile (1978),
Israel (1985),
Mexico (1987)
Credit expansion during stabilization
De Gre-
gorio and
Sturzeneg-
ger (1997)
MBS: Bolivia
(1985) ERBS:
Argentina
(1991), Mexico
(1987)
Banks’ credit to private sector expands as inflation
falls
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1.7.2 Inflation Stabilization Programs in High Inflation
Economies
Please note that this listing does not claim to cover all programs of inflation
stabilization in high inflation economies.
Exchange Rate Based Stabilizations (ERBS)
Latin America
Country Starting Date, Du-
ration
Program Design
Argentina 1959.3 - 1962.2
Argentina 1967.3 - 1970.5 Fixed exchange rate
Argentina 1973.3 - 1975.2
Argentina 1978.12 -1981.1 Crawling peg (Tablita)
Argentina
Austral Plan
1985.6 - 1986.3 Heterodox crawling peg
Argentina
Peso Plan
1991.4 - 2002.1 Currency board
Brazil 1964 Heterodox, gradualist
stabilization
Brazil
Cruzado
Plan
1986.2 - 1986.11 Heterodox peg
Brazil Real
Plan
1994.6 - 1999.1 Peg, crawling peg to US
dollar
Chile 1970 - 1973
Chile 1978.2 - 1982.6 Crawling peg, peg to US
dollar)
Ecuador 1992 - 1998 Crawling peg to US dol-
lar
Ecuador 2000.4 Adoption of the US dol-
lar as official currency
El Salvador 2001.1 Adoption of the US dol-
lar as official currency
Mexico 1987.12 - 1994.12 see chapter 3
Nicaragua 1990
continued on next page
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ERBS in Latin America
continued from previous page
Country Starting Date, Du-
ration
Program Design
Peru 1986 - 1990 Multiple fixed exchange
rates
Uruguay 1968.6 - 1971.12 Fixed exchange rate
Uruguay 1978.10 - 1982.11 Pre-announced crawling
peg
Uruguay 1990.12 - 2002.7 Exchange rate band
Venezuela 1997 - 2002.2 Exchange rate bands to
US dollar
Transition Economies (Eastern Europe and former Soviet
Union)
Country Starting Date Program Design
Bulgaria 1997.7 - present Currency board with
German mark/euro
Czech Repub-
lic
1992.1 - 1997.6 Crawling peg to basket of
currencies
Croatia 10.1993
Estonia 20.6.1992 - present Currency board with
German mark/euro
Hungary 1990.3 Crawling peg
Hungary 1995.3 Pre-announced crawling
peg
Slovak Re-
public
1992.11 Exchange rate band to
basket of currencies
Yugoslavia 1990 Peg to the German
mark/euro
Lithuania 1994.2 - present Currency board with US
dollar, currency board
with Euro
Poland 1990.1 Peg to US dollar, crawl-
ing peg to basket of cur-
rencies, crawling band
continued on next page
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ERBS in Transition Economies
continued from previous page
Country Starting Date Program Design
Macedonia 1994.1
Other countries
Country Starting Date Program Design
Egypt 8.10.1991 - present Exchange rate band to
US dollar
Iceland 1983 - 1988
Israel 1982 - 1983
Israel 1985.7 - present Peg, crawling peg, grad-
ual transition to inflation
targeting
Turkey 1958 - 1970 Peg to US dollar
Turkey 1.2000 - 2.2001 Crawling peg to US dol-
lar
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Money Based Stabilizations
Stabilizations of post-World War I hyperinflations
Country Date of Stabili-
zation
Austria 1922.9
Germany 1923.12
Hungary 1924.3
Poland 1924.2
Russia 1924.2
Latin America and Caribbean
Country Starting Date (Du-
ration)
Argentina BB
Plan
1988 - 1989
Argentina
Bonex
1990.1 - 1990.4
Argentina 1992.1
Bolivia 1985
Chile 1973
Chile 1975.4
Costa Rica 1982
Dominican
Rep.
1990.3 - 1992.4
Jamaica 1991
Peru 1990.8 - 1992.2
Uruguay 1972 - 1976
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Transition Economies (Eastern Europe and former Soviet
Union)
Country Starting Date
(Duration)
Albania 1992
Bulgaria 1991 - 1992
Kazakhstan 1994 - 1995
Romania 1991 - 1992
Russia 1993.3 - 1994.1
Slovak Re-
public
1991.10
Ukraine 1994 - 1995
Other Countries
Country Starting Date
(Duration)
Ghana 1983
Guinea- Bis-
sau
1992
Kenya 1991
Iceland 1974
Indonesia 1966
Nigeria 1988
Sierra Leone 1991
Somalia 1980
Somalia 1984
Turkey 1980
Turkey 1994 - 1995
Turkey 1998.1
Turkey 2001.5
Uganda 1987
Uganda 1980
Zaire 1983
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Sources:
Ageno´r and Montiel (1996), Annual Reports of the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, Calvo and Ve´gh (1999), Cardoso and Dornbusch
(1987), Dornbusch and Werner (1994) Dibooglu and Kibritcioglu (2001),
Easterly (1996), Fischer, Sahay and Ve´gh(1996), Heyman (1987), IMF Eco-
nomic Review : Estonia (1994), IMF World Economic Outlook (May 2001),
Kiguel and Liviatan (1992 and 1995), Krueger (1995), Sachs (1987), Sargent
(1982a), Schultz (2002), Schweickert (1994), OECD Economic Survey : The
Slovak Republic (1996) and Ve´gh (1992).
1.7.3 Data
Source for most variables are the International Financial Statistics (IFS ). The
numbers in brackets indicate the IFS classification number of the respective
variable.
• Inflation rate: Changes in consumer prices, % per annum (IFS : 64 X)
• Devaluation rate: Calculated from market rate, domestic currency/US
dollar (IFS : RF)
• Real consumption growth (IFS : 96F, in domestic currency)
• Real GDP growth (IFS : 99BP, constant prices)
• Unemployment rate, in % (IFS : 67r)
• Real investment growth: Private gross fix capital formation (IFS : 93e)
• Inventories: (IFS : 93i)
• Annual change in the current account balance, in percent (IFS : 78ald)
• Annual change in the financial account balance, in percent (IFS : 78
bjd)
• Net portfolio investment assets:
Calculated as portfolio investment assets (IFS : 78 bfd) minus portfolio
investment liabilities (IFS : 78 bgd)
• Average capacity utilization - Brazilian manufacturing industry: Cen-
tral Bank of Brazil
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• Deposit money banks’ claims on the private sector (millions of domestic
currency)(IFS : 32D)
• Money (IFS : 14)
• Government budget deficit (IFS : 80)
• Government revenue (IFS : 81)
• Government expenditures (IFS : 82)
• Interest rates spreads: Calculated from
– Deposit rate, percent per annum (IFS: 60L)
– Lending Rate, percent per annum, (IFS: 60P)
• US GDP deflator (OECD Main Economic Indicators: 421051KSA, 1995=100)
Chapter 2
Determinants of the Real
Exchange Rate across Exchange
Rate Regimes: Evidence from
Brazil
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented evidence on the real appreciation typically
witnessed during ERBS. This chapter aims at identifying the origin of this
real appreciation – and of real exchange rate fluctuations in general – using
the Brazilian-US real exchange rate as an example. Applying Engel’s (1999,
2000) method of real exchange rate variance decomposition, I assess what
fraction of real exchange rate variation can be attributed to variations in
relative prices of Brazilian non-tradable goods, and what fraction to variations
in cross-country tradable goods’ prices, denominated in Brazilian currency.
Interest in the origin of real exchange rate fluctuations during ERBS is
justified by the following considerations: First, the effectiveness of ERBS as a
means of stabilizing inflation depends on the magnitude of nominal exchange
rate pass through. If nominal exchange rate fluctuations have little effect
on domestic tradables’ prices, pegging the exchange rate is not an effective
tool for halting inflation. Thus, the design of inflation stabilization, and
particularly the choice of a nominal anchor, should take into account the
degree of nominal exchange rate pass through.
Second, the real appreciation is frequently held responsible for the break-
down of stabilization. Dornbusch (1996:1) states that
“large real appreciations (...) will invariably run into trouble. Just
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when and how the crisis comes about will of course depend very
much on the circumstances.”
Similarly, Calvo and Ve´gh (1999:1563) point out that fixed exchange rate
regimes can be associated with the
“problem of ‘overvaluation’ and the public’s expectations that a
corrective devaluation would have to take place at some point to
restore ‘equilibrium’ prices.”
Finally, Paul Krugman (2002) comments as follows on the Argentinean
currency board:
“Why can’t the currency board survive? It is clear that Argentina
suffers from a real overvaluation - that is, prices are too high given
the exchange rate.”
Similar concerns have been voiced by Dornbusch and Werner (1994), and
empirically confirmed by Goldfajn and Valdes (1999). Given this connection
between real exchange rate dynamics during ERBS and its termination, un-
derstanding what drives the real appreciation is crucial for effective crisis
prevention. As discussed in Chapter 1, the models on ERBS assume the law
of one price to hold, and attribute the real appreciation to increases in the
relative price of non-tradable goods. This follows most standard theories,
where, as emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), a role for cross-country
prices of traded goods in real exchange rate determination is largely absent.1
This chapter is devoted to analyzing the validity of this assumption. The next
section surveys previous research on real exchange rate variance decomposi-
tions and real exchange rates in developing economies. Section 2.3 reviews the
method of real exchange rate variance decomposition, and section 2.4 presents
results for the Brazilian-US real exchange rate. Section 2.5 summarizes the
main finding and points out some implication for models of ERBS.
2.2 Previous Research on Real Exchange Rate
Determinants
The focus of this chapter is on assessing the determinants of real exchange
rate fluctuations during ERBS, that is, determinants of short to medium run
1See for example the classic explanations for real exchange rate fluctuations by Balassa
(1964) and Samuelson (1964).
69
real exchange rate movements. Therefore, the extensive empirical literature
on the long run properties of the real exchange rate, specifically tests of PPP,
is not considered in detail; the reader is referred to surveys by Rogoff (1996)
or Mark (2001, Chapter 7). Both report ambiguous evidence concerning the
long-run validity of PPP. It therefore comes as little surprise that evidence on
short to medium run real exchange rate fluctuations disproves PPP and at-
tributes most of real exchange rate fluctuations to cross-country differences in
exchange rate-adjusted traded-goods’ prices. The most comprehensive study
in this context is by Engel (1999), who analyzes different measures of US-
Canadian, US-Japanese, and US-European real exchange rates. He finds that
cross-country differences in exchange rate-adjusted traded-goods’ prices ac-
count for nearly all the variance of real exchange rates. For example, almost
100 percent of the Mean Squared Error (MSE) of the 5-year change in US-
European and US-Japanese real exchange rates is due to the MSE of the
traded-good component.2 Even when excluding periods of flexible exchange
rates, the traded goods component still explains over 85 percent of the total
MSE.
In sum, Engel’s study reveals two important characteristics of industrial-
ized countries’ real exchange rates: First, the variation of the relative price of
non-tradable to tradable goods within a country accounts for only a very small
fraction of total real exchange rate variation. Second, this holds true even
when focussing on fixed exchange rate regimes. These findings are confirmed
by other empirical studies on medium-run real exchange rate determinants in
industrial countries, which are summarized in appendix 2.6.1.
The short and medium run determinants of real exchange rate fluctuations
in developing economies have been researched little. Engel (2000) analyzes
the US-Mexican real exchange rate from September 1991 to August 1999
and reports evidence very similar to that on industrialized economies: The
contribution of exchange rate adjusted cross-country tradable goods’ prices
to the total real exchange rate variance is slightly below 90 percent at a
14-months horizon, and almost 100 percent for shorter horizons. Changes
in relative tradables’ prices – “the channel implicit in almost all theoretical
models of real exchange rate behavior for Latin America” (Engel, 2000:8)
– seems of little importance.Likewise, Burnstein, Neves and Rebelo (2000)
find that only 4.7 percent of the real appreciation witnessed during the first
two years of the Argentinean currency board are due to changes in relative
non-tradable goods’ prices.
This evidence is partially refuted by Mendoza (2000), who reconsiders the
2The Mean Squared Error of a variable z is defined as the sum of its variance and its
squared mean, MSE(z) = var(z) +mean(z)2.
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Mexican case with data on prices of durables as tradables and non-durables
as well as services as non-tradable goods. In an extension of Engel’s analysis,
he performs separate variance decompositions for the full sample (from Jan-
uary 1969 to February 2000) and for periods of fixed, managed and flexible
exchange rates. The real exchange rate decomposition over the full sample
confirms Engel’s results: The contribution of cross-country tradables’ prices
to total real exchange rate fluctuations never falls below 92 percent for hori-
zons of up to 24 months. During fixed and managed exchange rate regimes,
however, it amounts only to 29 and 52 percent, respectively. This indicates the
important role of relative non-tradables’ prices during ERBS, and suggests
that determinants of real exchange rate fluctuations differ across exchange
rate regimes. Similarly, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000) report evidence that
real exchange rate movements in developing countries result from changes in
the relative price of non-tradable goods.
Differences between Mendoza’s and Engel’s findings might partly be due
to differing assumptions underlying the statistical analysis, in particular the
definitions of the respective variance ratios. The following section explores
this issue by reviewing the intuition of real exchange rate variance ratios and
presenting different possibilities for their computation.
2.3 The Method of Real Exchange Rate Vari-
ance Decomposition
This section follows Engel (1999) in producing measures of the importance of
movements in cross-country traded goods’ prices for the overall variation of
the real exchange rate. The starting point is the real exchange rate, defined
as the ratio of foreign to home price indices, both expressed in the home
currency. The log of the real exchange rate is given by
q = p∗ + e− p, (2.1)
where p and p∗ denote the log of the home and the foreign country’s price
levels, respectively, and e the log of the nominal exchange rate. The home
country’s price level is a geometric average of traded goods’ and non-tradable
goods’ prices, denoted pT and pN . Its logarithm can be expressed as a
weighted (arithmetic) average:
p = γpN + (1− γ)pT . (2.2)
Letting starred variables represent the foreign values, the log of the foreign
country’s price level is given as
p∗ = γ∗p∗N + (1− γ∗)p∗T , (2.3)
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where γ and γ∗ denote the weights of non-tradable goods in the home and
foreign country’s overall price index, and pN and p
∗
T non-tradables’ and trad-
ables’ prices at home and abroad. Substituting (2.2) and (2.3) in (2.1), the
real exchange rate can be reformulated as
q = [e+ p∗T − pT ] + [γ∗(p∗N − p∗T )− γ(pN − pT )] .
To simplify the notation, this is rewritten as
q = x+ y
where x is defined as
x ≡ [e+ p∗T − pT ]
and y as
y ≡ [γ∗(p∗N − p∗T )− γ(pN − pT )] .
x denotes the log of the ratio of traded goods’ prices in the foreign and the
home economy, both expressed in home currency. y is a weighted difference
between the relative prices of non-tradable goods in each country. Both q
and x exhibit high persistence, indicating that the variables might not be
stationary in levels. Therefore, the real exchange rate was tested for station-
arity using the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979).3 Under the
test’s null hypothesis, the time series contains a unit root, that is, its first dif-
ferences are stationary. The decision criterion is to reject the null hypothesis
if the absolute value of the standard t-statistic is greater than the absolute
value of the critical value at some desired level of significance reported by
Fuller (1976). The test results, based on 243 monthly observations of real
exchange rates (in logarithms), indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit
root cannot be rejected at a 1 percent significance level – the t-statistic is
-1.385, the corresponding critical value -3.463. This suggests that the real
exchange rate data must be first-differenced in order to obtain a stationary
series. It should be noted, however, that the test result should be interpreted
with caution, as in small samples unit root tests have low power distinguish-
ing between series that are non-stationary and series that are stationary but
highly persistent (Canzoneri et al. 1999).4
In view of the test results, the following analysis is based on changes. The
change of the real exchange rate over n periods is given as
qt − qt−n = xt − xt−n + yt − yt−n.
3The DF-test was chosen instead of the augmented DF-test since lagged differences
failed to be significant.
4Unit root tests based on several centuries of real exchange rate data, for example
Lothian and Taylor (1996), frequently find stationarity.
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In the following, I assess how much of the variance of the change of the real
exchange rate between periods t − n and t, qt − qt−n, is due to the variance
of (xt − xt−n), that is, cross-country traded goods’ prices. The variance of
(qt − qt−n) ≡ ∆nqt can be decomposed into the following components:
var (∆nqt) = var(∆nxt) + var(∆nyt) + 2cov (∆nxt,∆nyt) ,
where ∆nxt ≡ (xt − xt−n) and ∆nyt ≡ (yt − yt−n) . The total contribution of
∆nxt to the variance of ∆nqt depends on how much of the covariance between
∆nxt and ∆nyt is attributed to ∆nxt.
How much of the covariance should be attributed to ∆nxt? This question
cannot be unequivocally answered, as neither economic intuition nor statistics
tell us what fraction of the covariance is truly due to variations in ∆nxt. Engel
(1995:25) notes that “in any decomposition, the puzzling issue is how to deal
with comovements.” Still, considering the comovements between ∆nxt and
∆nyt, that is, not simply assuming these to equal zero is important. If they
account for a great fraction of real exchange rate variation, the fraction of real
exchange rate variation contributed to ∆nxt depends crucially on how the
comovements are treated. Therefore, I follow Mendoza (2000) and present
three variance ratio measures, each of which treats the covariance differently.
The first measure assumes a zero covariance between ∆nxt and ∆nyt,
which is correct only when x and y are independent random walks:
Variance Ratio 1 =
var(∆nxt)
var(∆nxt) + var(∆nyt)
The value of this variance ratio is, by definition, always below 1. It is proposed
by Engel (2000) in his analysis of Mexican real exchange rates, and neglects
the covariance between ∆nxt and ∆nyt. Engel justifies this with his finding
that the covariance is very small in industrial countries.5 Mendoza (2000),
in contrast, finds a negative correlation between ∆nxt and ∆nyt during fixed
and managed exchange rate regimes in Mexico, and therefore proposes two
alternative variance ratios. One measure contains the covariance of ∆nxt and
∆nyt only in the denominator, that is, assigns the entire comovements to yt :
Variance Ratio 2 =
var(∆nxt)
var(∆nqt)
=
var(∆nxt)
var(∆nx) + var(∆ny) + 2cov (∆nx,∆ny)
Another measure attributes half of the covariance to xt :
Variance Ratio 3 =
var(∆nxt) + cov(∆nxt,∆nyt)
var(∆nqt)
.
5Similarly, the ratios of Mean Squared Errors reported in Engel (1999) were also con-
structed under the assumption of a zero covariance between ∆nx and ∆ny.
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Ceteris paribus, a negative covariance between ∆nxt and ∆nyt increases
the value of Variance Ratio 2 relative to Variance Ratios 1 and 3.6
Varying n allows to differentiate between short and medium run determi-
nants of real exchange rates. On the basis of PPP, one would expect the share
of the variance accounted for by the x component to diminish over time: If
deviations from PPP are transitory, only short run real exchange rate fluctu-
ations should be determined by nominal exchange rate movements. It should
be pointed out, however, that parts of the literature have been reluctant to
interpret fluctuations in x as deviations from the law of one price. Mendoza
(2000:12), for example, states:
“The evidence reported here (...) does not suggest per se that
one should view fluctuations in x as deviations from the law of one
price or evidence of price stickiness. It simply shows how much
x contributes to explain the variance of exchange-rate-adjusted
CPIs. This is distant from the ideal scenario needed to interpret
changes in x as deviations from the law of one price.”
The ‘ideal scenario’ requires the conditions for PPP to hold, that is, ho-
mogenous goods which are traded on perfect international markets, identical
baskets of traded goods across countries and instant price adjustment. De-
spite the fact that these assumptions are violated by the data, this chapter
interprets fluctuations of x as failures of PPP as incorporated in macroeco-
nomic models on ERBS. As pointed out in section 1.5, most of these models
assume instant equality of aggregate cross-country traded goods’ price indices
despite the above-mentioned caveats.
Finally, it should be noted that decomposing the aggregate price level
into tradables’ and non-tradables’ prices (equations 2.2 and 2.3) assumes that
all goods can be unambiguously classified as either purely tradable or non-
tradable; a task whose difficulty gave rise to recent research on the degree of
tradability of goods (Betts and Kehoe, 2001) and on the distribution costs of
tradable goods (Burnside, Neves and Rebelo, 2000).
6The connection between measures 2 and 3 is given by
Variance Ratio 3=Variance Ratio 2+ cov(∆nxt,∆nyt)var(∆nqt) .
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2.4 Variance Decompositions of the Brazilian-
US Real Exchange Rate
2.4.1 Data Transformation
The first step in the decomposition of real exchange rate movements is con-
structing price indices for tradable and non-tradable goods. The indices con-
sidered in this chapter are based on monthly observations of disaggregated
consumer prices in Brazil and the US, dating from January 1981 to April
2001. The focus on consumer prices is dictated by data availability. Engel
(1999) reports his results to be robust to modifications of the real exchange
rate measure, that is, calculating it with other consumer or producer prices.
This suggests that alternative measures for the Brazilian rate would yield
similar results. Though the empirical equivalent to the real exchange rate
measure used in macroeconomic modeling is the real effective exchange rate,
focussing on the Brazilian-US real exchange rate is an admissible simplifica-
tion, since 34.2 percent of Brazil’s imports and 36 percent of its exports are
either from or to the US or countries whose currency was pegged to the US
dollar for most of my sample.7
Brazilian price indices are obtained from the Instituto de Geographia e
Informatica; the US data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.8 The index of
tradable goods’ prices is constructed as a weighted average of the price in-
dices for ‘Residential Articles’ and ‘Clothing’; the price index for non-tradable
goods from the price indices for ‘Housing’, ‘Transport and Communication’,
‘Health and Personal Care’, and ‘Personal Expenses’. The price index for
‘Food and Beverages’, which are frequently classified as tradable goods (see
for example Chari et al., 1998), is excluded, since non-tradable ‘Food Away
From Home’ enters the US data with a weight of 37 percent; the correlation
coefficient between the price indices for ‘Food and Beverages’ and ‘Services’
is almost unity. In all other respects, the classification of traded and non-
tradable goods follows the literature as summarized in appendix 2.6.1, and
is consistent with Betts and Kehoes’ (2001) trade-based classification.9 It
should be noted that indices for tradable and non-tradable goods are never
perfect. The category ‘Housing’, for example, includes tradable ‘Fuels and
Utilities’, whereas prices for ‘Residential Articles’ in Brazil have recently in-
7These numbers are based on data for the year 2000, in which exports to the US and Ar-
gentina amounted to 23.1 and 11.1 percent, respectively, and imports from these countries
to 23.8 and 12.2 percent.
8See appendix 2.6.2 for a detailed description of data sources and transformations.
9A trade-based classification of tradable and non-tradable Brazilian goods is precluded
by lacking data on foreign trade flows for the groups of goods entering the Brazilian CPI.
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cluded the cost of their maintenance and repair. These sub-categories could
not be considered separately, as the more detailed classification of Brazilian
prices is available only from 1991 onwards.
The overall weight of non-tradable goods in the CPI is computed as the
sum of the most recent weights of ‘Food & Beverages Away From Home’,
‘Shelter’, ‘Transportation’, ‘Communication’, ‘Medical Care Services’, ‘Mis-
cellaneous Personal Services’, ‘Recreation’ and ‘Education’. This yields a
share of 71 percent for non-tradables in the US CPI and of 46 percent in
the Brazilian CPI.10 Based on these weights, the price indices for traded and
non-tradable goods and the US-Brazilian nominal exchange rate, x, y, and q
are computed.
2.4.2 Decomposition Results
As pointed out, results by Mendoza (2000) indicate considerable differences
between the determinants of real exchange rate fluctuations during periods
of fixed and of flexible exchange rates. Therefore, variance decompositions
were performed with three different samples: First, with the full sample from
January 1981 to April 2001. Second, for periods of officially fixed or managed
exchange rates, and third, for periods of ‘relatively stable exchange rates’,
which are quantified as periods where the monthly devaluation rate remains
below ten percent for at least six consecutive months. This holds for the
periods from February 1981 to January 1983, from March 1986 to January
1987, from August 1994 to December 1998, and from March 1999 to February
2001, that is, for a total of 112 months. During 74 of these, a regime of fixed or
managed exchange rates was implemented; namely, the ‘Cruzado Plan’ from
March to October 1986, which maintained a zero devaluation rate most of the
time, and the ‘Plano Real’ from July 1994 to December 1999. It entailed the
introduction of a new currency – the ‘Real’ – which was initially pegged to
the US dollar at parity. In March 1995, a one-time 5-percent devaluation was
administered, and a 5-percent fluctuation band introduced. The stabilization
effort collapsed in January 1999, giving rise to a monthly devaluation rate of
25 percent.11
10Proceeding this way, it is implicitly assumed that prices which were omitted (like the
prices of Food and Beverages) and those which could not be assigned to the appropriate
group of goods because of lacking data (as for example the fuel prices contained in ‘Shelter’)
behave like the average tradables’ and non-tradables’ prices I compute. An alternative
approach is to calculate γ and γ∗ considering only the weights of prices which actually enter
the price indices of traded and non-traded goods. The variance decompositions based on
these values yield very similar results, and are therefore not reported, but available upon
request.
11See Bonomo and Terra (1999) for further details on exchange rate policy in Brazil.
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Full Sample Official. fixed Devr.<10%
No. of obs. 243 61 112
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
q 4.15 0.30 3.87 0.20 4.04 0.24
x 4.3 0.29 4.25 0.1 4.33 0.26
y -0.14 0.20 -0.29 0.18 -0.23 0.21
Notes: ‘Devr.<10%’ denotes the sample which contains only months where the
monthly devaluation rate was below 10% for at least six consecutive months;
‘Official. fixed’ denotes periods of officially announced managed exchange rate
regimes. x, y and q are in levels, that is, n=0.
Table 2.1: Characteristics of x, y and q during different exchange rate regimes
Characteristics of x, y and q (in levels) during the different samples are
summarized in table 2.1. It confirms that the real exchange rate appreciates
during periods of officially fixed or stable exchange rates – the mean of q
is lower during these periods, that is, domestic goods relatively more expen-
sive. Furthermore, the real exchange rate fluctuates less during these periods.
Given the high share of non-tradables in the US CPI, the fact that y assumes
a negative value indicates that the ratio of non-tradables’ to tradables’ prices
in Brazil is higher than the ratio of these prices in the US, that is, relative non-
tradables’ prices in Brazil exceed those in the US.12 y seems to be positively
correlated with the devaluation rate, which suggests that Brazilian relative
non-tradables’ prices rise during these periods of relatively low devaluation
rates. This will be confirmed by the analysis of variance ratios.
The first set of variance ratios is computed for the full sample from January
1981 to April 2001. Figure 2.1 graphs the three variance ratio measures.
The ordinate reports the value of the real exchange rate ratio for a specific
horizon, that is, a specific value of n (in months), which is reported on the
abscissa. The variance ratio for n = 24, for instance, indicates how much of
the variance of the real exchange rate’s change over the past two years is due
to the variance of the change in cross-country tradables’ prices.
Figure 2.1 shows that the value of Variance Ratio 1 remains at around
0.90 regardless of the horizon considered. Even for two-year differences, 91
12This can be shown as follows: y is defined as
y ≡ [γ∗(p∗N − p∗T )− γ(pN − pT )] .
The share of non-tradable goods in the Brazilian GDP is smaller than in the US, γ < γ∗.
Thus, a negative y implies that (pN − pT ) > (p∗N − p∗T ).
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Figure 2.1: Variance decompositions over the full sample
percent of the real exchange rate changes’ variance is due to the variation of
xt−xt−24. The maximum value of 0.93 occurs for one-month differenced data
(n = 1) . These values are slightly lower than what Engel (1999) found for US-
European real exchange rates13 – but still a death blow for PPP. Moreover,
the importance of cross-country tradables’ prices does not diminish when
considering longer horizons: Figure 2.2 reports variance decompositions for
differences of up to 210 months. Even at these long horizons, the contribution
of cross-country tradables’ prices to total real exchange rate variation, as
measured by Variance Ratio 1, exceeds 80 percent.14
Variance Ratios 2 and 3 in figures 2.1 and 2.2 exceed unity for most
values of n. This is at odds with the interpretation of variance ratio as
denoting the fraction of real exchange rate variation due to variation in
cross-country tradable goods: No component can sensibly account for more
than total real exchange rate variation. This demonstrates that the frac-
tion of the covariance assigned to ∆nxt is to some extent arbitrary, as al-
13The variance ratios for US-Italian and US-German real exchange rates, for example,
always exceed 95% for horizons of up to 400 months (Engel, 1999:513).
14The minimum of 0.82 is reached for n = 185. It should be noted, however, that the
variance ratio statistic is not very reliable at long horizons, where only few observations
enter the calculation. This loss of statistical significance is a plausible explanation for the
variance ratio’s increase for n > 93, and the pronounced rise for n > 185.
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Figure 2.2: Variance decompositions over the full sample with a maximum
difference of 210 months
ready pointed out in section 2.3. Variance ratio values exceeding unity result
from the negative covariance of ∆nxt and ∆nyt : Variance Ratio 2 is greater
than one when [0.5var(∆nyt) < −cov(∆nxt,∆nyt)]; Variance Ratio 3 when
[var(∆nyt) < −cov(∆nxt,∆nyt)]. How can the negative correlation between
var(∆nyt) and cov(∆nxt,∆nyt) be interpreted? Given that ∆nxt is mainly
determined by nominal exchange rate fluctuations, my interpretation of the
negative correlation is that an increase in nominal exchange rate fluctuations
is associated with increased volatility of the relative price of domestic non-
tradable goods. This can be shown as follows: ∆nx is given as
∆nx ≡ ∆ne+∆np∗T −∆npT
and ∆ny as
∆ny ≡ [γ∗∆n(p∗N − p∗T )− γ∆n(pN − pT )] .
The negative covariance implies that increases in ∆nx are accompanied by a
reduction in ∆ny. The latter occurs when ∆n(pN−pT ) increases. This finding
is compatible with the empirical literature on the effects of inflation on rela-
tive price volatility: Tommasini (1993) and Lach and Tsiddon (1993) report
that the volatility of relative prices increased during inflationary periods in
Argentina and Israel.
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Variance Ratio 3: (varx+cov(x,y))/varqn
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Figure 2.3: Variance decompositions: only periods of fixed or managed ex-
change rates
Given the evidence presented in figure 2.1, Engel’s (1999:507) statement
that “relative prices of non-tradable goods appear to account for almost none
of the movement of US real exchange rates” seems to be confirmed by the
Brazilian-US real exchange rate. This result is disproved, however, when fo-
cusing on periods of managed exchange rates15 (see figure 2.3): During these,
relative non-tradables’ prices explain almost half of total real exchange rate
variation – the minimum values of Variance Ratios 1 to 3 are 0.66, 0.54 and
0.63, respectively. Furthermore, the share of real exchange rate movements
due to cross-country tradables’ prices decreases for longer horizons, as to be
expected if deviations from PPP are transitory.
As shown by figure 2.4, the same holds true for periods with a monthly
devaluation rate below 10 percent: The minimum values of Variance Ratios
1, 2 and 3 equal 0.55, 0.46 and 0.56, respectively. These findings indicate
that the causes of real exchange rate fluctuations vary with the exchange rate
regime under consideration and over the time horizon: For the full sample,
which includes both regimes of fixed and of floating exchange rates, relative
non-tradables’ prices are of minor importance for real exchange rate fluctua-
tions. During periods of managed exchange rate regimes and low devaluation
15These are defined to include periods of fixed exchange rates.
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Variance Ratio 3: (varx+cov(x,y))/varqn
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Figure 2.4: Variance decompositions: only periods with a monthly devalua-
tion rate below 10%
rates, in contrast, they account for up to half of the real exchange rate’s
variance. Furthermore, the contribution of cross-country tradables’ prices to
real exchange rate fluctuations is decreasing over time for the low-devaluation
subsample, as suggested by PPP.
How can these differences across exchange rate regimes be explained? A
straightforward justification is based on regime-specific nominal exchange rate
volatility coupled with sticky prices: As reported in table 2.1, fluctuations of
the Brazilian-US nominal exchange rate are considerably higher during pe-
riods of flexible exchange rates which, ceteris paribus, increases the contri-
bution of var (∆nx) to real exchange rate movements. In this context, the
‘ceteris paribus’ assumes constant domestic-currency prices of foreign and
home goods, which implies that the covariance between ∆nx and ∆ny is zero,
and that PPP fails. The former is valid at longer horizons for periods of
fixed exchange rates. In the short run and for the full sample, however, ∆nx
and ∆ny exhibit a negative covariance.
16 This suggests that it is negatively
related to the nominal exchange rate’s variance
(
∂cov(∆nx,∆ny)
∂var(∆ne)
< 0
)
. When
this is considered, the effect of an increase in var(∆ne) on Variance Ratios 2
and 3 becomes ambiguous.
16Of an absolute magnitude of about one third of the variance of ∆nq.
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Figure 2.5: Annual growth rates of non-tradables’ prices during the ‘Real’
stabilization (in %)
Another explanation is offered by the models discussed in Chapter 1.
These show that cash-covered transactions will rise as ERBS induces a
fall in inflation rates. Coupled with temporarily inelastic supply of non-
tradable goods, the positive demand shock produces an initial increase in
relative non-tradable goods’ prices, which subsides when supply increases.
This increases the volatility of non-tradables’ prices and their contribution to
the real exchange rate volatility. As an informal exploration of this hypothesis,
annual and monthly growth rates of various non-tradables’ prices during the
1994 ‘Real’ stabilization are graphed in figures 2.5 and 2.6. Figure 2.5 shows
that ERBS is initially accompanied by high growth rates of non-tradables’
prices, which are gradually reduced as a result of the exchange rate peg.
All non-tradables’ prices are characterized by large fluctuations, as figure 2.6
evinces.
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Figure 2.6: Monthly growth rates of non-tradables’ prices during the ‘Real’
stabilization (in %)
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter presents decompositions of Brazilian-US real exchange rate fluc-
tuations from April 1981 to May 2001. For the full sample, movements of
the relative price of non-tradable goods are found to account for less than
20 percent of the real exchange rate’s variance. When focusing on periods
of managed or relatively stable exchange rates, however, the contribution
of relative non-tradables’ prices reaches up to 50 percent. The difference
across exchange rate regimes confirms Mendoza’s (2000) findings based on
Mexican-US real exchange rates. Thus, the relatively high contribution of
non-tradables to real exchange rate fluctuations apparently constitutes an
additional ‘stylized fact’ of ERBS.
My findings underline differences between real exchange rate behavior in
developing and industrial economies: First, the determinants of real exchange
rate fluctuations in industrialized countries do not change across exchange
rate regimes. Second, the difference between the real exchange rate’s vari-
ance during regimes of fixed and of flexible exchange rates is much higher in
industrial countries: Mussa (1986) reports a tenfold rise in the real exchange
rates’ variance during periods of floating exchange rates. For the Brazilian-US
real exchange rate, I find a less than twofold increase. These differences point
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to particularities in the price setting processes of industrial and developing
countries, a topic which has been little researched so far.
Models on the real effects of ERBS typically assume PPP to hold and at-
tribute all real exchange rate movements to changes in relative non-tradables’
prices. This is only partially confirmed by my empirical analysis: Even dur-
ing fixed exchange rate regimes and horizons of up to two years, more than
half of the real exchange rate movements are due to differences in exchange
rate-adjusted prices of tradable goods. This raises the question of whether
the models incorporating PPP miss a crucial aspect of price setting in devel-
oping countries. In my opinion, the answer is negative: Replacing PPP by a
weaker, but still positive relationship between domestic and foreign tradables’
prices – as indicated by the data – would not alter the models’ qualitative re-
sults. Substituting PPP in calibrated models of ERBS, however, could prove
to be fruitful – in particular since Rebelo and Ve´gh (1995) show that the
magnitude of the real exchange rate appreciation cannot be reproduced in
flexible-price models in which PPP holds.17 The exact formulation to replace
PPP is still subject to debate. The analysis undertaken in this chapter is one
of accounting, and can provide only frail indications on what should replace
PPP: One is the reduced synchronization between nominal exchange rates
and tradable goods’ prices during periods of high (and volatile) devaluation
rates. This could possibly result from the existence of fixed menu costs asso-
ciated with changing tradables’ prices. Further investigation into the nature
of price setting in high inflation countries could shed light on this conjecture.
As for now, I retain the finding that fluctuations of relative non-tradables’
prices do contribute to real exchange rate fluctuations. In a next step,
presented in the following chapter, possible determinants of relative non-
tradables’ prices are assessed.
17Another shortcoming of calibrated models is their failure to reproduce the observed
persistence of real exchange rate fluctuations, see for example Chari et al. (1998). This
subject is not addressed here since my empirical analysis is based on real exchange rate
changes, and hence not ideally suited for an assessment of real exchange rate persistence.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Summary of the Literature on Real Exchange
Rate Decompositions
Publication Geographical
Coverage
Traded
Goods
Non-
Traded
Goods
Period Data
Source
Chari,
Kehoe,
McGrat-
tan 1998
Measure I
USA, Eu-
rope
CPI: Food,
all goods
less food
CPI: Rent,
services
less rent
1972-
1994
OECD
MEI
Measure II USA,
Europe
(France,
Italy, UK)
Private
consump-
tion de-
flators:
Durables,
semi-
durables
and non-
durables
Private
consump-
tion de-
flators:
Services
1972-
1994
OECD
Quart.
Nat.
Acc.
Measure
III
USA, Eu-
rope
Wholesale
prices
1972-
1994
Engel 1999
Section I
Canada,
France,
Germany,
Italy,
Japan,
US
CPI: Food,
all goods
less food
CPI: Shel-
ter, all
services
less shelter
1/1962
-
12/1995
OECD
MEI
Section IV Japan,
USA, Eu-
rope
Overall
producer
price index
Consumer
price index
1.1972
- 1997
OECD
MEI
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Publication Geographical
Coverage
Traded
Goods
Non-
Traded
Goods
Period Data
Source
Engel 2000
Measure I
Mexico,
USA
Mex.:
Consumer
prices of
traded
goods; US:
Consumer
prices of
commodi-
ties
none 9.1991-
8.1999
Data-
stream
Engel 2000
Measure II
Consumer
prices of
traded
goods:
food,
household
furnish-
ings,
apparel
none
Mendoza
2000
Mexico,
USA
CPI:
Durables,
non-
durables
CPI: Ser-
vices
1.1969-
5.2000
BoM,
BLS
Parsley
2001
6 Asian
Countries,
USA
Different
consumer
price
indices
Different
consumer
price
indices
1990 -
2000
Burnstein,
Neves,
Rebelo
2000
Argentina,
USA
Various
consumer
prices
Various
consumer
prices
4.1991
-
4.1993
Argent.
Min-
istry
of
Econ.
Notes: “OECD MEI” denotes the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators,
“BoM” the Bank of Mexico and “BLS” the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Result of all above-mentioned studies, with exception of Mendoza (2000):
Most of real exchange rate appreciation due to cross country tradable goods’
prices.
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2.6.2 Data
Brazilian prices are based on the national consumer price index (Indice Na-
cional de Prec¸os ao Consumidor, INPC ), which reports the sub-categories
‘Food and Beverages’, ‘Housing’, ‘Apparel’, ‘Transportation and Communica-
tion’, ‘Medical Care’ and ‘Personal Expenditure’. From August 1999 onwards,
prices for ‘Transportation’ and Communication’ are reported separately. The
‘Transportation and Communication’ index is constructed by weighting the
variables with their respective weights in the CPI, that is 14.37 percent for
‘Transportation’ and 1.05 percent for ‘Communication’. Likewise, the price
of ‘Education’ is excluded from ‘Personal Expenditure’ from August 1999 on-
wards. I reconstruct the previously used index by including the price index for
‘Education’ with a weight of 0.26. All data on Brazilian prices was obtained
from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geographia e Estat´ıstica (www.ibge.gov.br).
US Consumer Prices for ‘All Urban Consumers’ were obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.org). A price index equivalent to the Bra-
zilian index of ‘Personal Expenses’ is calculated from the price indices for ‘En-
tertainment/Recreation’ (until December 1992) and ‘Miscellaneous Personal
Services’. Instead of ‘Transportation and Communication’, only ‘Transporta-
tion’ was used until December 1992.
The nominal exchange rate from January 1981 to May 2000 was obtained
from the International Financial Statistics (market rate, US dollars per real,
period average, Line ah). Thereafter, the monthly arithmetic average calcu-
lated from the daily exchange rate (Taxa Venta), as reported by the Brazilian
Central Bank, (www.bcb.br.gov) is used.
All prices and the exchange rate are re-based such that the arithmetic
average from January 1982 to December 1984 equals 100. Prices are not
seasonally adjusted.
The overall weight of non-tradable goods’ prices in the CPI is computed
as the sum of the weights of ‘Food & Beverages Away From Home’, ‘Shelter’,
‘Transportation’, ‘Communication’, ‘Medical Care Services’, ‘Miscellaneous
Personal Services’, ‘Recreation’ and ‘Education’. Weights entering the Brazi-
lian CPI are based on the 1987/88 Pesquisa de Orc¸amentos Familiares. They
were used for calculating the CPI from June 1989 to July 1999. Previously,
the weights were based on the Pesquisa ENDEF of 1974/75, and beginning
in August 1999, on the 1995/96 Pesquisa de Orc¸amentos Familiares. US
weights are based on the 1993-95 Household Survey. These have been used
for calculating the CPI since January 1998.
Chapter 3
Forward-Looking Price Setting
during Temporary Exchange
Rate-Based Stabilizations
3.1 Motivation
Exchange rate pegs in high inflation economies are typically accompanied by
pronounced real exchange rate movements. This has been documented by two
strands of empirical research: First, studies on the stylized facts of ERBS,
which found the implementation of – frequently transitory – exchange rate
pegs in high inflation economies to be accompanied by a pronounced real ex-
change rate appreciation. Second, the literature on early warning indicators
for currency crises, which documents that the collapse of exchange rate pegs
is generally preceded by a real exchange rate appreciation. The empirical
analysis of the stylized facts of (temporary) ERBS conducted in section 1.3.2
revealed that the real appreciation is halted only when the stabilization is
abandoned and followed by a nominal depreciation. Furthermore, the grad-
ual real appreciation was found to be accompanied by a consumption boom.
Argentina’s ‘Tablita’ Program, a crawling peg implemented in December 1978
and abandoned in the first quarter of 1981, illustrates this phenomenon. Fig-
ure 3.1 evinces that the Argentinean devaluation rate reduction was paralleled
by a real exchange rate appreciation which was halted only with the peg’s
end in 1981.
Empirical studies on early warning indicators for currency crises in semi-
industrialized economies suggest that these are typically preceded by real
exchange rate appreciations, regardless of the peg’s previous duration. Klein
and Marion (1997), for example, identify determinants of the duration of cur-
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Figure 3.1: Consumption and real exchange rate dynamics during the Argen-
tinean ‘Tablita’ stabilization program
89
rency pegs. Based on data for a panel of 17 countries over the period from
1957 to 1991, they find devaluations to be predated by sharp real apprecia-
tions. Similarly, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) survey the empir-
ical literature on early warning indicators for developing countries’ currency
crises, and identify the real exchange rate appreciation as a key predictor.1
This result is supported by other empirical studies on developing economies
by Frankel and Rose (1996), Kamin and Babson (1999) , as well as Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1999).2
How can the pre-crisis real exchange rate appreciation be rationalized?
The literature on currency crises has largely failed to offer an explanation.
Without explicit reference to a modeling framework, it tends to view the real
appreciation as a ‘fundamental’ phenomenon. Kamin and Babson (1999:7),
for instance, classify the real exchange rate as a variable “reflecting the fun-
damental determinants of a country’s financial position”, in contrast to “var-
iables reflecting market expectations of a future crisis or the initial effects of
an emerging crisis”. This stands in contrast to the notion of forward-looking
nominal exchange rates, which, coupled with sticky domestic and foreign
prices, produce forward-looking real exchange rates.
As pointed out in Chapter 1, the recent literature on the stylized facts of
ERBS regards the real appreciation as the result of excess demand for non-
tradable goods, coupled with sluggish adjustment of non-tradables’ supply.
However, simulations show that the magnitude of the real appreciation arising
from the above mechanism falls significantly short of the empirical observed
ones (Rebelo and Ve´gh, 1995). Extensions by Uribe (1997b) and Burnstein,
Neves and Rebelo (2000) improve the models’ quantitative performance in
reproducing the real appreciation: In general equilibrium models with flexible
prices, Uribe assumes habit formation, whereas Burnstein et al. relax the
assumption of purchasing power parity for tradable final goods by introducing
a distribution sector. Despite these extensions, the real appreciation still
hinges on the assumption of excess demand for and deficient supply of non-
tradable goods. However, some evidence suggests that this might not be the
only source of the real exchange rate appreciation: Section 1.3.2 indicates an
increase in inventories before and during stabilizations, which contradicts the
notion of supply shortages. Furthermore, sketchy data on car sales in Latin
1Kaminsky et al. (1998) list a total of sixty explanatory variables which have been
included in regressions explaining currency crises. Only six variables of those have been
included in at least four of the surveyed publications and have proved to be significant in at
least half of the estimations. These six variables are the real exchange rate, international
reserves, credit growth, inflation, real GDP growth or level, and the fiscal deficit.
2Similarly, Eichengreeen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) find that OECD countries experi-
ence problems of external balance prior to devaluation crises.
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America suggests that the consumption boom during ERBS mainly reflects
increases in tradable goods purchases.3Moreover, excess demand is a very
unlikely cause for the real appreciation witnessed before currency crises in
developing economies, as these are typically preceded by below-trend output
(see Kaminsky et al. 1998).
An alternative explanation for the initial real appreciation during ERBS is
offered by the ‘early’ reduced-form models. Rodriguez (1982) and Dornbusch
(1982) explain the stylized facts and termination of ERBS, respectively, in
models with inflation inertia. In these models, backward-looking inflation
expectations or predetermined inflation rates give rise to a slow adjustment
of prices to the (stabilized) devaluation rate, producing the real appreciation.
More recently, Calvo and Ve´gh (1993) incorporate sluggish adjustment of non-
tradables’ prices in an optimization-based model of temporary stabilization.4
However, despite this extension, the cause of the real appreciation is identical
to what is underlying the flexible-price models discussed above: Stabilization
effects an increase in goods demand, causing the price of non-tradable goods
to rise and the real exchange rate to appreciate.
The model presented in this chapter shares two properties of Calvo and
Ve´gh’s framework, namely the existence of price stickiness and the perfectly
anticipated temporariness of stabilization. These features give rise to a new
mechanism for real exchange rate appreciation: Non-tradable producers’ price
setting behavior. This is explored in a small open economy, in which produc-
ers of intermediate non-tradable goods are monopolists which can change
their prices only every other period. The price of tradable goods, in contrast,
is determined by PPP. Stabilization is defined as a publicly known, tempo-
rary fall in the nominal exchange rate. Given PPP, this is equivalent to a
reduction in tradable goods’ prices. This effects a decrease in nominal unit
input costs of the production of non-tradable goods. However, as producers
of non-tradable goods anticipate the future devaluation rate increase, and
incorporate this expected rise in input costs in current prices, the relative
price of non-tradable goods exceeds its pre-stabilization value, and the real
exchange rate appreciates. Thus, the transitoriness of stabilization affects the
real exchange rate through two channels: First, as in other models, via the in-
crease in demand and second, via the forward-looking pricing of non-tradable
goods. In contrast to models which rely exclusively on the first channel, the
second channel can also explain the real appreciation witnessed in the eve of
3Data on car sales is analyzed by de Gregorio et al. (1998) and Calvo and Ve´gh (1999).
4Calvo and Ve´gh assume that non-tradables’ prices do not immediately reach their
market-clearing level, but rise slowly if demand exceeds an exogenously given full em-
ployment output. This, however, is contradictory to their alleged assumption of demand-
determined supply of non-tradables.
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currency crises.5
Technically, the model is closest to frameworks with monopolistic com-
petition and sticky prices by Kiley (2002) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996,
Chapter 10). The latter is part of the recent research on open economies
with sticky prices, which includes approaches by Svensson and van Wijnber-
gen (1989), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995 ), Corsetti and Pesenti (1997), and
others surveyed by Lane (2001). The three aforementioned models present
economies with forward-looking, optimizing agents in an environment with
short run nominal price rigidities, but in which the law of one price holds for
traded goods.6 The model here follows this literature and introduces price
stickiness by assuming that producers of non-tradable goods fix their prices
in the period prior to an exogenous shock (which, in my model, is the nominal
devaluation). This, of course, is to some extent arbitrary. Alternatively, the
forward-looking price setting could be based on microeconomic foundations
by introducing convex price adjustment costs.7 This would yield similar qual-
itative results as the imposed two-period price setting: Adjusting the price
of non-tradable goods to the decrease and the subsequent surge of tradables’
prices is then associated with costs which increase in the price change’s mag-
nitude. Thus, price setters find it optimal to decrease non-tradables’ prices
by less than implied by the fall in input prices, incorporating the future in-
crease. However, extending the model in this direction would render the
derivation and interpretation of implied real exchange rate movements much
more tedious – as noted by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996:674):
“It is profoundly difficult to rationalize nominal price rigidities in
a way that is both theoretically elegant and empirically sensible.”
My modeling choice was initially skewed towards greater analytical sim-
plicity. An extension of the original model presented in section 3.3 shows that
the main results remain valid when assuming overlapping price contracts a` la
Taylor (1979, 1980).
A crucial element of the model is that agents anticipate the peg’s collapse,
that is, the deficient credibility of stabilization. This lack of credibility is a
5It should be noted that the implied positive impact of expected currency devaluation
on relative non-tradables’ prices is opposite to what models of strategic price setting de-
rive as optimal exchange rate pass through (see for example Tirole, 1988, and Froot and
Klemperer, 1989). This does not undermine my model, as it is perfectly sensible that price
setting processes should vary under different circumstances, that is, between low inflation
industrialized economies and high inflation developing countries.
6However, most of above-mentioned work deals with two symmetric economies, which
is not adequate for my analysis of small high inflation economies.
7Convex price adjustment costs have for example been used in models by Rotemberg
(1987) and Caballero (1989) .
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likely fate of inflation stabilization efforts in chronic inflation countries, where
a prolonged fight against inflation and a large number of unsuccessful stabili-
zation programs are likely to render any additional stabilization effort ex ante
non-credible. Empirical evidence on the deficient credibility of stabilizations
in developing economies has been presented, among others, by Baxter (1985),
Ageno`r and M. Taylor (1993), Ruge-Murcia (1995), and Ageno`r and Masson
(1999).
Another important feature of the model is, of course, the assumption
of price stickiness. Evidence on goods pricing and the nature of nominal
price rigidities in inflationary economies has been presented in section 1.6.
An explicit account of forward-looking price setting prior to the recent crisis
in Argentina is given by the Economist (2002, January 5th-11th:39), which
reports that “some retailers have started putting up prices in anticipation of a
devaluation.” Similarly, Bruno and Piterman (1988) describe forward-looking
wage setting during the Israeli stabilization experience:
“[F]irms and workers apparently did not expect stabilization to
last. Both firms and workers expected devaluation and a renewal
of the inflation and therefore they set nominal wage increases at
an excessively high level. It could reasonably be assumed, on the
basis of more than a decade of experience on this regard, that the
government could not be able to resist for long the pressure (...)
for devaluation.”
Under monopolistic competition, these wage increases are passed on to
prices – giving rise to exactly the price setting hypothesis incorporated in
this chapter’s model.8
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents
a model with monopolistic competition and sticky non-tradables’ prices and
analyzes the effect of an exogenous, temporary fall in the exchange rate on
consumption, the real exchange rate and the current account. Section 3.3 ex-
tends the model to incorporate staggered price setting. Section 3.4 empirically
investigates the proposed price-setting mechanism, that is, the impact of de-
valuation expectations on non-tradables’ prices, using disaggregated Mexican
data. Section 3.5 discusses how the model could be extended to incorporate
self-fulfilling currency crises.
8This can easily be shown in a modeling framework with sticky wages, as for example
the one suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) in their section 10.4.
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3.2 The Model
The model economy is populated with agents that derive utility from the
consumption of a basket of tradable and non-tradable goods, both of which
are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. Agents are endowed with a fixed
amount of tradable goods, priced exogenously in the world market. Non-
tradable final goods are produced competitively using a continuum of non-
tradable inputs. Each agent owns a firm which holds a monopoly over produc-
ing one of these non-tradable intermediate goods. The firms which produce
non-tradable intermediate goods maximize profits under the constraint that
their goods’ prices must remain constant for two periods. The non-tradable
final good is produced with a continuum of differentiated intermediate goods.
Home agents can borrow and lend abroad, whereas the expenditure of the
home government is financed exclusively by issuing new currency. The model
is deterministic and rational expectations hold, which implies that all agents
have perfect foresight.
The next sections introduce the theoretical model. After deriving the
agents’ and the firms’ optimal policies, monetary and fiscal authorities are
considered. In a next step, the effects of a credible and a non-credible ex-
change rate peg are compared.
3.2.1 Consumption
A representative agent of the economy chooses his consumption path as to
maximize the following utility criterion:
Ut =
∞∑
s=t
βs−tlog(Cs) (3.1)
To abstract from inessential dynamics, it is assumed that β, the subjective
discount factor, equals the real interest rate factor, (1 + r)−1. C denotes a
Cobb-Douglas consumption index over tradable (CT ) and non-tradable (CN)
consumer goods
Ct = C
γ
T,tC
1−γ
N,t . (3.2)
γ ∈ (0, 1) and (1 − γ) are the weights of tradable and non-tradable goods.9
Following Calvo and Ve´gh (1993), it is assumed that consumption has to be
covered with money holdings from the previous period:
PT,tCT,t + PN,tCN,t ≤Mt−1 (3.3)
9This formulation of the consumption basket implies a unity elasticity of substitution
between tradables and non-tradables
(
d log
(
CT
CN
)
d log
(
pN
pT
) |U=U¯ = 1
)
.
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where Mt−1 denotes period t − 1 nominal money holdings and PT,t and PN,t
the domestic currency prices of tradable and non-tradable final goods, re-
spectively. The cash-in-advance constraint captures the function of money as
a medium of exchange and can be thought to result from sequenced open-
ing hours of goods and asset markets.10 The above cash-in-advance con-
straint assumes that transactions in both the market for tradable and for
non-tradable goods are conducted with domestic currency. An alternative
formulation of the cash-in-advance constraint consists in requiring agents to
hold either domestic or foreign currency for transacting, thus accounting for
currency substitution (see Calvo and Ve´gh, 1994b). However, this implies
that the amount of seignorage accruing to the foreign central bank, and thus
the economy’s aggregate wealth, decreases in the inflation rate. In order to
avoid these wealth effects, currency substitution is ruled out in this chapter’s
model.11 Note that the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality when
the nominal interest rate is positive: Agents do not hold money in excess of
what is strictly necessary for consuming if they can earn interest on holding
bonds instead. Since attention is restricted to equilibria with positive interest
rates, the cash-in-advance constraint therefore implies that
PT,tCT,t + PN,tCN,t = Mt−1. (3.4)
The agent’s nominal period budget constraint is given by
PtB
∗
t+1 = Pt(1 + r)B
∗
t − (Mt −Mt−1) + PtCt + PT,tY¯T + pN,t(z)yN,t(z) + Ptgt.
(3.5)
Pt, B
∗
t+1, Y¯T and gt denote the price level, that is, the consumption-based
price index (which will be explicitly derived later), real holdings of foreign
bonds at the beginning of period t+1, the endowment of tradable goods and
government net transfer to the private sector, respectively. yN,t(z) denotes
the output produced by the firm which is owned by the agent indexed by z,
pN,t(z) the price.
12 Equation (3.5), coupled with the transversality condition
10Clower (1967) is the pioneering work incorporating cash-in-advance constraints. De-
tailed treatments of sequenced opening hours in a stochastic environment can be found in
Sargent (1987:158ff). The notation for prices used in the cash-in-advance constraint, that
is, explicitly denoting the price levels of tradable and of non-tradable goods is adopted for
the sake of expositional clarity. It is particularly useful for analyzing (temporary) changes
in the nominal exchange rate. No fundamental difference exists between this notation
and the more common practice of formulating everything in terms of the relative price of
tradable goods.
11For the same reason, imports are not modeled to be subject to a foreign-cash-in-advance
constraint.
12Notice that pN,t(z)yN,t(z) is the sum of the nominal production cost and the profits of
intermediate non-tradable goods production. The latter are given as
95
limT→∞ (1 + r)
−T
(
B∗t+T+1 +
Mt+T+1
Pt+T+1
)
= 0 and the assumption that agents’
initial asset holdings equal zero yields the intertemporal budget constraint as
∞∑
s=t
(1 + r)t−sCs =
∞∑
s=t
(1 + r)t−s
[
PT,s
Ps
y¯T +
PN,s
Ps
YN,s + gt − Ms −Ms−1
Ps
]
.
(3.6)
This chapter’s analysis will show that the price charged and quantity supplied
by each monopolist equal the aggregate non-tradables’ price, PN,t, and output
of non-tradable final goods, YN,t. In anticipation on this result, pN,t(z) and
yN,t(z) are therefore substituted with PN,t and YN,t in what follows.
Substituting the cash-in-advance constraint into the period budget con-
straint the latter can be reformulated to yield
Ct = −Pt−1
Pt
(
B∗t − (1 + r)B∗t−1
)
+
PT,t−1
Pt
Y¯T +
PN,t−1
Pt
YN,t−1 +
Pt−1
Pt
gt.
Substituting this expression for C into the intertemporal utility function and
taking the derivative with respect to B∗ gives rise to the following first-order
condition for optimal consumption:
Ct
Pt
Pt−1
= Ct+1
Pt+1
Pt
(3.7)
Equation (3.7) differs from the usual Euler equation as agents have to hold
currency in the period prior to consumption. Defining the inflation rate be-
tween periods t − 1 and t as pit ≡ PtPt−1 − 1, pit+1 as pit+1 ≡
Pt+1
Pt
− 1, the
first-order condition can be reformulated to yield
∂U(Ct)/∂Ct
1 + pit
=
∂U(Ct+1)/∂Ct+1
1 + pit+1
(3.8)
where ∂U(Ct)/∂Ct denotes the derivative of utility with respect to consump-
tion, ∂U(Ct)/∂Ct = C
−1
t . The above equation states that the marginal utility
of consumption per unit of its cost must be equal across periods. Since con-
sumption must be covered by the preceding period’s money holdings, the cost
of consumption includes the cost of holding money, that is, for money held
between periods t − 1 and t the inflation rate pit, and pit+1 for money held
pN,t(z)yN,t+j(z)− Pt+jMCyN,t+j(z)
where MC yN,t+j(z) denotes the real production cost function.
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between periods t and t + 1. The first order condition shows that optimal
consumption is constant in equilibria with a constant inflation rate.13
The first-order condition and the intertemporal budget constraint allow
to derive a closed-form solution for optimal consumption as
Ct = (1 + pit)
−1
[ ∞∑
s=t
(1 + pis)
−1 (1 + r)t−s
]−1
Wt
whereW is defined asWt ≡
∑∞
s=t (1 + r)
t−s
(
PT,s
Ps
Y¯T +
PN,s
Ps
YN,s + gt − Ms−Ms−1Ps
)
.
A detailed derivation of this expression for consumption can be found in ap-
pendix 3.6.1.
First-order condition (3.7) determines the optimal path for total consump-
tion. The division of total consumption between tradable and non-tradable
goods is found by maximizing total consumption, given total expenditure,
that is, by maximizing
Ct = C
γ
T,tC
1−γ
N,t
subject to
PN,t
Pt
CN,t +
PT,t
Pt
CT,t = Zt
where Zt equals total real expenditure on consumption. This yields
14
CT,t = γ
1
PT,t
Znomt (3.9)
and
CN,t = (1− γ) 1
PN,t
Znomt (3.10)
where Znomt denotes total nominal expenditure, Z
nom
t = PtZt. Total real ex-
penditure, Zt, equals total real consumption, Ct. Therefore, above demand
equations can be expressed as
CT,t = γ
Pt
PT,t
Ct
13Recall that the subjective discount factor and the real interest rate factor do not enter
the first-order condition, as these were assumed to be equal.
14The derivation is as follows: In a first step, the Lagrange function
L = CγT,tC
1−γ
N,t − λ(PN,tPt CN,t +
PT,t
Pt
CT,t − Zt) is maximized with respect to CT,t and CN,t.
The ratio of first-order conditions gives relative consumption of non-tradables as CN,tCT,t =
1−γ
γ
PN,t
PT,t
. Substituting CN and CT with the values implied by the total expenditure function
yields equations (3.9) and (3.10).
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and
CN,t = (1− γ) Pt
PN,t
Ct.
In a last step, the (consumption-based) price index P is derived. Follow-
ing Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996:227), it is defined as the minimum nominal
expenditure Znomt required to acquire one unit of the consumption bundle.
15
Formally, this can be expressed as
Pt ≡ {Znomt |C(Znomt ) = 1} .
Demand equations (3.9) and (3.10) maximize consumption, given spending
Znom. The minimum expenditure to acquire one unit of C is thus found by
substituting these demand functions into the definition of the consumption
basket, equation (3.2), setting the resulting expression equal to one.(
γ
1
PT,t
Znomt
)γ (
(1− γ) 1
PN,t
Znomt
)1−γ
= 1
Solving the above equation for Znomt yields the price index as
Pt =
(
PT,t
γ
)γ (
PN,t
1− γ
)(1−γ)
. (3.11)
3.2.2 Production of Non-tradable Goods
The non-tradable goods sector is characterized by the following structure:
Final non-tradable goods, YN , are produced competitively, using a continuum
of intermediate inputs, yN . Each of these intermediate goods is produced by a
monopolist. It is assumed that intermediate good prices can be changed only
every other period, that is, their producers set one price for periods t and
t+ 1 at the beginning of period t. The monopolistic competition framework
serves to render the assumption of sticky prices more plausible: Monopolistic
producers possess some market power, and thus are able to set prices for their
products. As shown by Akerlof and Yellen (1985 ) and Mankiw (1985), in the
presence of menu costs these preset prices might not be changed in response
to shocks.
The following sections will first derive the demand for non-tradable in-
termediate goods by analyzing the production of non-tradable final goods,
and then turn to the production and pricing decision of intermediate goods’
producers.
15The definition used here is not identical to Obstfeld and Rogoff’s since they use tradable
goods’ prices as numeraire.
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Production of Non-Tradable Final Goods
The production of non-tradable final goods uses non-tradable intermediate
goods, indexed by z ∈ [0, 1], according to the following linear homogenous
CES production function:
YN =
[∫ 1
0
yN(z)
θdz
] 1
θ
(3.12)
where 0 < θ < 1. yN(z) denotes the intermediate goods, which the producers
of final goods purchase at a price of pN,s(z). The real cost of producing final
non-tradable goods thus amounts to
[
P−1N,s
∫ 1
0
[yN,s(z)pN,s(z)] dz
]
; the present
value of final good producers’ real profits is given as
∞∑
s=t
(1 + r)s−t
[(∫ 1
0
yN,s(z)
θdz
) 1
θ
− P−1N,s
∫ 1
0
yN,s(z)pN,s(z)dz
]
.
Maximizing the above function with respect to yN yields the demand for
intermediate goods as
yN,t(z) =
(
PN,t
pN,t(z)
) 1
1−θ
YN,t. (3.13)
Note that the price elasticity of demand faced by each monopolistic sup-
plier of intermediate non-tradable goods is given by |∂yN,t/∂pN,t
yN,t/pN,t
| = 1
1−θ . The
price of non-tradable final goods, PN,t, is the minimum nominal expenditure
necessary to acquire one unit of YN . Analogously to the derivation of the
consumption-based price index, it is calculated by substituting the demand
of final goods’ producers, equation (3.13), into the production function, and
setting the resulting expression for YN equal to one:
1 =
∫ 1
0
[(
PN,t
pN,t(z)
) 1
1−θ
]θ
dz
 1θ (3.14)
Solving above equation for PN yields the minimum expenditure for acquiring
one unit of YN as
PN,t =
[∫ 1
0
pN,t(z)
θ
θ−1dz
] θ−1
θ
. (3.15)
Non-tradable final goods are produced exclusively for domestic consump-
tion. An equilibrium on the market for non-tradable final goods is thus given
by
YN,t = CN,t. (3.16)
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Intermediate Goods Production and Pricing
Suppliers of non-tradable intermediate goods are monopolists who are con-
scious of the above-derived demand function for their respective good. At
the beginning of period t, each supplier sets the price for his good over two
periods such that the present value of expected profits over these periods is
maximized. Demand is then met at the posted price.
A producer of a particular non-tradable intermediate good chooses the
price pN,t(z) which maximizes
1∑
j=0
(1 + r)−j
[(
pN,t(z)
Pt+j
−MC
)
yN,t+j(z)
]
. (3.17)
MC yN,t+j(z) is the producer’s cost function. MC denotes the constant real
unit cost of producing the intermediate good.16 The (unorthodox) assumption
of constant average costs is imposed only as it greatly simplifies computations
in what follows; replacing it by a cost function with increasing marginal costs
would not change the results. Furthermore, it can be shown that the second-
order conditions for profit maximization hold. Each price setter is assumed
to be ‘small’ in the sense that he ignores the effect of his price on the overall
price level and on aggregate demand for non-tradables. Since agents hold
perfect foresight, expectation operators are omitted.
Maximizing the above function with respect to pN,t(z) yields the following
first-order condition:
θpN,t(z)
1∑
j=0
{
(1 + r)−j P
1
1−θ
N,t+jYN,t+j
}
=
1∑
j=0
{
(1 + r)−j MCPt+jP
1
1−θ
N,t+jYN,t+j
}
From this, the profit-maximizing price of non-tradable intermediate goods
can be solved as
pN,t(z) = θ
− 1
γ γ−1(1− γ)1− 1γMC 1γ
P γT,t + (1 + r)−1 P γT,t+1 YN,t+1YN,t
1 + (1 + r)−1 YN,t+1
YN,t
 1γ . (3.18)
A detailed derivation of above expression is presented in the appendix 3.6.2
to this chapter. Equation (3.18) shows that all monopolistic competitors
charge the same price for their good: The determinants of each producer’s
16The intermediate goods’ production functions are not spelled out explicitly in order to
simplify the model. An example of a production function which yields the assumed cost
function is the assumption of output as proportional to labor input, coupled with infinitely
elastic labor supply.
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price, namely, marginal cost, tradables’ prices and aggregate demand for non-
tradables, are equal across producers. Using pN,t(z) = pN,t in the definition
of final non-tradable goods’ prices, equation (3.15), yields
PN,t = pN,t, (3.19)
that is, in a symmetric equilibrium, the price of non-tradable final goods
equals the price of non-tradable intermediate goods.17
Tradable Goods
Home agents are endowed with an amount Y¯T of tradable goods. Supply of
tradable goods from abroad is infinitely elastic. In absence of impediments
to trade, purchasing power parity holds, that is, the price of tradable goods
in the domestic economy equals their domestic-currency denominated price
abroad.
PT,t = Et, (3.20)
where Et denotes the nominal exchange rate and the foreign price of tradable
goods (in foreign currency) is normalized to one. Equilibrium in the market
for tradable goods is given by the equality of supply and demand for these
goods,
Y¯T + CAt = CT,t (3.21)
where CA denotes net imports of goods.
3.2.3 The Money Market
Money demand is given by the cash-in-advance constraint: Given the posi-
tive nominal interest rate and perfect foresight, agents will hold exactly the
amount of cash necessary for consuming. This implies nominal money de-
mand of
Mt = Ct+1Pt+1.
It is assumed that money supply is determined by the government’s fi-
nancing requirements: Each period, the government pays out a net transfer
of an exogenously given magnitude to households. The transfer is financed
with seignorage revenues, which equal the sum of the inflation-tax proceeds,
that is , the total capital loss inflation imposes on holders of real money
17Recall that this result has already been used in the previous section for the period
budget constraint.
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balances, and the change in the economy’s real money holdings:18
Mt −Mt−1
Pt
=
(
Pt − Pt−1
Pt
Mt−1
Pt−1
)
+
(
Mt
Pt
− Mt−1
Pt−1
)
Given this financing pattern, money supply is given as
Mt −Mt−1
Pt
= gt. (3.22)
The financing pattern described above implies that the government’s fiscal
and monetary branches are not separated, that is, that the fiscal branch can
dictate the level of money supply, and all proceeds of money creation are
transferred directly to the fiscal authorities.19 gt denotes the governments
net transfers to the private sector, that is, the model does not rule out fiscal
tax revenues. Similarly, the model’s results do not hinge on the government’s
inability to borrow abroad. It could easily be extended to a version where
only a certain fraction of net spending has to be covered with seignorage. As
pointed out in section 1.2, this is a realistic assumption for the developing
economies under consideration.
The government budget constraint implies that changes in reserve money
have no effect on the economy’s wealth. This can be shown by substituting
above equation into the private sector’s nominal budget constraint, which
yields the economy’s aggregate nominal budget constraint as
PtBt+1 = Pt(1 + r)Bt + PtCt + PT,tY¯T + PN,tYN,t. (3.23)
Thus far, the account of monetary policy and fiscal policy has focused
on monetary aggregates: The central bank was assumed to increase reserve
money – ‘print money’ – in order to finance government spending. During
managed exchange rate regimes, however, nominal money supply is deter-
mined endogenously by the requirement to maintain the nominal exchange
rate at the targeted level. The exchange rate target – coupled with money
demand – then determines money supply. If, on the contrary, the central
bank engages in seignorage-finance of government expenditure, the nominal
exchange rate devalues. This can be further explored by reformulating the
government budget constraint, which gives the increase in nominal money
supply in period t as
Mt −Mt−1 = Ptgt.
18In models with nominal bonds, seignorage includes the capital loss inflation inflicts on
holders of nominal government bonds. This effect is not present in this chapter’s model,
which assumes that the home government does not issue bonds.
19The fiscal and monetary authorities’ separate and consolidated balance sheets are pre-
sented in appendix 4.7.1 to chapter 4.
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The period change in money demand is given by the cash-in-advance con-
straint as Mt − Mt−1 = Ct+1Pt+1 − CtPt. Money market equilibrium thus
implies
Ptgt = Ct+1Pt+1 − CtPt.
Substituting Ct+1 with the expression implied by first-order condition (3.7)
and reformulating yields
gt = Ct
[
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
]
.
The above equation shows that Pt must exceed Pt−1 whenever net transfers
are positive. As the aggregate price level is a function of PN,t and PT,t,
an increase in net transfers must be accompanied either by a rise in non-
tradables’ prices or an increase in the nominal exchange rate. Non-tradables’
prices are set by their producers, and are thus only indirectly affected by
government policy. The nominal exchange rate, in contrast, is under direct
control of the government. An increase in net transfers g must hence be
financed by increasing PT,t = Et, that is, currency devaluation.
3.2.4 Equilibrium in an Economy with a Constant Ex-
change Rate
This section derives characteristics of consumption and the real exchange rate
for an economy with a constant nominal exchange rate. This establishes a
benchmark against which to compare the effects of a temporary stabilization
policy presented in the next section.
When the devaluation rate equals zero, the price of non-tradable goods
can be shown to be constant, too. This follows from equation (3.18), which
gives PN,t as
PN,t = θ
− 1
γ γ−1(1−γ)1− 1γMC 1γPT,t
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t+1
PT,t
)γ
YN,t+1
YN,t
1 + (1 + r)−1 YN,t+1
YN,t

1
γ
. (3.24)
When tradables’ prices are constant, that is, P¯T = PT,t+1 = PT,t, the above
equation simplifies to
PN,t = θ
− 1
γ γ−1(1− γ)1− 1γMC 1γ P¯T
which shows that the price of non-tradable goods is constant and proportional
to the one of tradable goods. The demand functions for tradable and non-
tradable goods, equations (3.9) and (3.10), then imply that the consumption
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of tradable relative to non-tradable goods is constant:
CT,t
CN,t
=
γ
1− γ
P¯N
P¯T
= const.
Furthermore, constant tradables’ and non-tradables’ prices imply that the
overall price level is constant, too. First-order condition (3.7) shows that
aggregate consumption is constant:
Ct
Ct+1
=
Pt+1
Pt
Pt−1
Pt
= 1
Coupled with the intertemporal budget constraint, this implies that period
consumption must equal period income, that is, the sum of the output of
non-tradable goods and the endowment of tradable goods.
The real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of the foreign and the domes-
tic economies’ price levels, both expressed in domestic currency. Substituting
the aggregate price level with the expression given by equation (3.11), the
real exchange rate can be reformulated to yield
Et
Pt
=
PT,t
Pt
= γγ(1− γ)1−γ
(
P¯T
P¯N
)1−γ
.
Given constant prices of tradable and non-tradable goods, the real exchange
rate is constant.
In sum, an economy with a permanently constant exchange rate is chara-
cterized by constant prices, consumption, output and a constant real exchange
rate. The next section examines dynamics in an economy where the nominal
exchange rate is subject to exogenous changes.
3.2.5 Non-Credible, Temporary Stabilization
This section analyzes the central policy experiment of this chapter: The con-
sumption and real exchange rate dynamics resulting from a perfectly antici-
pated increase in the rate of nominal currency devaluation. This devaluation
can be thought to mark the end of an ERBS in which the government aimed
at permanently stabilizing the nominal exchange rate at a lower level. Ac-
cording to the government budget constraint, this must be associated with a
reduction in net government spending. The government achieved to imple-
ment lower spending during one period, but is then pressured to reverse the
spending cut and pay out positive net transfers.20 In order to finance these,
20The pressure can plausibly be thought to originate from the interest groups most
affected by the spending cuts.
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Figure 3.2: The price of tradable goods during stabilization
the government must sacrifice its nominal exchange rate target – recall that
the only means of generating revenue are increases in the nominal money sup-
ply, implying an increased devaluation rate. This nominal exchange rate path
is perfectly anticipated by private agents, that is, agents do not believe in the
government’s initial announcement of a permanently lower nominal exchange
rate. The temporary peg is thus equivalent to a non-credible peg.
In sum, the nominal exchange rate path is as follows: The nominal ex-
change rate is at a level of P¯T prior to the ‘stabilization’, where ‘stabilization’
denotes the period in which the exchange rate is targeted. It is lowered to a
level denoted PT,t∗ < P¯T at the beginning of period t
∗, denoted as the ‘sta-
bilization period’. At the beginning of period t∗ + 1, the nominal exchange
rate rises to its pre-stabilization level of P¯T and remains there indefinitely.
Formally, this can be expressed as
PT,s = P¯T for all s ∈ {0,∞|s 6= t∗} (3.25)
PT,s = PT,s < P¯T for s = t
∗.
Figure 3.2 graphs this nominal exchange rate path, and figure 3.3 (on page
105) recapitulates the timing in the model.
The above account of a transitory stabilization policy captures two im-
portant features of ‘real world’ ERBS: The nominal exchange rate target is
abandoned due to increased government spending, and the end of exchange
rate targeting is associated with a rise in currency devaluation. The main
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and t*+1,
pN,t*=pN,t*+1
Producers of non-
tradable goods set
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t*+2 and t*+3,
pN,t*+2=pN,t*+3
Figure 3.3: The timing in the model
purpose of my model is to assess the effects of this anticipated devaluation
rate increase. Therefore, a simplification seems admissible: The exchange rate
path (3.25) assumes that stabilization is a reduction of the nominal exchange
rate’s level. This differs from actual ERBS which typically aim at a lower
rate of currency devaluation. However, my results equally hold in a model
with a constant steady state devaluation rate which is temporarily reduced
during transitory stabilization. In this extension, the price setting rule must
be slightly altered: In period 0, each producer of a non-tradable intermediate
good sets a constant rate of price increase. Additionally, he can alter his price
discretely every other period. It can be shown that profit-maximizing produc-
ers set the constant rate of price increase equal to the steady state devaluation
rate. The exchange rate and price paths presented above can therefore be in-
terpreted as the exchange rate and price dynamics which remain when the
economy’s exogenous steady state devaluation is subtracted.
In what follows, the effects of the fully anticipated devaluation rate in-
crease – as implied by the nominal exchange rate path (3.25) – are explored.
The analysis will first present the formal proof for the respective effect, and
then elaborate on its intuition.
With regard to consumption, the following can be stated:
Proposition 1 Aggregate consumption increases during the stabilization pe-
riod.
Proof:
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From the first-order condition (3.7), the ratio of consumption in the sta-
bilization and in the post-stabilization period is given as
Ct∗
Ct∗+1
=
Pt∗+1
Pt∗
Pt∗−1
Pt∗
.
The above equation shows that Ct∗ unequivocally exceeds Ct∗+1 if the price
level decreases in the stabilization period, that is, if both Pt∗ < Pt∗+1 and
Pt∗ < Pt∗−1.
To begin with, the first of these inequalities, that is, Pt∗
Pt∗+1
< 1, will be
shown to hold. The ratio of the periods t∗ and the t∗ + 1 price levels is given
by
Pt∗
Pt∗+1
=
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗+1
)γ (
PN,t∗
PN,t∗+1
)1−γ
(3.26)
where I have used the fact that the price index Pt is defined as a geometric
average of non-tradables’ and tradables’ prices. Tradable goods’ prices are
determined exogenously by the assumed nominal exchange rate path (3.25)
which defines that PT,t∗ is smaller than PT,t∗+1. The price setting process for
non-tradable goods imposes the constraint that PN,t∗+1 equals PN,t∗ . Thus,
the equation (3.26) is smaller than one, that is, the price level in period t∗
is lower than in period t∗+1. The intuition for this is straightforward: As
tradable prices are assumed to increase in period t∗+1 and non-tradables’
prices are constant over periods t∗ and t∗+1, the overall price level increases.
In a next step, I show that Pt∗ is smaller than Pt∗−1. This is more involved,
as period t∗ non-tradables’ prices depend positively on both (reduced) current
and (increased) future tradable goods’ prices. The price of non-tradable goods
is given by the producer’s profit maximization as
PN,t∗ = γ
−1(1− γ)− 1−γγ θ− 1γMC 1γ PT,t∗
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗+1
PT,t∗
)γ YN,t∗+1
YN,t∗
1 + (1 + r)−1 YN,t∗+1
YN,t∗

1
γ
.
Even though each individual price setter considers YN,t∗ and YN,t∗+1 to be
exogenous, these are endogenous to the model: Goods market equilibrium
implies that YN is equal to the demand for non-tradables, given by
CN,t∗ = (1− γ) Pt∗
PN,t∗
Ct∗ .
YN,t∗+1
YN,t∗
can thus be reformulated to yield
YN,t∗+1
YN,t∗
=
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ (
PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ (
PN,t∗
PN,t∗+1
)
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where I have used the fact that the first-order condition for optimal consump-
tion implies that
Ct∗+1
Ct∗
= Pt∗
Pt∗+1
Pt∗
Pt∗−1
. Recall that the assumed price setting rule
imposes that PN,t∗ = PN,t∗+1.
Substituting the above expression for
YN,t∗+1
YN,t∗
in the equation for PN,t∗
yields
PN,t∗ = γ
−1(1−γ)− 1−γγ θ− 1γMC 1γPT,t∗
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗+1
PT,t∗−1
)γ ( PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ ( PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ

1
γ
.
(3.27)
Similarly, PN,t∗−1 can be expressed as
PN,t∗−1 = γ−1(1−γ)−
1−γ
γ θ−
1
γMC
1
γPT,t∗−1
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−2
)γ (PN,t∗−1
PN,t∗
)
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PN,t∗−1
PN,t∗
)

1
γ
(3.28)
where I have used the fact that PN,t∗−1 = PN,t∗−2 – non-tradables’ prices are
changed in even periods only – and that PT,t∗−1 = PT,t∗−2 is given by the
exogenously assumed nominal exchange rate path. The above equations yield
the ratio of non-tradables’ prices in periods t∗ and t∗ − 1 as
PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
=
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗+1
PT,t∗−1
)γ ( PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ ( PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ 1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PN,t∗−1
PN,t∗
)
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−2
)γ (PN,t∗−1
PN,t∗
)

1
γ
.
The ratio of the overall price levels in periods t∗ and t∗ − 1 is given as
Pt∗
Pt∗−1
=
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ (
PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ
. (3.29)
Substituting
PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
in the above equation and rearranging terms yields the
ratio of the overall price levels in periods t∗ and t∗ − 1 as
Pt∗
Pt∗−1
=
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ
+ (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ ( PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ ( PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ

1−γ
γ
·
·

(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ
+ (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ (PN,t∗−1
PN,t∗
)
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−2
)γ (PN,t∗−1
PN,t∗
)

1−γ
γ
. (3.30)
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In order to show that the price level decreases during temporary stabili-
zation, that is, in period t∗, each of the three terms of the above expression
is analyzed. By the very definition of stabilization, the first term is smaller
than one. The magnitude of the second term can easily be assessed when
expressing it as 
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ
+ A
1 + A

1−γ
γ
where A is defined as A ≡ (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ ( PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ
. Once more, it
just needs to be recalled that PT,t∗ falls during stabilization to find out that
this second term is smaller than one as well. Similarly, the third term can be
re-defined to yield 
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ
+B
1 +B

1−γ
γ
where I have used the fact that PT,t∗−1 equals PT,t∗−2, implying that
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)
=(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−2
)
, and B ≡ (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ (PN,t∗−1
PN,t∗
)
. Hence, the third term of
equation (3.30) is smaller than one, too, which implies that Pt∗ is smaller than
Pt∗−1, that is, the overall price level decreases during temporary stabilization.
Having shown that Pt∗ increases both with respect to Pt∗−1 and Pt∗+1, it is
now known that consumption increases during temporary stabilization, that
is, Ct∗ increases relative to Ct∗+1. 
What is the intuition for the rise in consumption? The government’s
period t∗ exchange rate target effects a fall in tradable goods’ prices. As
shown above, this decrease in tradables’ prices is associated with a lower
overall price level. Since the cash-in-advance constraint requires agents to
hold money prior to consuming, the effective cost of consumption includes
the capital loss or gain on holding real money balances due to nominal price
changes. A fall in prices implies that the real value of money balances in-
creases, which reduces the effective price of consumption. Therefore, period
t∗ consumption increases. In sum, the rise in consumption results from in-
tertemporal consumption substitution as a response to intertemporal price
changes. As pointed out in section 1.5, this mechanism was originally pro-
posed in a simpler modeling framework by Calvo (1986).
The next proposition considers the real exchange rate movements caused
by the temporary devaluation rate decrease.
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Proposition 2 The real exchange rate appreciates during temporary stabili-
zation.
Proof:
The real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of the foreign and the domes-
tic price levels, both expressed in home currency. Since PPP holds and the
price level abroad is normalized to 1, the real exchange rate can be expressed
as
PT,t
Pt
. Substituting Pt with the expression implied by equation (3.11), this
can be reformulated to yield
PT,t
Pt
= γγ(1− γ)1−γ
(
PT,t
PN,t
)1−γ
. (3.31)
The above equation shows that the real exchange rate is a strictly increasing
function of the relative price of tradable goods, which allows to focus on the
latter when assessing real exchange rate movements. The real exchange rate
appreciates in period t∗ when the relative price of tradable goods decreases
during period t∗, that is, when(
PT,t∗
PN,t∗
:
PT,t∗−1
PN,t∗−1
)
< 1.
This can be shown to hold: The relative price of tradables in period t∗ is
given as
PT,t∗
PN,t∗
= θ
1
γ γ(1− γ) 1−γγ MC− 1γ
[
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ ( PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ] 1γ
[
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗+1
PT,t∗−1
)γ ( PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ] 1γ
(3.32)
and
PT,t∗−1
PN,t∗−1
as
PT,t∗−1
PN,t∗−1
= θ
1
γ γ(1− γ) 1−γγ MC− 1γ
[
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PN,t∗−1
PN,t∗
)] 1
γ
[
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−2
)γ (PN,t∗−1
PN,t∗
)] 1
γ
.
(3.33)
The real exchange rate appreciates in period t∗ if PT,t∗
PN,t∗
<
PT,t∗−1
PN,t∗−1 , that is, if
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ ( PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗+1
PT,t∗−1
)γ ( PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ < 1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PN,t∗−1
PN,t∗
)
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−2
)γ (PN,t∗−1
PN,t∗
) .
(3.34)
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One possibility to show that the above inequality holds is to demonstrate
that the value of its left hand side is below one, and the expression on the
right hand side greater than one for all prices and parameters in the ranges
initially assumed (in particular, 0 < γ < 1). This can be shown to hold: The
left hand side of equation (3.34) is smaller than one if
1+(1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−1
)γ (
PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ
< 1+(1 + r)−1
(
PT,t∗+1
PT,t∗−1
)γ (
PN,t∗
PN,t∗−1
)1−γ
which can be reduced to the following inequality:
PT,t∗ < PT,t∗+1
The above inequality is fulfilled, since the exogenously given nominal exchange
rate path (3.25) exactly assumes that PT,t falls in period t
∗. Thus, the left
hand side of inequality (3.34) is smaller than one. Similarly, it can be shown
that the right hand side exceeds one, as, by assumption,
PT,t∗
PT,t∗−2
< 1. Thus,
inequality (3.34) holds and the real exchange rate appreciates during the
temporary peg. 
The mechanism underlying the real exchange rate appreciation is a novel
feature of this chapter’s model: As pointed out in section 1.5, most of the
existing models of ERBS explain the real appreciation with increases of rela-
tive non-tradables’ prices stemming from excess demand for these goods. The
model proposed in this chapter explains the real appreciation with forward-
looking price setting : Non-tradables producers anticipate the jump of the
nominal exchange rate when setting their prices over periods t and t + 1 by
maximizing the present value of their profits over these periods at the begin-
ning of period t. Via PPP, a rise in the nominal exchange rate is equivalent
to an increase in tradable goods’ prices, which enter the profit function as
a component of nominal costs. Therefore, the future increase in tradable
goods’ prices is reflected in relatively higher current prices of non-tradables,
thus giving rise to the real appreciation.
Given that the previous two propositions indicate that temporary stabi-
lization is accompanied by an increase in demand and a real appreciation,
it is straightforward to demonstrate that the consumption of tradable goods
rises and the current account deteriorates during stabilization. This is shown
analytically below.
Proposition 3 The consumption of tradable goods increases in period t∗,
both in absolute value and relative to non-tradable consumption. The current
account deteriorates.
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Proof:
In a first step, it will be shown that CT,t increases in absolute value. From
equation (3.9), the ratio of period t∗ and t∗ + 1 tradables consumption can
be derived as
CT,t∗
CT,t∗−1
=
Pt∗
Pt∗−1
PT,t∗−1
PT,t∗
Ct∗
Ct∗−1
.
Substituting Ct∗
Ct∗−1
with the expression given by the first-order condition (3.7),
this can be reformulated to yield
CT,t∗
CT,t∗−1
=
PT,t∗−1
PT,t∗
Pt∗−1
Pt∗−2
.
Pt∗−1 equals Pt∗−2, as both tradables’ and non-tradables’ prices are constant
over periods t∗−1 and t∗−2. PT,t∗ is smaller than PT,t∗−1, which implies that
CT,t∗ exceeds CT,t∗−1. Thus, the consumption of tradable goods rises during
the peg. The intuition for this is straightforward: As the price of tradable
goods falls, consumption demand for these goods rises.
Relative consumption of tradable goods is given as
CT
CN
=
γ
1− γ
PN
PT
. (3.35)
In the proof of proposition 2, PN
PT
has been shown to increase in period t∗.
Thus, as the relative price of tradable goods falls, the consumption of these
goods rises relative to the consumption of non-tradable goods.
Coupled with the assumption that agents are endowed with a constant
amount of tradable goods, the rise in the consumption of tradable goods
implies that the current account moves into deficit: The consolidated inter-
temporal budget constraint requires that the present value of the economy’s
lifetime resources must equal the present value of its lifetime expenditures.
This implies that the present value of all current account deficits or surpluses
must equal zero:
∞∑
s=t
(1 + r)t−s (CT,t − y¯T ) = 0
Proposition 3 retains that CT,t∗ exceeds tradables consumption realized in
periods preceding or following t∗. This is compatible with the intertemporal
budget constraint only if CT,t < y¯T∀t 6= t∗ and CT,t∗ > y¯T . Hence, the current
account will move into deficit in period t∗. 
In sum, given the constant endowment of tradable goods, the current ac-
count deterioration results from the increased consumption of tradable goods.
The latter arises through two mechanisms: The temporary fall in tradables’
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prices effects intertemporal substitution of tradable goods consumption into
the period where prices are lower. The fall in the relative price of tradable
goods gives rise to intersectoral consumption substitution: Relatively more
expensive non-tradable goods are replaced with (imported) tradable goods.
The model proposed in this section is capable of reproducing the main
stylized facts of ERBS, namely, the consumption boom-slowdown cycle, the
current account deficit and the real exchange rate appreciation. The latter
is explained without recurring to excess demand for non-tradable goods, the
channel present in most other models of ERBS, but relies on forward-looking
price setting. The anticipated transitoriness of stabilization is crucial for the
proposed explanation, implying that it is most appropriate for stabilization
efforts perceived to be non-credible.
3.3 Modifying Intermediate Goods Pricing: Tay-
lor Contracts
So far, the simplest possible form of price stickiness – the simultaneous re-
negotiation of all non-tradables’ prices every second period – has been as-
sumed. This allowed to derive the consumption, real exchange rate and cur-
rent account dynamics analytically. This section shows that the model’s main
results remain valid when assuming overlapping price contracts a` la Taylor
(1979, 1980), that is, multi-period nominal contracts with only a fraction
of prices re-negotiated each period.21 The motivation for this extension is
twofold: First, it enables me to show that the model’s results do not hinge on
a restrictive assumption about price setting. Second, Taylor pricing generates
richer dynamics, as it imparts both forward- and backward-looking aspects
to non-tradables’ prices and the real exchange rate.
To develop a simple example, each producer of intermediate goods is as-
sumed to set his price for two periods, with a fraction α of intermediate goods’
producers adjusting in periods t+ i, i = {0, 2, 4, 6, ..}, and a fraction (1− α)
in periods t + i + 1. Price setters of the first group are characterized by the
superscript I, those of the second group by the superscript II.
A group I producer sets his price pN,t(z) = pN,t+1(z) such that the present
value of his profits over periods t and t+1 is maximized, that is, he maximizes
21Another widely-used variant of price adjustment has been proposed by Calvo, 1983.
He assumes that every individual firm adjusts its price with a constant, exogenously given
probability each period. For open economy models with partial adjustment, see for example
Ambler and Harb, 1999 and Kollmann, 1997. Introducing partial adjustment of prices
would not change my model’s main results.
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the following function:
1∑
j=0
(1 + r)−j
(
pN,t(z)
Pt+j
−MC
)
yN,t+j(z). (3.36)
As in the previous section, yN,t is given by the final good producer’s demand
for non-tradable intermediate goods, equation (3.13). The only difference to
the profit maximization problem considered in the previous section is that
period t and t + 1 aggregate non-tradables’ prices now also depend on the
price set by group II producers.
Profit maximization yields pIN,t(z) as
pIN,t(z) = θ
−1MC
PtP 11−θN,t YN,t + (1 + r)−1 Pt+1P 11−θN,t+1YN,t+1
P
1
1−θ
N,t YN,t + (1 + r)
−1 P
1
1−θ
N,t+1YN,t+1
 (3.37)
where, as in the previous section, it is assumed that each individual producer
ignores the effect of his price on aggregate prices and output. The above
equation shows that all group I producers charge the same price, that is,
P IN,t = p
I
N,t (z) ∀ z.
The period t price of non-tradable final goods is given as a geometric
average of the prices charged by group I and group II producers. Group I
producers charge t. Group II producers, who must hold their price constant
over periods t−1 and t, charge the price set in period t−1. PN,t is thus given
as
PN,t = (p
I
N,t)
α(pIIN,t−1)
1−α (3.38)
and the period t+ 1 price level as
PN,t+1 = (p
I
N,t)
α(pIIN,t+1)
1−α. (3.39)
Substituting PN,t and PN,t+1 with the expressions implied by the above equa-
tions, and Pt and Pt+1 with equation (3.11), equation (3.37) yields p
I
N,t as
pIN,t(z) =
ΦpII (1−α)(1−γ)N,t−1
P γT,t + (1 + r)
−1 YN,t+1
YN,t
(
pIIN,t+1
pIIN,t−1
) (1−α)[1+(1+γ)(1−θ)]
(1−θ)
P γT,t+1
1 + (1 + r)−1 YN,t+1YN,t
(
pIIN,t+1
pIIN,t−1
) 1−α
1−θ

1
1−α(1−γ)
(3.40)
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where Φ is defined as Φ ≡ θ−1γ−1(1− γ)1− 1γMC. Note that, when the price
of tradable goods and those set by group II are constant, pIN is constant and
equal to
pIN,t(z) =
[
θ−1γ−1(1− γ)1− 1γMC
] 1
γ
P¯T .
Profit maximization of group II producers yields pIIN,t−1(z) as
pIIN,t−1(z) =
ΦpI (1−α)(1−γ)N,t−2
P γT,t−1 + (1 + r)
−1 YN,t
YN,t−1
(
pIN,t
pIN,t−2
) (1−α)[1+(1+γ)(1−θ)]
(1−θ)
P γT,t
1 + (1 + r)−1 YN,tYN,t−1
(
pIN,t
pIN,t−2
) 1−α
1−θ

1
1−α(1−γ)
.
(3.41)
Substituting equations (3.40) and (3.41) in equation (3.38) yields the period
t price level of non-tradable goods as
PN,t = Φ
1
1−α(1−γ)
[(
pIIN,t−1
)α (
pIN,t−2
)(1−α)] (1−α)(1−γ)1−α(1−γ) ·
·
P
γ
T,t + (1 + r)
−1 YN,t+1
YN,t
(
pIIN,t+1
pIIN,t−1
) (1−α)[1+(1+γ)(1−θ)]
(1−θ)
P γT,t+1
1 + (1 + r)−1 YN,t+1
YN,t
(
pIIN,t+1
pIIN,t−1
) 1−α
1−θ

α
1−α(1−γ)
·
·
P
γ
T,t−1 + (1 + r)
−1 YN,t
YN,t−1
(
pIN,t
pIN,t−2
) (1−α)[1+(1+γ)(1−θ)]
(1−θ)
P γT,t
1 + (1 + r)−1 YN,t
YN,t−1
(
pIN,t
pIN,t−2
) 1−α
1−θ

1−α
1−α(1−γ)
.
(3.42)
and the relative price of tradable goods as
PT,t
PN,t
= Φ−
1
1−α(1−γ)P
1−α
1−α(1−γ)
T,t
[(
pIIN,t−1
)α (
pIN,t−2
)(1−α)]− (1−α)(1−γ)1−α(1−γ) ·
·
1 + (1 + r)
−1 YN,t+1
YN,t
(
pIIN,t+1
pIIN,t−1
) (1−α)[1+(1+γ)(1−θ)]
(1−θ) (P γT,t+1
P γT,t
)γ
1 + (1 + r)−1 YN,t+1
YN,t
(
pIIN,t+1
pIIN,t−1
) 1−α
1−θ

− α
1−α(1−γ)
·
·
P
γ
T,t−1 + (1 + r)
−1 YN,t
YN,t−1
(
pIN,t
pIN,t−2
) (1−α)[1+(1+γ)(1−θ)]
(1−θ)
P γT,t
1 + (1 + r)−1 YN,t
YN,t−1
(
pIN,t
pIN,t−2
) 1−α
1−θ

− 1−α
1−α(1−γ)
.
(3.43)
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In what follows, Proposition 2 will be reproduced in the above model-
ing framework with Taylor-pricing. Since the real exchange rate depends on
lagged and future prices in a complex manner, real exchange rate dynamics
are solved numerically.22 The parameter values are chosen as follows: α, the
fraction of firms setting prices in even periods, is set to equal 0.5. Following
Mendoza and Uribe (1999b), γ, the share of tradables in total consumption,
was set to 0.5. This is in line with Mexican and Brazilian data, where the
weights of non-tradable goods in the CPI equal 0.6 (see Mendoza, 2000:6) and
0.46, respectively.23 The value of θ = 4
5
is taken from Blanchard and Kiotaki
(1987); the real interest rate r = 6.5 percent from King, Plosser and Rebelo
(1988). The path of the nominal exchange rate is set such that the nominal
devaluation in the aftermath of stabilization amounts to 30 percent. It is
assumed that the implementation of the period t∗ exchange rate reduction is
publicly announced at the beginning of period t∗ − 1, that is, price setters
in period t∗ − 1 are the first to take into account the future reduction and
ensuing increase in the nominal exchange rate.
Given the exogenously assumed nominal exchange rate path, (relative)
non-tradables’ prices and the real exchange rate can be numerically solved.
A graphic exposition of the exogenously imposed path of PT and the resulting
paths of PN and the real exchange rate are presented in appendix 3.6.3 to this
chapter; the implied rates of real appreciation are reported in table 3.1 (on
page 116). They give evidence of a real exchange rate appreciation of almost
13 percent in the period preceding the peg’s breakdown, followed in period
t∗ + 1 by a real depreciation of 16.66 percent. Thereafter, the real exchange
rate converges quickly to its long-run value.
Of course, given the relatively simple modeling setup, these values are not
fit for a direct comparison with actually observed dynamics during ERBS.
This would require extending the model, for instance by a further endogeni-
zation of labor supply and production decisions and more sophisticated for-
mulations of the consumption basket, exchange rate policy and the formation
22Note that Y
e
N,t+1
YN,t
is a function of pIN,t :
Y eN,t+1
YN,t
=
CeN,t+1
CN,t
= pα(1−γ)N,t p
(1−α)γ
N,t−1 p
−(1−α)
N,t+1 p
−α(1−γ)
N,t+2
(
PT,t
PT,t−1
)γ
.
Due to the way the PN enter the enumerators of the second and third terms of these
equations, logarithmic versions of equations (3.42) and (3.43) cannot be solved analytically
for PN,t or
PN,t
PT,t
(nor be transformed into linear functions in non-tradables’ prices).
23See Chapter 2.
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Period Real Appreciation (-)/Depreciation Rate
(in percent)
t∗ − 1 2.05
t∗ -12.98
t∗ + 1 16.66
t∗ + 2 -3.87
t∗ + 3 0.40
t∗ + 3 0.02
t∗ + 4 0.001
Table 3.1: The real appreciation in the model with Taylor pricing
of exchange rate expectations.24 Despite these caveats, the model’s results are
not too far from what has been witnessed during the Mexican ERBS which
lasted from February 1988 to November 1994: During this program – which
was followed by an annual devaluation rate of 90 percent – the real exchange
rate appreciated by 32.6 percent.
3.4 Empirical Evidence on Forward-Looking
Price Setting
The model developed in the previous sections presents an explanation for the
real exchange rate dynamics prior to currency devaluation. This section looks
to Mexican data to test if current non-tradables’ prices actually incorporate
expectations of nominal exchange rate depreciation. Mexico was chosen as a
testing ground due to its history of failed exchange rate pegs and the avail-
ability of disaggregated monthly data on prices.
3.4.1 Exchange Rate Policy in Mexico
This section provides a short summary of exchange rate regimes implemented
in Mexico from 1975 to 2000. This serves as the basis for classifying periods of
‘managed’ and ‘flexible’ exchange rate regimes in the empirical analysis. The
account is based on Cardoso and Levy (1988), Dornbusch and Werner (1994),
and the 1995, 1997 and 1999 OECD Economic Surveys of Mexico. I abstain
from explaining why a certain monetary policy regime was implemented or
abandoned. With respect to the later, the reader is referred to the extensive
24The consumption basket assumed here, for example, implies a unity elasticity of substi-
tution between tradable and non-tradable goods, whereas empirical estimates find a value
of about 1.3 (see Mendoza, 1995).
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literature on the 1994 Mexican currency crisis, for example the survey by
Calvo and Mendoza (1996) and the contributions in the May 1996 issue of
the American Economic Review.
Since 1969, Mexico implemented two exchange rate pegs, each of which
lasted for more than five years.25 The first lasted from January 1969 to July
1976. Throughout this period, the peso/US dollar exchange rate (as reported
in the OECD Main Economic Indicators database) was pegged at a level of
0.0125 pesos per US dollar. The peg was followed by a 60 percent devaluation
of the Mexican peso in September 1976. After the crisis, the central bank
quickly managed to stabilize the exchange rate without officially returning to
a managed exchange rate regime. The period from March 1982 to November
1987 was characterized by high levels and volatility of the devaluation rate:
The introduction of dual exchange rates in August 1982 could not prevent a 41
percent depreciation of the peso in September 1982. Major depreciations with
monthly rates of 113, 18 and 21 percent occurred in January 1983, July 1985
and November 1987, respectively. In response to the foreign exchange market
turbulences of November 1987, the peso was pegged to the US dollar: After
an administrative devaluation of 38.9 percent in December 1987, the exchange
rate was maintained at a level of 2297.50 pesos per US dollar (from February
1988 until January first of 1989). Thereafter, the fixed exchange rate was
replaced by a crawling peg, a system of pre-announced currency depreciation.
In November 1991, a fluctuation band was introduced, whose lower bound was
widened at a pre-announced rate of 0.0002 pesos per day, equivalent to an
annual devaluation rate of two percent, until October 1992 and 0.0004 pesos
thereafter. The fluctuation band was thus gradually widened from 1.1 to 15
percentage points by the end of 1994. In December 1994, Mexico witnessed a
major currency crisis: The crawling peg collapsed, and the peso devalued at
a monthly rate of 38 percent. Since then, the official exchange-rate policy in
Mexico is a commitment to a floating exchange rate, with occasional central
bank interventions to decrease nominal exchange rate volatility.
Given this historical record, the periods from January 1969 to July 1976
and from February 1988 to November 1994 are classified as ‘managed ex-
change rate regimes’26. Obviously, this classification can be debated – the
Mexican authorities intervened heavily in the foreign exchange market dur-
ing the first half of the eighties and monthly depreciation rates ranged from
-1.45 to 5.7 percent during the ‘managed exchange rate regime’ from Febru-
25With that, Mexico has not exactly followed the pattern of chronic inflation countries,
countries where high and persistent inflation rates motivated frequent stabilization at-
tempts, as for example during the past four decades in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.
Unfortunately, data on disaggregated prices is scarcely available for these economies.
26These are defined to include regimes of fixed exchange rates.
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Figure 3.4: The relative price of tradable goods and the devaluation rate,
August 1975 to May 2000
ary 1988 to November 1994. Despite these qualifications, the classification
is broadly consistent with a data-based criterion for exchange rate stability:
When considering all periods where the monthly devaluation rate is below
one percent for at least six consecutive months, only the periods from March
1977 to April 1981 and from December 1995 to May 1996 are not contained
in the above periods of managed exchange rates.
3.4.2 The Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis is based on monthly data from August 1975 to May
2000. Data was obtained from the OECDMain Economic Indicators Database,
the International Financial Statistics, the Central Bank of Mexico, the Insti-
tuto Nacional de Estad´ıstica, Geographia e Informatica (INEGI), Mexico, the
Currency Forecasters Digest publication and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Appendix 3.6.4 provides a detailed description of the data.
Figure 3.4 presents the Mexican devaluation rate and the relative price
of traded goods in Mexico. The latter is computed as the ratio of Mexican
durables’ and services’ prices, both re-based such that the ratio equals 1 in
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1994. The classification of durables as tradable goods and services as non-
tradables is standard in the literature.27 Mendoza (2000:3) reports it to be
roughly consistent with a definition of tradable goods “as those pertaining to
sectors for which the ratio of net exports to gross output exceeds 5 percent.”
The relative price of traded goods is measured on the right axis, the annual
devaluation rate (in percent) on the left axis. The vertical lines indicate
“major exchange rate crises”, as identified by Osakwe and Schembri (1999).
The major devaluations which occurred in August 1976 and in December 1994
mark the end of managed exchange rate regimes.
The data shows that relative tradables’ prices decrease (that is, non-
tradables’ prices increase) preceding the collapse of managed exchange rate
regimes and the pronounced devaluation rate increase which started in 1982.
Price movements prior to the ‘Tequila Crisis’ in December 1994 are salient –
the relative price of non-tradables increased by 170 percent during the man-
aged exchange rate episode which lasted from February 1988 to December
1994. Under the assumption of perfect foresight, these price dynamics are
consistent with the mechanism depicted in my model, that is, producers of
non-tradables which raise prices in anticipation of the devaluation-induced
increase in input costs.
From February 1982 to November 1987, however, repeated jumps of the
devaluation rate which are not preceded by real appreciations can be observed.
This period is generally characterized by high and volatile inflation and deval-
uation rates, presumably associated with considerable insecurity about mon-
etary policy. During this period, the annual devaluation rate is characterized
by a mean and a standard deviation of 108.4 and 80.1 percent, respectively,
whereas the mean and standard deviation for the period from August 1975 to
January 1982 amount to 13.6 and 27.5 percent, and to 20.7 and 32.2 percent
during the period from December 1978 to May 2000. This suggests two pos-
sible explanations for the missing link between future devaluation rates and
the relative price of tradable goods which are not incorporated in my model:
First, contract length – and thus the degree of forward-orientation of prices –
is likely to decrease as the magnitude and volatility of the overall price level
rises. Second, a loss of forecast accuracy should be reflected in a weaker link
between current relative non-tradables’ prices and the observed (forwarded)
devaluation rate.28 Using the Mexican-US nominal interest rate differential
as the expected devaluation rate, the second hypothesis is confirmed: The
correlation coefficient of the spread and the one-month ahead devaluation
27See the overview of the literature on real exchange rate decompositions summarized in
the appendix to Chapter 2.
28These features are not present in my model, where non-tradables’ prices are always
constant over two periods and agents are assumed to hold perfect foresight.
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rate amounts to only 0.58 for the full sample from August 1975 to May 2000,
but rises to a value of 0.83 when excluding the period from August 1976 to
January 1988.
Devaluation rate expectations play a crucial role in this chapter’s model.
The above approximation with the nominal interest rate spread follows the lit-
erature.29 The theoretical basis for this is international interest parity (IIP):
Under perfect international capital mobility, dollar-denominated returns on
Mexican and US assets with identical characteristics as regards to liquidity
and riskiness should be equal: If an asset earns a higher real return, profit-
maximizing international investors buy the assets, bidding up its price until its
real return equals those of the other assets. The difference between Mexican
and US interest rates can therefore be interpreted as the expected devaluation
rate of the Mexican peso. It must be pointed out, however, that the assump-
tions underlying IIP are restrictive, and certainly not fulfilled by Mexican and
US government debt, which is characterized by different riskiness and liquid-
ity; moreover, perceptions of the bonds’ riskiness, in particular, the Mexican
government’s probability to default have been subject to change over the pe-
riod considered. Furthermore, high nominal interest rates might not always
reflect expected devaluation rates, but sometimes the central bank’s restric-
tive monetary policy stance, as for example when the Swedish central bank
tried to fend off a currency crisis in 1992. In general, empirical assessments of
IIP based on industrial country’s nominal exchange rates give an ambiguous
account of its validity: Most of the estimates surveyed in Froot and Thaler
(1990) find that IIP does not hold; Chinn and Meredith (2002), in contrast,
find that it tends to hold in the long run.30 Frankel and Okongwu (1995),
however, conclude, based on a sample of nine emerging economies (among
them Mexico):
“The largest single component of the gap [between Emerging Mar-
kets and US interest rates] is expectations of depreciation of the
local currency against the dollar.”
To assess the spread’s predictive quality, figure 3.5 compares the Mexican-
US interest rate spread and the annual ‘forward devaluation rate’, calculated
from 1-month forward exchange rates for the limited periods where this data
is available.31 It shows that both measures follow the same tendency, even
29See for example Froot and Klemperer (1989), and Rose and Svensson (1995).
30An exposition of tests of covered and uncovered interest parity can be found in Cuth-
bertson (1996, Chapters 11 and 12).
31Monthly data on Mexican nominal interest rates – namely, the series on Banks’ Av-
erage Cost of Funds provided by the Mexican Central Bank – is available from August
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Figure 3.5: The spread and the annual devaluation rate implied by 1-month
forward exchange rates, February 1989 to March 2000
though their absolute value differs substantially at times. The same holds
true for survey-based one-month ahead exchange rate forecasts, which are
almost identical to one-month forward rates.32
Besides the spread between Mexican and US government debt, alterna-
tive measures of devaluation rate expectations have been suggested by the
literature. These include the interest rate differential on peso- and dollar-
denominated liabilities of the Mexican government (see Ageno`r and Masson,
1999), forward rates, survey-based forecasts, or estimates on the basis of eco-
nomic fundamentals. However, data on the first three variables is not publicly
available for the entire period under consideration here, and the latter pro-
duced counter-intuitive and barely significant results.33 Therefore, I rely on
1975 onwards. Survey-based forecasts and one-month forward rates are from the Currency
Forecasters’ Digest (CFD). My access to this data is limited to the period from January
1988 to March 2000. I am indebted to Menzie Chinn and Stefan Hubrich for granting
access to their CFD data.
32The variables’ correlation coefficient is 0.99 for the period from February 1988 to March
2000. As pointed out by the literature on the ‘peso problem’, forward exchange rates
during exchange rate pegs frequently exhibit an (alleged) ‘bias’ as they might incorporate
the possibility of a large devaluation (see Lewis, 1995).
33The regression results of the fundamentals-based estimations of devaluation rate ex-
pectations are available upon request.
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Full sample Managed Exchange Regimes
Spread 1-M-Forward Rate Spread 1-M-Forward Rate
1 month ahead 0.58 0.91 0.84 0.96
3 months ahead 0.53 0.72 0.87 0.87
6 months ahead 0.45 0.52 0.89 0.67
12 months ahead 0.22 -0.01 0.26 0.30
18 months ahead 0.10 -0.16 0.56 0.01
24 months ahead 0.03 -0.23 0.64 -0.26
Table 3.2: Correlations of the spread and the one-month forward rate with
the actual devaluation rate
the interest rate differential to quantify devaluation rate expectations. In
order to assess the accuracy of the different devaluation rate forecasts, table
3.2 presents correlation coefficients of the annual forward devaluation rate,
calculated from one-month-forward rates, the spread and the actual (future)
devaluation rate. It shows that the one-month forward rate is better at pre-
dicting the short run, whereas the spread performs better when forecasting at
longer horizons. For instance, the correlation of the spread and the 18-month
ahead devaluation rate is higher for both the full sample and for periods of
managed exchange rates (see table 3.2). Assessing the accuracy of devaluation
rate expectations during managed exchange rate regimes might appear futile,
since these should consist in a pre-announced nominal exchange rate. Recall,
however, that private agents’ predictions have to account for the possibility
of an abandonment of the current exchange rate regime. Furthermore – as
reported in section 3.4.1 – the Mexican monetary authorities exercised some
discretion during the most recent exchange rate peg.
The basic model introduced in section 3.2 assumed that non-tradables’
prices must be held constant over two periods, that is, current prices only
incorporate expectations of what happens one period ahead. What is the
empirically ‘correct’ forecasting horizon, that is, how many months of ex-
pected future devaluation rates are reflected in current non-tradables’ prices?
Answering this question requires information about the duration of the (im-
plicit) ‘price contracts’, a subject the empirical literature on high inflation
economies is silent on. As a crude measure for price inertia, I calculate corre-
lations of current prices and different lags of money growth, that is, growth of
the monetary aggregateM4. This is meant to approximate the duration until
an increase in M4 is reflected in higher prices, thus giving a notion about the
degree of price stickiness.34 The correlation coefficients presented in table 3.3
34This analysis ignores concerns about reverse causality.
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Correlations of CPI Price of Durables Price of Services
contemporaneous M4 growth 0.63 0.59 0.57
1-month lagged M4 growth 0.70 0.58 0.70
2-month lagged M4 growth 0.62 0.57 0.59
3-month lagged M4 growth 0.60 0.52 0.62
4-month lagged M4 growth 0.59 0.54 0.58
5-month lagged M4 growth 0.54 0.52 0.52
6-month lagged M4 growth 0.55 0.48 0.53
12-month lagged M4 growth 0.38 0.27 0.44
18-month lagged M4 growth 0.13 0.006 0.23
24-month lagged M4 growth 0.046 -0.14 0.20
Note: all variables transformed into monthly growth rates; data from January
1986 (earliest date for which monthly data on monetary aggregates is publicly
available) to May 2000
Table 3.3: Correlation of the CPI, the prices of durables and the prices of
services with (lagged) values of M4
confirm the model’s assumption of excess sluggishness of non-tradables’ over
tradables’ prices. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient of 0.2 between two-
year lagged growth in M4 and non-tradables’ prices suggests a high degree
of persistence of non-tradables’ price inertia.
To investigate the effect of an expected exchange rate depreciation on non-
tradables’ prices and the real exchange rate more closely, the differential of
monthly growth in services’ and durables’ prices is regressed on the expected
future depreciation rate of the Mexican peso. A significant positive relation-
ship between these two variables can be interpreted as supporting my model,
that is, the hypothesis that the relative increase in non-tradables’ prices pre-
ceding currency crises results from forward-looking price setting. Regression
specification is based on the model’s pricing equation (3.42), which gives the
price of non-tradable goods as a function of the expected devaluation rate,
the current level of tradables’ prices, lagged and future non-tradables’ prices
and lagged, current and future demand for non-tradable goods. The basic
regression is(
∆PN
PN
− ∆PT
PT
)
= constant + β(expected devaluation)+f(other determinants)
where
(
∆PN
PN
− ∆PT
PT
)
denotes the differential of services’ and durables’ prices
and ‘expected devaluation’ the log of the spread. ‘Other determinants’ of(
∆PN
PN
− ∆PT
PT
)
suggested by equation (3.42) include variables reflecting the
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supply and demand of tradable and non-tradable goods, lagged and future
values of
(
∆PN
PN
− ∆PT
PT
)
. Furthermore, goods prices in the US – Mexico’s main
trading partner35 – the devaluation rate, lagged CPI, monetary variables and
a trend variable were included in different specifications. All variables besides
the spread were either transformed into monthly growth rates, or logs of first
differences. To avoid spurious regressions, the differential of services’ and
durables’ prices was tested for stationarity. The tests allowed to reject the
null hypothesis of a unit root; detailed test results are reported in appendix
3.6.4.
Estimation results are presented in tables 3.4 to 3.6. Table 3.4 reports
results based on the full sample from August 1975 to May 2000, with all var-
iables except the spread transformed into monthly growth rates. Interacted
dummies are included to differentiate between regimes of flexible and man-
aged exchange rates. The regression results show that the spread’s impact
on relative non-tradables’ prices is positive and significant only during pe-
riods of managed exchange rates. Therefore, the further estimates reported
in tables 3.5 and 3.6 are based on samples which include only periods of
managed exchange rates. The estimations in table 3.5 reproduce those re-
ported in table 3.4 with data transformed in first-differenced logs (instead
of monthly growth rates); Table 3.6 includes retail sales, which are publicly
available only from January 1986 to March 2000, as an additional regressor.
Three different specifications are presented in each table: Specification (I) is
the ‘base specification’; Specification (II) includes lagged endogenous varia-
bles, which yields biased, but asymptotically efficient and consistent results.36
Specification (III) considers only regressors which proved to be significant at
a level of at least 10 percent in the fully interacted estimations (I) and (II)
reported in table 3.4. All estimations were performed with OLS, using Prais-
Winsten (Prais and Winsten, 1954) transformed data whenever first-order
serially-correlated residuals were detected.
The results indicate that the spread is one of the few robust determinants
of relative non-tradables’ prices during managed exchange rate regimes. The
sign and significance of the expected devaluation rate’s coefficient is robust to
varying the exact specification and method of data transformation. Although
35In the year 2000, 84.3 percent of Mexican imports and 88.7 percent of its exports were
from or to the USA.
36Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic is biased towards 2. Therefore, I perform
Durbin’s h-test when lagged endogenous variables are included. The Durbin h-test regresses
the OLS residuals on their own lags and the original regressor list. The coefficient on the
lagged residual series, in ratio to its estimated standard error, is distributed ‘t’ under the
null of zero autocorrelation in the error process. This test is asymptotically equivalent to
the original test proposed by Durbin, as discussed in Greene (1999, Chapter 13).
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(I) (II) (III)
OLS Prais-Winsten Prais-Winsten
1-month-lagged
(
∆PN
PN
− ∆PT
PT
)
– 0.25(3.29)∗∗ 0.25(3.11)∗∗
1-m.-lagged
(
∆PN
PN
− ∆PT
PT
)
, mg. exr. – 0.25(2.00)∗ 0.22(1.58)
Spread 0.23(1.45) 0.23(1.75)# 0.20(1.62)
Spread, mg. exr. 0.80(2.54)∗ 0.42(1.52) 0.46(1.73)#
Devaluation rate -0.08(-6.46)∗∗ -0.09(-6.72)∗∗ -0.09(-7.48)∗∗
Devaluation rate, managed exch.r. -0.00(-0.02) -0.04(-0.31)
Lagged CPI -0.18(-1.93)# -0.14(-1.76)# -0.11(-1.49)
Lagged CPI, managed exch.r. 0.22(1.64) 0.16(1.20)
US durables’ prices -0.66(-2.20)∗ -0.47(-1.73)# -0.30(-1.41)
US durables’ prices, manag. exch.r.. 0.59(1.19) 0.62(1.32)
US services’ prices 0.91(2.30)∗ 0.71(2.07)∗ 0.62(2.25)∗
US services’ prices, managed exch.r. 0.22(0.37) 0.17(0.30)
Manufacturing production -0.02(-0.41) -0.03(-0.83) -0.06(-2.21)∗
Manuf. prod., managed exch.r. -0.02(-0.45) -0.01(-0.24)
Lag. manuf. prod. -0.09(-2.10)∗∗ -0.12(-2.48)∗
Lag. manuf. prod., manag. exch.r. 0.05(0.89) 0.07(1.18)
Services production 0.15(1.40) 0.15(1.35) 0.15(1.37)
Services production, mg. exr. -0.19(-1.35) -0.25(-1.80) -0.21(-1.69)#
Lag. services production 0.18(1.30) 0.12(0.95)
Lag. services prod., man. exr. -0.11(-0.66) -0.01(-0.05)
Exch.r-reg. dummy -1.75(-1.95)# -1.14(-1.49) -0.77(-1.25)
Constant -0.39(-0.82) -0.36(-0.91) -0.35(-1.01)
R2 0.42 0.54 0.51
DW Statistic 1.94 2.08 2.08
Durbin’s h 0.50
Notes: Fully interacted regression to distinguish between regimes of managed and flexible exchange rates; 295
observations.
∗∗
,
∗
and
#
indicate significance at a level of 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Heteroscedasticity-consistent t-values are
in parentheses. “Exch.r-reg. Dummy” denotes the exchange rate regime dummy, which equals one during periods of fixed
exchange rate regimes and zero otherwise. All variables carrying the addition “mg. exr.” (“managed exchange rate
regimes”) are interacted dummies, which capture a possible additional impact of the respective variable during managed
exchange rate regimes. They are generated by multiplying the variable with the exchange rate regime dummy. “Lag.”
denotes one-month lagged values, “Manuf. prod.” manufacturing production.
Table 3.4: Regressions for the full sample
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(I) (II) (III)
Prais-Winsten OLS OLS
1-m.-lagged
(
∆PN
PN
− ∆PTPT
)
0.31(3.22)∗∗ 0.29(3.24)∗∗
Spread 0.01(4.50)∗∗ 0.01(4.58)∗∗ 0.01 (4.76)∗∗
Devaluation rate -0.03(-0.26) -0.07(-0.59) -0.10(-0.80)
Lagged CPI 0.00(-1.27) 0.00(-0.37) 0.00(-0.40)
US durables’ prices -0.29(-0.64) 0.12(0.29) 0.28(0.69)
US services’ prices 1.25(2.87)∗∗ 1.15(2.54)∗ 1.06(2.37)∗
Manufacturing prod. -0.03(-1.14) -0.04(-1.75)#
Lag. man. prod. -0.03(-1.74)# -0.04(-1.70)# -0.022( -0.79)
Services production -0.11(-1.52) -0.09(-1.11) -0.11(-3.81)∗∗
Lag. services prod. 0.05(0.56) 0.09(1.11)
Constant -0.02(-3.13)∗∗ -0.02(-3.79)∗∗ -0.02(-3.81)∗∗
R2 0.33 0.52 0.49
DW Statistic 1.83 1.76 1.74
Durbin’s h 0.12 0.95
Notes: 91 observations. ∗∗, ∗ and # indicate significance at a level of 1, 5 and 10
percent, respectively. Heteroscedasticity-consistent t-values are in parentheses.
‘1-m.-lagged’ denotes 1-month lagged variables
Table 3.5: Regressions with data in first-differenced logs, managed exchange
rate regimes only
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(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Prais-Winsten OLS OLS OLS
1-m.-lagged
(
∆PN
PN
− ∆PT
PT
)
0.36(3.94)∗∗ 0.38(4.36)∗∗ 0.36(3.89)∗∗
Spread 1.06(2.60)∗∗ 0.68(2.24)∗ 0.63(2.13)∗ 0.63(2.14)∗
Devaluation rate 0.02(0.15) 0.00(-0.01) -0.04(-0.32) -0.07(-0.59)
Lg. CPI 0.08(0.43) 0.23(1.67)# 0.24(1.86)# 0.23(1.71)#
US durables’ prices -0.40(-0.75) 0.17(0.32) 0.19(0.38) -0.11(-0.23)
US services’ prices 0.54(0.95) 0.27(0.46) 0.11(0.21) 0.59 (1.13)
Manufacturing production 0.03(-1.32) -0.03(-1.42)
Lag. man. prod. -0.04(-2.02)∗ -0.04(-1.75)# -0.02(-0.94)
Services production -0.07(-0.85) -0.09(-1.13) -0.13(-1.71)#
Lag. services prod. 0.03(0.36) 0.03(0.38)
Retail sales -0.01(-1.05) -0.01(-0.55) 0.00(-0.15) 0.00 (-0.40)
Lag. retail sales 0.01(0.64) 0.02(1.43) 0.02(2.01)∗ 0.02 (1.89#)
Constant -1.98(-2.01)∗ -1.54(-2.22)∗ -1.40(-2.09)∗ -1.50 (-2.23∗)
R2 0.35 0.57 0.56 0.54
DW Statistic 1.86 1.94 1.94 1.95
Durbin’s h -0.34 -0.08 -0.05
Notes: 81 observations. ∗∗, ∗ and # indicate significance at a level of 1, 5 and 10
percent, respectively. Heteroscedasticity-consistent t-values are in parentheses.
Table 3.6: Regressions including retail sales, managed exchange rate regimes
only
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the coefficients’ magnitude varies across specifications, the quantitative im-
pact of an increase in expected devaluation does not change excessively: Ac-
cording to my minimum and maximum coefficient estimates, an expected 30
percent increase in the nominal exchange rate, for example, yields a 0.93
to 1.57 percent increase in the monthly growth rate of non-tradables’ over
tradables’ prices.
The price setting mechanism implied by my model should – in theory –
also hold for flexible exchange rate regimes. Two reasons why this cannot be
found empirically are to be pointed out: First, nominal exchange rates might
be harder to predict during flexible exchange rate regimes. Second, nominal
exchange rate fluctuations and their impact on relative non-tradables’ prices
dwarf all other factors (see Mussa, 1986). The estimation result supports the
latter hypothesis: The current devaluation rate is highly significant during
periods of floating exchange rates, whereas it is not significant during managed
exchange rate regimes. The same holds true for US prices of durables and of
services.
The fact that the prices of services in the US are not significant when retail
sales are included (see table 3.6) suggests that both variables might be cap-
turing the effect of global economic tendencies. As pointed out in chapter 1,
most explanations of the initial stylized facts of ERBS view the real exchange
rate appreciation as a result of excess demand for non-tradable goods. Of
the demand and supply indicators included in above regressions, only lagged
manufacturing production turned out to have a significant effect on relative
non-tradables’ prices. Counter-intuitively, the effect is negative. This reflects
the strong correlation of demand and supply: The correlation coefficient of
durables consumption and manufacturing production, for example, is 0.98
(calculated with annual data from 1988 to 1993). Thus, the coefficient of
manufacturing production might as well be interpreted as reflecting demand
for traded goods.37 The fact that the coefficient of lagged retail sales is pos-
itive and significant when only retail sales are included as an indicator for
demand or supply (see estimation (IV ) of table 3.6) suggests that the regres-
sors’ correlation might indeed blur results when including various variables
capturing demand and supply.
A further important determinant of the growth rate of relative non-tradables’
prices is their one-month lagged value. This is compatible with the staggered
price setting discussed in section 3.3, which gives rise to a backward-looking
37Of course, this contradicts the model’s assumption of PPP, which implies that the home
economies’ supply or demand for tradable goods should not affect their price. However,
the coefficient value is sufficiently small (the maximum absolute value of 0.12 implies that
a ten percent increase in manufacturing production cum demand yields decrease in relative
non-tradables prices of 1.2%) to uphold PPP.
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component in non-tradables’ prices.
All of the above results are robust in the sense that the magnitude and
significance of the regressors, in particular the spread, does not change sub-
stantially when including further explanatory variables, as the monetary ag-
gregate M4, a linear trend variable, more lagged values of regressor variables
(that is, lagged indicators of supply and demand, the CPI or the devaluation
rate), or the endogenous variable.
These findings constitute evidence in favor of my model, which explains
real exchange rate movements during fixed exchange rate regimes with pro-
ducers of non-tradable goods who incorporate expectations of a future devalu-
ation rate increase in their current prices. Nevertheless, economic models and
their empirical verification can virtually always be criticized on the grounds
of fundamental misspecification. Playing the devil’s advocate, how could the
positive correlation between the spread and the relative price of non-tradable
goods be interpreted? If IIP did not hold, that is, the spread not reflect deval-
uation rate expectations, it could be interpreted as resulting from increased
credit costs: Assuming the existence of a credit-in-advance constraint in the
(monopolistic) production of non-tradable goods, an increase in credit costs
is passed through on the price of non-tradable goods. This gives rise to a
positive relation between the nominal interest rate differential and relative
non-tradables’ prices. However, the story is not plausible given the policy
background of this chapter: The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 1
showed that the real appreciation during ERBS is accompanied by a credit
expansion, a fact which renders increasing credit costs implausible.
To summarize, the empirical results show that an explanation of the real
appreciation during temporary ERBS includes the following elements: (1)
backward-looking relative non-tradables’ prices, (2) increases in demand, and
(3) forward-looking price setting in the sense that relative non-tradables’
prices reflect expectations of a future devaluation.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter offers an explanation for the real appreciation witnessed during
transitory ERBS and in general prior to currency crises. In a model with
monopolistic competition and sticky prices of non-tradable goods, producers’
devaluation rate expectations are shown to contribute to the real appreciation
preceding the collapse of an exchange rate peg. Empirical evidence for the
existence of a positive relation between relative non-tradables’ prices and the
expected devaluation rate is then explored with monthly Mexican data. Using
the Mexican-US interest rate differential as an indicator for devaluation rate
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expectations, OLS regressions confirm the model’s price setting hypothesis:
During managed exchange rate regimes, a rise in the spread is found to have
a significant and positive impact on the relative price of non-tradable goods.
In the model presented here, the peg’s breakdown originates from seignorage-
financed government spending. Hence, it is warranted by fundamentals which
are independent from the expectations-driven real exchange rate appreciation.
However, as pointed out in the introduction to Chapter 2, the real exchange
rate appreciation is frequently viewed to cause the peg’s collapse: Policymak-
ers might become concerned about the distortion arising from an overvalued
real exchange rate, in particular the associated current account deficits.38
The expectations-driven real exchange rate appreciation could thus cause a
self-fulfilling currency crisis.
The next chapter presents a model in this spirit. There, sustained current
account deficits cause the stabilization’s self-fulfilling transitoriness.
38This chapter’s model could be extended in this direction by introducing a quadratic
government loss function which increases in the real appreciation rate (or current account
deficits) and the devaluation rate.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Deriving a Closed-Form Solution for Total Con-
sumption Demand
A closed-form consumption function can be derived combining the first-order
condition for optimal consumption and the intertemporal budget constraint.
Leading the first-order condition and summing up yields
∞∑
s=t
Cs(1 + r)
t−s = (1 + pit)Ct
∞∑
s=t
(1 + pis)
−1(1 + r)t−s. (3.44)
As agents do not hold initial assets, their intertemporal budget constraint can
be reformulated to yield
∞∑
s=t
(1 + r)t−sCs =
∞∑
s=t
(1 + r)t−s
[
PT,s
Ps
y¯T +
PN,s
Ps
YN,s + gt − Ms −Ms−1
Ps
]
.
(3.45)
Inserting (3.44) into (3.45) allows to solve for Ct as
Ct = (1 + pit)
−1
[ ∞∑
s=t
(1 + pis)
−1 (1 + r)t−s
]−1
Wt (3.46)
whereWt is defined asWt ≡
∑∞
s=t (1 + r)
t−s
(
PT,s
Ps
Y¯T +
PN,s
Ps
YN,s + gt − Ms−Ms−1Ps
)
.
Note that a rise in inflation decreases contemporary consumption, whereas
an increase in future inflation increases current consumption:
∂Ct
∂pit
= (−1) (1 + (1 + pit)∑∞s=t(1 + pis)−1 (1 + r)t−s)−2 ·
·∑(1 + pis)−1(1 + r)t−sWt + (1 + pit)−1∑∞s=t(1 + pis)−1 (1 + r)t−s−1 ∂Wt∂pi < 0
∂Ct
∂pit+1
= (1 + pit)
−1(1 + pit+1)−2
[∑∞
s=t(1 + pis)
−1 (1 + r)t−s
]−2
(1 + r)−1Wt > 0
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3.6.2 Deriving the Price of Intermediate Non-Tradable
Goods from Producers’ Profit Maximization
The price of each non-tradable intermediate good is constant over periods t
and t + 1. The present value of expected nominal profits over these periods
accruing to the producer of an intermediate non-tradable good is given by
1∑
j=0
(1 + r)−j [pN,t(z)− Pt+j MC] yN,t+j(z). (3.47)
In setting their prices, the producers of non-tradable intermediate goods
incorporate the effect on the demand for their respective good, given as
yN,t(z) =
(
PN,t
pN,t(z)
) 1
1−θ
YN,t. (3.48)
Individual price setters ignore the effect of their prices on the aggregate price
level and aggregate demand, that is, ∂Pt
∂pN,t(z)
= ∂PN
∂pN
= ∂YN
∂pN
= 0. Maximizing
above equation with respect to pN,t(z) yields the first-order condition
1∑
j=0
(1 + r)−j
[
yN,t+j(z)− 1
1− θyN,t+j(z) +
1
1− θMC Pt+jyN,t+j(z)pN,t(z)
−1
]
.
(3.49)
Substituting yN,t(z) with the expression given by above equation and rear-
ranging terms yields pN,t(z) as
pN,t(z) = θ
−1MC
∑1
j=0
{
(1 + r)−j Pt+jP
1
1−θ
N,t+jYN,t+j
}
∑1
j=0
{
(1 + r)−j P
1
1−θ
N,t+jYN,t+j
}
.
The above equation shows that all determinants of the individual producer’s
price depend on economy-wide uniform variables. Thus, all prices of interme-
diate non-tradable goods are equal, and – according to equation 3.15 – equal
to the aggregate price level, PN,t = pN,t(z). PN is assumed to be constant
over periods t and t+ 1,which simplifies above expression to yield
PN,t = θ
−1MC
∑1
j=0 (1 + r)
−j Pt+jYN,t+j∑1
j=0 (1 + r)
−j YN,t+j
.
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Substituting for Pt and Pt+1
(
=
(
PT,t+1
γ
)γ (
PN,t+1
1−γ
)(1−γ))
in above expression
and setting pN,t(z) = PN,t yields pN,t(z) as
PN,t = θ
− 1
γ γ−1(1− γ)1− 1γMC
P γT,t + (1 + r)−1 P γT,t+1 YN,t+1YN,t
1 + (1 + r)−1 YN,t+1
YN,t
 1γ
.
(3.50)
Above equation yields pN,t(z) as a function of YN,t+1 and YN,t, which are
considered exogenous by the individual price setter. Within the model, the
output of non-tradable goods is of course endogenous: The assumption of
demand- determined output implies that non-tradables output equals non-
tradables consumption. Demand for non-tradables is given by CN,t = (1− γ) PtPN,tCt.
The first-order condition for optimal consumption yields Ct+1
Ct
= Pt
Pt+1
Pt
Pt−1
. Pt
was derived as Pt =
(
PT,t
γ
)γ (
PN,t
1−γ
)(1−γ)
. Using these equations,
YN,t+1
YN,t
can be
reformulated to yield
YN,t+1
YN,t
=
Pt+1
Pt
PN,t
PN,t+1
Ct+1
Ct
=
=
PN,t
PN,t+1
Pt
Pt−1
=
=
PN,t
PN,t+1
(
PN,t
PN,t−1
)1−γ (
PT,t
PT,t−1
)γ
=
= P 2−γN,t P
−1
N,t+1P
−(1−γ)
N,t−1
(
PT,t
PT,t−1
)γ
.
Substituting this expression in the above equation for PN,t yields
PN,t = θ
− 1
γ γ−1(1−γ)1− 1γMC 1γPT,t
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t+1
PT,t
)γ (
PT,t
PT,t−1
)γ (
PN,t
PN,t+1
)(
PN,t
PN,t−1
)1−γ
1 + (1 + r)−1
(
PT,t
PT,t−1
)γ (
PN,t
PN,t+1
)(
PN,t
PN,t−1
)1−γ

1
γ
.
(3.51)
This equation cannot be solved analytically for PN,t. However, an explicit
solution for PN,t is not necessary to derive the real exchange rate and con-
sumption movements during stabilization (see the proofs of Propositions 1
and 2).
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Figure 3.6: Tradables’ prices in the model with Taylor pricing
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Figure 3.7: Non-tradables’ prices in the model with Taylor pricing
3.6.3 The Paths of PT,t , PN,t, and the Real Devaluation
Rate in the Model with Taylor Pricing
The path of PT is set such that the nominal devaluation between periods t
∗
and t∗ + 1 amounts to 30 percent. The values for PN and the real exchange
rate are then endogenously derived, under the assumption that PN returns
to its long run value in period t∗ + 4. The ‘Mathematica’-files used for the
computation of PN and the other endogenous variables are available upon
request. The figures below present the exogenously assumed path of PT , the
resulting paths for non-tradables’ prices and the real exchange rate.
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Figure 3.8: The real appreciation (-)/depreciation rate in the model with
Taylor pricing
3.6.4 Appendix to the Empirical Section
Data
Mexican Data:
• Price of durable goods: Central Bank of Mexico (“Sector Precios, Bienes
durables”)
• Price of services: Central Bank of Mexico (“Sector Precios, Servicios”)
• Interest rate: Banks’ average cost of funds, Central Bank of Mexico
• 1 Month Forward Rate: The data is proprietary of the Currency Fore-
casters Digest (CFD) publication, various issues.
• Nominal Exchange Rate: OECDMain Economic Indicators (MEI), Line
437003D (Mexican pesos per US dollar, Monthly average)
• M4: Central Bank of Mexico
• CPI: OECD MEI, Line 435205K
• Manufacturing Production: Index of monthly level of manufacturing;
Interpolated from annual data from the Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica,
Geographia e Informatica (INEGI) until 1/80 (assuming a constant an-
nual growth rate), thereafter monthly data from the OECD MEI, Line
432007K IIP
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• Supply of services: Weighted average of supply of financial services and
transport; Interpolated from annual data from the INEGI until 1/80
(assuming a constant annual growth rate), thereafter from quarterly
data
US Data:
• Price of durable goods: CPI durable goods, OECD Main Economic
Indicators, Line 425205K
• Price of services: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Urban CPI for services
• CPI: OECD, Main Economic Indicators
• Nominal interest rate: Bank prime Loan Rate (IFS: 60P)
(all price indices were re-based such that the average of all observations
for 1994 equals 100)
Testing ∆PN
PN
− ∆PT
PT
for Stationarity
Testing for stationarity of the endogenous variable in above regressions,(
∆PN
PN
− ∆PT
PT
)
, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron
tests were employed. Under the null, the time series contains a unit root.
The decision criterion is to reject the null hypothesis if the absolute value
of the standard t-statistic is greater than the absolute value of the critical
values at some desired level of significance reported by Fuller (1976) and
Perron (1988), respectively. In choosing the lag length for the lagged differ-
ences of
(
∆PN
PN
− ∆PT
PT
)
in the ADF test regressions, Campbell and Perron’s
(1993) backward selection procedure was followed. It indicates an order of
the estimated ADF regression of 14. The test results, based on 282 monthly
observations, are reported in the following table:
Test Statistic McKinnon approx. p-val.
ADF with constant -3.444 0.0095
ADF without constant -3.359 n.a.
Phillips-Perron Test with constant -11.989 0.0000
Phillips-Perron Test without constant -11.949 n.a.
The null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at a 1 percent signifi-
cance level. A trend variable proved to be not significant, and was therefore
not included in above-reported regressions. Note that the caveats to unit root
tests pointed out in section 2.3 apply.
Chapter 4
The Self-Fulfilling
Temporariness of Exchange
Rate-Based Stabilizations
4.1 Introduction
“Left unaddressed, however, was a more fundamental issue: To
what extent did the crisis reflect genuine deficiencies in the Brazi-
lian economy and to what degree was it a self-fulfilling prophecy?”
(The New York Times, May 23th, 1999, on the Brazilian currency
crisis, which led to a 40 percent devaluation of the Brazilian cur-
rency in January 1999.)
This collapse of the Brazilian currency peg to the US dollar constitutes yet
another example for the spectacular failures of ERBS. During the last three
decades, Brazil alone implemented four different ERBS, none of which suc-
ceeded in permanently stabilizing Brazilian devaluation (and inflation) rates–
between 1970 and 1994, Brazil added 12 zeroes to its price level. The average
duration of the exchange rate pegs was 11 quarters. Figure 4.1 illustrates
the typical ‘rise and fall’ during ERBS with data on the recent Brazilian sta-
bilization, which was implemented in June 1994 and officially abandoned in
January 1999.
The panels give evidence of an increase in consumption and GDP growth
during the initial stages of stabilization. As the former exceeds the latter, the
economy runs a current account deficit, which is financed with capital imports.
These dynamics constitute part of the ‘stylized facts’ of ERBS, which have
been discussed already in Chapter 1. An additional empirical regularity is
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Figure 4.1: Dynamics during the 1994 ERBS in Brazil
(Growth rates are expressed in percent per annum, the current and finan-
cial account balances in millions of US dollars (in 1995 prices)).
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the programs’ collapse: Almost half the episodes analyzed in the first chapter
of this dissertation ended in a currency crisis within five years, 70 percent
within ten years after their implementation. Further empirical evidence on the
transitory nature of ERBS is provided by the extensive empirical literature on
currency crises in developing economies.1 The cyclical movements predating
the collapse lead Reinhart and Ve´gh (1995b:1) to conclude:
“[T]he book of exchange rate-based stabilization in chronic infla-
tion countries is filled with pages and pages of costly and spectac-
ular failures. Successes are rare as a flawless diamond. Exchange
rate-based stabilizations appear to lead to a dynamic adjustment
which often carries the seeds of its own destruction.”
What is this auto-destructive mechanism of ERBS? The literature on the
initial effects of ERBS and the theories on currency crises are silent on pos-
sible connections between the two phenomena. Calvo and Ve´gh (1999:1536)
observe:
“The literature, however, has had precious little to say so far
about the possible links between the dynamics of exchange rate-
based stabilizations and balance-of-payment crises. The Mexican
crisis of December 1994 – which put an end to an exchange-rate-
based stabilization plan initiated seven years earlier – brought
back to life some of the key questions: Do exchange rate-based
stabilizations sow the seeds of their own destruction by unleashing
“unsustainable” real appreciations and current account deficits?
Or are credibility problems and self-fulfilling prophecies at the
root of these crises?”
This chapter tries to bridge this gap in the literature. It demonstrates
that unsustainable current account deficits and credibility problems might
not constitute alternative explanations for currency crises, as suggested by
Calvo and Ve´gh, but that deficient credibility might cause unsustainable cur-
rent account deficits via consumption increases. Coupled with partial capital
mobility, the current account deficits can bring about the peg’s termination
in a currency crisis. Thus, both the initial dynamics of ERBS and their tran-
sitoriness can be explained with self-fulfilling expectations about the duration
of the peg.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 surveys the relevant liter-
ature on ERBS and on balance of payments crises. Section 4.3 informally
1See for example Kaminsky et al. (1998) for a survey of the literature, and Kamin and
Babson (1999) for a recent contribution.
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presents the model’s intuition; section 4.4 introduces the formal modeling
framework. Section 4.5 compares the real effects and sustainability of a cred-
ible and of a non-credible stabilization effort. Section 4.6 points out policy
implications and a fruitful area for future research.
4.2 Survey of the Literature
This section presents a selective review of theories designed to explain the sty-
lized facts of ERBS, and of models of self-fulfilling currency crises. As the the-
ories have already been surveyed at length in section 1.5, only the approaches
closest to the model presented in this section are pointed out, namely, those
based on the perceived transitoriness of stabilization: When agents expect
the devaluation rate reduction to be temporary, the consumption boom can
be explained with (expected) intertemporal price changes (Calvo, 1986) or
intergenerational wealth redistribution (Helpman and Razin, 1987). In these
models, temporary stabilization is modeled as an exogenously given, perfectly
anticipated temporary fall in the devaluation rate, which, via PPP, effects an
equal reduction in the inflation rate. Government expenditure adjusts pas-
sively to redistribute the resulting seignorage revenues to the private sector.
In an extension, Calvo (1987) endogenizes the devaluation rate path by in-
corporating Krugman’s (1979) classic balance-of-payment crisis framework,
in which the transitoriness of stabilization results from excessive domestic
credit growth.
However, representative-agent models which exogenously assume tempo-
rary stabilization, or policies which render stabilization temporary, are not
compatible with rational policy makers. From a welfare perspective, no stabi-
lization, that is constant rates of inflation and currency devaluation, is prefer-
able to temporary stabilization: Agents respond to inflation fluctuations by
varying consumption. Given the decreasing marginal utility of consumption,
this reduces overall utility, compared to an equilibrium with constant inflation
and a flat consumption path.2 Moreover, transitory ERBS cannot be inter-
preted as the result of a time-inconsistent policy, that is, a policy which gives
the policymaker an incentive to discontinue the policy once private agents
believe in it and act accordingly.3 Time inconsistency can explain tempo-
rary inflation stabilization only if the policymaker has an incentive to return
2This assumes that inflation itself is not associated with negative welfare effects.
3Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996:389) define the problem of dynamic inconsistency in poli-
cymaking as follows: “[A] future policy that the government finds optimal today, taking
account of its influence over the actions of others, may no longer be optimal once those
actions have been taken.”
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to inflation when agents believe in permanently lower inflation rates, as in
the seminal models by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gor-
don (1983). A crucial element of models of temporary ERBS, however, is
that private agents fully anticipate the short-lived nature of stabilization –
this anticipation is exactly why they increase consumption during the low-
inflation period. Thus, the ensuing increase in inflation and devaluation rates
cannot be interpreted as ‘cheating’ on private agents.
The implementation of temporary stabilization policies can be motivated
when giving up the representative-agent assumption: Helpman and Razin
(1987) propose an OLG model in which the current generation benefits from
temporary stabilization at the expense of future generations. As the current
generation votes, current policymakers have an incentive to favor them over
future generations. Alfaro (1999) shows that policymakers might implement
temporary ERBS to boost electoral outcomes by increasing the welfare of the
owners of non-tradable goods.
A different answer to the question of why policy makers implement tran-
sitory stabilizations is offered by models of self-fulfilling currency crises. In
these, policymakers intend stabilization to be permanent,˙ its actual duration,
however, is endogenously determined by private agents’ arbitrary expecta-
tions. The pioneering work in this field is due to Obstfeld (1986), who shows
that expectations of expansionary monetary policy in the aftermath of stabi-
lization can lead to an instantaneous fall in money demand and increase in
currency devaluation. However, as the other theories on currency crises, this
model ignores the full dynamics preceding the collapse.4
4.3 Overview of the Model
Models on the stylized facts of ERBS simply assume stabilization to be tem-
porary, while models which explain why stabilizations collapse, ignore what
happens at the inception of stabilization. The framework presented in this
chapter offers a joint explanation of both features of ERBS.
What is the mechanism? Intertemporal consumption substitution in re-
sponse to expected intertemporal price changes is combined with credit ra-
tioning on international capital markets: Similar to Calvo (1986), consump-
tion and output are subject to cash-in-advance constraints. Therefore, infla-
tion stabilization implies a decrease of effective consumer goods’ prices and
production costs. If agents believe that the stabilization effort will be tem-
4Further models of self-fulfilling currency crises have been proposed by Dellas and Stock-
man (1989), Obstfeld (1994, 1996 ), and Cole and Kehoe (1996). A synthesis is presented
by Jeanne (1995).
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porary, they substitute consumption, and, to a smaller extent, production
intertemporally into the low-inflation period. Due to imperfections in inter-
national capital markets, the resulting current account deficits can only be
partially financed with capital imports: International investors are willing
to supply credit only if private domestic agents’ net foreign indebtedness is
below a specific exogenously given fraction of their economy’s GDP. Once
the maximum level of foreign debt is reached, goods imports and the associ-
ated demand for foreign currency lead to a gradual depletion of central bank
foreign currency reserves, which eventually culminates in the stabilization’s
collapse. As the government spending rule entails seignorage finance after the
breakdown, devaluation and inflation rates rise, validating ex post agents’ de-
valuation expectations. If, on the other hand, agents consider stabilization
to be credible and associated with permanently lower inflation and devalua-
tion rates, consumption remains constant and is entirely financed with period
income. As no foreign debt is incurred, the peg can be upheld indefinitely.
Thus, arbitrary expectations about the program’s duration prove to be self-
fulfilling.
Partial international capital mobility plays an important role in the anal-
ysis presented in this chapter. My model abstracts from explaining why con-
straints on international borrowing exist, but explores the effects of their
existence in the analysis of ERBS. Given this focus, financial frictions are not
formally derived as features of an optimal credit contract, but introduced by
a simple aggregate borrowing constraint which imposes an upper limit on the
ratio of net foreign debt to GDP. As pointed out in section 1.6, formulation is
compatible with theories on borrowing under imperfect contract enforcement
and with the empirical evidence on developing economies. Similar financial
constraints have been incorporated in models on emerging economies by Co-
hen and Sachs (1986) and Mendoza (2001). The cessation of capital inflows
above a particular debt-to-GDP ratio can either be interpreted as resulting
from international creditors’ behavior, in particular the collateralization of
loans, or as reflecting official restrictions on international borrowing: In a
(counterproductive) effort to prevent a crisis, the government might impose
capital controls once foreign indebtedness reaches a certain level of GDP. The
halt of capital inflows then brings about the crisis.5
5This argument follows Dellas and Stockman (1989), who propose a model where agents’
expectations of capital controls cause currency crises.
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4.4 The Model
Consider an economy which is populated with identical, infinitely-lived pri-
vate agents and a government, which consists of a monetary and a fiscal
branch. Private agents consume and produce a single traded good. In ab-
sence of impediments to trade, purchasing power parity holds, which – coupled
with the assumption of constant prices abroad – implies that domestic infla-
tion and devaluation rates are equal. Agents must hold real balances both for
consuming and producing. The government’s fiscal and monetary branches
are not separated, meaning that the monetary branch is required to monetize
the government’s net transfers to the private sector whenever necessary.
4.4.1 The Private Sector
The representative private agent chooses his paths of consumption and pro-
duction as to maximize the following utility function:∫ ∞
0
(
1(
1− 1
σ
)c1− 1σt − κ2y2t
)
e−βt dt (4.1)
c denotes consumption of a homogeneous good which is produced both at
home and abroad, y output, σ the constant intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution (0 < σ < 1) and κ a positive constant. In order to eliminate inessen-
tial dynamics, β, the agent’s subjective rate of time preference, is assumed
to equal the real world interest rate, r. Output enters the utility function in
order to capture the disutility the agent experiences when producing output.
As shown by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996:662), this formulation can be derived
assuming the disutility of labor l as −Φl, and a production function of y = A
l
1
2 . Solving the production function for l yields l =
(
y
A
)2
. Setting κ ≡ Φ
A2
yields the second term in equation (4.1). Without a loss of generality, the
number of agents is assumed to equal unity.
The agent faces cash-in-advance constraints on consumption and output,
that is, he has to cover at least a fraction α of total consumer expenditure
and a fraction ν of production with cash holdings.
mnpt ≥ αct (4.2)
mpt ≥ νyt (4.3)
where mnp denotes money held for non-productive purposes and mp money
held for productive purposes, and α and ν are constants which satisfy 0 <
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α ≤ 1 and 0 < ν ≤ 1.6 The rationale for the cash-in-advance constraint on
consumption has been explored already in section 3.2.1. The cash-in-advance
constraint on output can be interpreted as a cash-in-advance constraint on
wage payments (which are not explicitly modeled): Based on the above-
assumed production function and equality of wages and the marginal product
of labor, the wage bill amounts to wl=0.5 A l
1
2 ; the cash-in-advance constraint
requires mpt ≥ νyt = νA l 12 , and thus implies that at least a fraction of 2ν of
the wage bill must be held in cash.7
Total real balances, m, are given by the sum of money held for productive
and non-productive purposes:
mt = m
np
t +m
p
t (4.4)
The agent faces the following intertemporal budget constraint:
E0 +
∫ ∞
0
(yt + gt)e
−rt dt =
∫ ∞
0
(ct + it (m
np
t +m
p
t ))e
−rt dt (4.5)
where E0 denotes the agent’s initial endowment; g and i real government
net lump-sum transfers to the private sector and the nominal interest rate,
respectively. The intertemporal budget constraint states that the sum of the
present value of the agent’s lifetime income and his initial wealth must equal
the present value of his expenditure. The terms itm
p
t and itm
np
t capture the
opportunity cost of holding money, that is, the interest income forgone, rm,
and the capital loss inflation inflicts on holders of money, pim. The nominal
interest rate is given by Fischer Parity as
it = r + pi
e
t (4.6)
where piet denotes the expected inflation rate, which, in this model of per-
fect foresight, equals the actual inflation rate. r denotes the (constant) real
international interest rate.
Restricting attention to equilibria where the nominal interest rate is pos-
itive, the cash-in-advance constraints will always hold with equality. This
allows to reformulate the intertemporal budget constraint as
E0 +
∫ ∞
0
(yt(1− νit) + gt)e−rt dt =
∫ ∞
0
ct(1 + αit)e
−rt dt.
Assuming no barriers to international trade, the price of the consumption
good, expressed in a common currency, is equal across the domestic and the
6Similar cash-in-advance contraints on consumption and output have been used in recent
papers by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe.
7In which case ν must be restricted to 0 < ν ≤ 0.5.
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foreign economy. Combined with the assumption of constant prices abroad,
purchasing power parity (PPP) implies that
pit = εt (4.7)
where pit denotes the domestic inflation rate and εt the devaluation rate.
As pointed out in the introduction, the economy is characterized by im-
perfect capital mobility: International creditors halt credit supply when the
private sector’s net foreign assets fall below a critical value b˜∗t < 0, defined to
equal the negative of a certain fraction of GDP. The constraint on interna-
tional borrowing requires
b∗p,t ≥ b˜∗t ≡ −nyt (4.8)
where b∗p,t denotes the private sector’s net foreign assets and n is a positive
constant. It is assumed that the domestic agent considers the critical value
b˜∗t to be exogenous.
As long as the borrowing constraint is not binding, the evolution of private
wealth is given by
a˙ = rat + y(1− νit)− c(1 + αit) + gt (4.9)
where a denotes the agent’s wealth. Equation (4.9) states that the agent’s
wealth increases when his period income, that is, output, interest income
and net government transfers, exceeds period expenditure, which includes
the cost of holding money. Wealth consists of holdings of money, the initial
endowment, home (bp,t) and foreign bonds (b
∗
p,t).
at ≡ mt + b∗p,t + bp,t + E0 (4.10)
Foreign assets are foreign currency-denominated. As PPP holds, it is ad-
missable to suppress the nominal exchange rate, since changes in the nominal
exchange rate or domestic prices do not affect the assets’ real value.8 Note
that the initial endowment E0 is stated as a separate element of the agent’s
wealth, as this renders analytical derivations in the following easier to trace. It
will be shown shortly how the initial endowment is invested. Solving equation
(4.10) for b∗p,t and replacing mt (= m
np
t +m
p
t ) with the expressions implied by
the cash-in-advance constraints yields the private sector’s net foreign assets
as
b∗p,t ≡ at − (αct + νyt)− bp,t − E0
8This can be shown as follows: Let b∗,nomp,t denote nominal net foreign assets at the
foreign price level. Real home-currency denominated bonds are given as (St b
∗,nom
p,t )/P,
where S denotes the nominal exchange rate and P the home price level. Given PPP with
foreign prices normalized to 1, St = Pt and b
∗,nom
p,t = b∗p,t.
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Thus, the constraint on international borrowing can be rewritten as
at − (αct + νyt)− bp,t − E0 ≥ b˜∗t . (4.11)
The agent’s optimization problem consists in choosing the paths for con-
sumption and output which maximize his intertemporal utility, subject to his
budget constraint, equation (4.9), and the constraint on international borrow-
ing given by equation (4.11). Formally, the agent’s optimal consumption and
production decisions are derived by maximizing the following Hamiltonian
function:9
H = { 1(
1− 1
σ
)c1− 1σt −κ2y2t+λt [rat + y(1− νit)− c(1 + αit) + gt]−
−µt
[
b˜∗t − at+(αct+νyt) + bp,t + E0
]
}e−βt (4.12)
where λ denotes the costate variable associated with the agent’s budget con-
straint and µ the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (4.11). The
static first-order conditions are given by
c
−1/σ
t = λt(1 + αit) + µtα (4.13)
and
κyt = λ(1− νit)− µtν; (4.14)
the dynamic first-order condition by
λ˙t = λt(β − r)− µt. (4.15)
The complementary slackness condition requires that
µt ≥ 0 µt
[
b˜∗t − at + (αct+νyt) + bp,t + E0
]
= 0. (4.16)
It is assumed that the usual transversality conditions hold.
Condition (4.13) equates the marginal utility of consumption, c
−1/σ
t , to
the sum of two terms: The first term is the cost of consumption when the
borrowing constraint is not binding. It consists of the output cost of 1 plus the
opportunity cost of money held per unit of consumption, αit, multiplied with
the marginal utility of wealth at the optimum, λt. The second term captures
the shadow cost of consuming implied by the borrowing constraint: Increasing
9See Turnovsky (1997) for applications of dynamic control to open economies and
Kamien and Schwartz (1991) for a general treatment of optimal control problems with
inequality constraints.
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consumption by one unit must be associated with an increase in money hold-
ings by α, which is valorized with the multiplier associated with constraint
(4.11), µ. The Lagrange multiplier µ can be interpreted as the shadow value of
the international borrowing constraint, that is, as the increase in maximized
utility that would occur if the constraint was to be eased marginally. First-
order condition (4.14) states that at the optimum, the marginal disutility of
producing output must equal the marginal utility generated by the additional
unit of output. To see this, the first-order-condition is reformulated to yield
κyt = λt − ν (λtit + µt) .
κyt is the marginal disutility of producing output; the right hand side states
the marginal utility derived from the additional output unit. It is lower
than the marginal utility of income, λ, since the output increase must be
accompanied by an increase in money holdings of ν units. This implies an
opportunity cost of νit and a tightening of the wealth constraint, as, ceteris
paribus, increased money holdings imply less holdings of foreign assets.10
In all periods where the borrowing constraint does not bind, the dynamic
first-order condition boils down to
λ˙t = λt(β − r) (4.17)
which, given the assumption that β = r, implies that λ is constant.
Finally, condition (4.16) states that µt equals zero whenever the borrowing
constraint is not binding. How can this be interpreted? For some optimal c
and y, the inequality might be tight, for some not. When it is not tight,
it can be ignored and the corresponding shadow value is zero. When the
borrowing constraint is binding, it can be treated as an equality, as in standard
Lagrangian optimization.
4.4.2 The Government
The government consists of two branches: One is a fiscal branch that pays
out a net transfer to the private sector according to an exogenous spending
rule. The other is the central bank. It has two tasks: During regimes of fixed
exchange rates, it must intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary
to defend the exchange rate. Its second task is to issue money to finance the
net transfers whenever required by the fiscal branch. When these two tasks
are conflicting, the latter takes precedence.
10Recall that the agent views b˜∗p as exogenous, that is, he does not consider the effect of
increased output on the debt ceiling.
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Exchange Rate Policy and Reserve Dynamics
The nominal exchange rate can be regarded as the relative price of the foreign
currency: It states how many units of home currency must be paid in order
to acquire one unit of the foreign currency.11 The relative price of the foreign
currency is determined by the relative demand for and the relative supply
of it. In our model, demand for foreign currency is equal to the demand for
imported goods and capital, both of which are denominated in foreign cur-
rency.12 Foreign currency is supplied when foreigners buy domestic goods and
assets. Furthermore, the central bank can intervene in the foreign exchange
market and either increase demand for foreign currency by changing domestic
into foreign currency, or expand supply by selling its foreign currency reserves
against domestic currency. During a fixed exchange rate regime, the central
bank has to supply exactly the amount of home or of foreign currency such
that the foreign exchange market clears at the targeted nominal exchange
rate. The frequency and type of central bank intervention is thus determined
by the private sector’s demand for and supply of the foreign currency. In
case of excess demand for foreign currency, the central bank can intervene
only as long as its reserves exceed a lower bound denoted Rmin. A currency
crisis is defined to occur when private investors acquire the stock of central
bank foreign currency reserves up to Rmin and the exchange rate devalues.
Put differently, the exchange rate peg can be maintained in every period t in
which
b∗CB,t > Rmin (4.18)
holds, where b∗CB,t denotes the level of foreign-currency denominated bonds
held by the central bank. It is assumed that the central bank’s initial reserves,
b∗CB,0, have been acquired with means borrowed from the private sector in
period zero, that is, b∗CB,0 = E0. The interest earned on reserve holdings is
transferred to the private sector as interest payment on E0.
In general, the level of Rmin depends on the central bank’s willingness to
defend the peg, and its ability to incur foreign debt. In this model, where
the central bank cannot borrow abroad and does not dispose of own initial
wealth, Rmin is equal to zero.
11This is based on a nominal exchange rate expressed in ‘European terms’.
12The cash-in-advance constraint on consumption assumes that both the consumption
of domestic and of imported goods must be covered with home currency. It is assumed
that agents can convert this currency into foreign currency and spend it without delay on
foreign goods and assets.
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Fiscal Policy
The government’s net transfer to the private sector is determined by the
following spending rule:
gt = max[0, h(y¯ − ct)] (4.19)
where h denotes a positive constant and y¯ the agent’s permanent income,
defined as the constant stream of period incomes whose present value is equal
to the present value of the actual income stream:∫ ∞
0
y¯e−rtdt ≡ E0 +
∫ ∞
0
yte
−rtdt
This yields permanent income as
y¯ =
[
r
(∫ ∞
0
yte
−rtdt+ E0
)]
(4.20)
where I have used the fact that
∫∞
0
y¯e−rtdt = y¯
∫∞
0
e−rtdt = y¯r−1. Equation
(4.19) states that no net transfers are payed out when consumption is greater
than or equal to permanent income, and positive transfers when consumption
falls short of permanent income. This can be rationalized as the government’s
attempt to minimize demand fluctuations (by imposing taxes on c when c > y¯,
and granting transfers when c < y¯) which is undermined by tax evasion, such
that effectively, above spending rule emerges. Alternatively, the government
spending rule (4.19) could be replaced by a government spending function
which increases in the inflation rate, since the further analysis will show that
government expenditure is positive when the inflation rate is high, and zero
when prices are constant. This accords with the empirically observed negative
correlation between inflation and tax revenues.13
To finance the transfer, the fiscal authority can either issue debt (held
by the domestic private agent) or use the central bank’s proceeds of money
creation. I assume that these proceeds are transferred directly to the fiscal
authorities. In reality, the fiscal branch issues debt to finance expenditure.
The central bank then monetizes the debt by issuing money and using the
proceeds to buy the debt. As shown in appendix 4.7.1 to this chapter, the
net effect on the government’s consolidated budget constraint is identical
to assuming central bank revenues to be directly transferred to the fiscal
authority.
13The negative correlation has been explained with tax collection lags (the so-called
Tanzi Effect, see Tanzi, 1989) and increasing tax evasion as the inflation rate rises (Crane
and Nourzad, 1986).
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The government period budget constraint is given by14
gt = m˙t + εtmt + b˙p,t − rbp,t (4.21)
and its intertemporal budget constraint by∫ ∞
0
gte
−rt dt =
∫ ∞
0
(m˙+ εm)e−rt dt. (4.22)
where I have used the transversality condition that limT→∞ e−rTλT bp,T = 0.
The economy-wide consolidated period budget constraint can be derived
by substituting (4.21) in equation (4.9). This yields
b˙∗p,t = r
(
b∗p,t + E0,t
)
+ yt − ct − E˙0,t. (4.23)
The economy-wide intertemporal budget constraint can be derived as
E0 +
∫ ∞
0
yte
−rt dt =
∫ ∞
0
cte
−rt dt (4.24)
where I have used the transversality conditions that limT→∞ e−rTλT b∗p,T = 0
and limT→∞ e−rTλTE0,T = 0. Equation (4.24) shows that monetary variables
do not enter the consolidated intertemporal budget constraint: The existence
of money or the magnitude of inflation do not affect the economy’s wealth.
This follows from the assumption that all proceeds from seignorage are fully
redistributed to the private sector.
4.4.3 The Money Market
Money demand is given by the cash-in-advance constraints: Recall that the
agent holds a fraction α of consumption and a fraction ν of output in cash:
mt = m
np
t +m
p
t = αct + νyt (4.25)
Money market equilibrium implies that
m˙s = αc˙+ νy˙ (4.26)
where ms denotes real money supply. As elaborated above, money supply is
determined by the government’s financing needs.
14This assumes that m does not jump, as proceeds from discrete changes in m (∆m) are
neglected.
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4.5 Stabilization
4.5.1 Defining Equilibria
Before proceeding to analyze the effects of ERBS under different expecta-
tional regimes, the model is clarified by summarizing the respective equilib-
rium conditions for an economy under fixed and under flexible exchange rates.
Definition 1 In an equilibrium with a fixed exchange rate
(P.1.) The representative agent follows his optimal consumption and produc-
tion paths: First-order-conditions (4.13) and (4.14) are fulfilled for all t.
(P.2.) The private agent’s and the government’s budget constraints hold.
(P.3.) Either
(a) the reserve constraint (4.18) holds or
(b) the exchange rate remains constant, that is, the devaluation rate re-
mains at zero without central bank intervention.
(P.4.) Money supply is such that the money market is balanced, that is,
equation (4.26) holds.
(P.5.) Rational expectations hold. The expected devaluation rate equals ac-
tual future devaluation.
(P.6.) The constraint on international borrowing holds, that is, the level of
net foreign assets exceeds b˜∗t for all t.
Definition 2 In an equilibrium with a flexible exchange rate
(F.1.) The representative agent follows his optimal consumption and produc-
tion paths: First-order-conditions (4.13) and (4.14) are fulfilled for all t.
(F.2.) The private sector’s and the government’s budget constraints hold.
(F.3.) The devaluation rate is such that the money market is balanced, that
is, equation (4.26) holds.
(F.4.) Rational expectations hold. The expected devaluation rate equals ac-
tual future devaluation.
(F.5.) The constraint on international borrowing holds, that is, the level of
net foreign assets exceeds b˜∗t for all t.
The following differences between the equilibria with fixed and those with
flexible exchange rates can be pointed out: Under fixed exchange rates, the
central bank must assure that the money market is in equilibrium at the
targeted devaluation rate, that is, it must adjust money supply such that it
equals money demand at ε = ε¯ = 0:
gt − ε¯mt − b˙p,t + rbp,t = αc˙+ νy˙.
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Under flexible exchange rates, in contrast, the devaluation rate (which, due
to PPP, equals the inflation rate) adjusts until the money market is in equi-
librium. As retained in condition (P.2), the fixed exchange rate can only be
upheld if either the equilibrium exchange rate resulting from private agent’s
demand and supply of currency is equal to the targeted level, or if the central
bank disposes of sufficient foreign currency reserves to intervene in the foreign
exchange market such that the targeted exchange rate results.
The ensuing two sections analyze the real effects and the sustainability
of ERBS. It will be shown that the implementation of an exchange rate peg
can result in two different equilibria: If the peg is considered credible, that
is, if the public expects the devaluation rate to remain permanently at zero,
consumption and income remain at their steady state levels and the peg
will be sustainable. If, on the other hand, the public expects the peg to be
temporary and followed by an increase in the devaluation rate, consumption
rises in excess of income during the peg, central bank reserves are eventually
exhausted and the peg fails. Thus, expectations about the program’s duration
– which are exogenous ex ante – prove to be self-fulfilling.
4.5.2 Credible, Permanent Stabilization
Permanent stabilization consists of setting the devaluation rate permanently
to zero, starting in period 0. The agent believes that stabilization will be
permanent and sets his devaluation expectations accordingly. Setting εet = 0
for all t, the first-order conditions for optimal consumption and production
are given by:
c
−1/σ
t = λ(1 + αr) + µtα (4.27)
κyt = λ(1− νr)− µtν (4.28)
λ˙ = λ(β − r)− µt (4.29)
µt ≥ 0 , µt
[
at − αct − νy − bp,t − b˜∗t
]
= 0 (4.30)
It was assumed that the agent does not hold any initial foreign assets, that
is, the constraint on international borrowing is not binding at the inception
of stabilization and µ0 = 0. The values of the other µt, t > 0, depend on
consumption and output. Equation (4.30) shows that their values, inter alia,
determine if the borrowing constraint becomes binding and µ positive. The
paths of c and y, however, can only be assessed when the value of µt is known.
Therefore, I will first assume that µt equals zero, and then show that the paths
of c and y actually are such that µt = 0 ∀ t arises endogenously.
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If µ = 0, that is, if the constraint on international borrowing is not binding
during credible stabilization, c and y are constant and given by their first-
order-conditions as
c−1/σ = λ(1 + αr)
and
κy = λ(1− νr).
Given that consumption and output are constant, the consolidated intertem-
poral budget constraint allows to derive period consumption as
c = y + rE0
where I have used the fact that
∫∞
0
e−rt dt = r−1. The above equation shows
that in each period the agent’s consumption equals his period income. No
foreign assets or liabilities are incurred and the constraint on international
borrowing never becomes binding:15
b∗p,t = 0 > b˜
∗
t ≡ −nyt ∀ t
The initial assumption of µ = 0, which was used to derive the paths of
consumption and production, is confirmed, and condition (P.6) for a fixed
exchange rate equilibrium holds.
Conditions (P.1) to (P.5) are fulfilled, too: The agent follows his optimal
consumption and production paths, respecting his budget constraint (con-
dition P.1). Money market equilibrium requires real money supply to be
constant at the level of money demand, (αc+ νy), which – coupled with the
zero devaluation rate – implies that no seignorage revenue is collected (con-
dition P.4). This is compatible with the government budget constraint, since
no transfers are paid when consumption equals permanent income (condi-
tion P.2). The nominal exchange rate remains constant without central bank
intervention (condition P.3). Finally, the agent’s belief that stabilization is
credible and permanent is compatible with rational expectations, as a per-
manent fixed exchange rate equilibrium is indeed feasible (condition P.5).
4.5.3 Non-Credible, Temporary Stabilization
As in the previous section, stabilization policy involves setting the devaluation
rate to zero in period 0. However, now the private agent expects this policy to
be upheld only temporarily, that is, for T ∗ periods and followed by a floating
15Recall that the private agent does not hold any initial foreign assets (b∗p,0 = 0).
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exchange rate regime with a positive devaluation rate thereafter. Formally,
these devaluation rate expectations can be described as:
εet = ε
e
I = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ∗ (4.31)
εet = ε
e
II > 0 for t > T
∗
In what follows, the period from zero to T ∗ will be called ‘stabilization inter-
val’ and from T ∗ to infinity the ‘post-stabilization interval’.
As long as the borrowing constraint is not binding, the first-order condition
(4.13) indicates that consumption is constant over [0, T ∗] at a level denoted as
cI , and constant over ]T
∗,∞[ at a level denoted cII . The optimal consumption
path is characterized by the following equation:
cII(1 + α(r + ε
e
II))
σ = cI(1 + αr)
σ (4.32)
The optimal path of GDP is given by
yII(1− νr) = yI(1− ν(r + εeII)) (4.33)
where yI and yII denote period GDP during the stabilization and post-
stabilization interval, respectively. The above equations show that both con-
sumption and output exceed their post-stabilization values during temporary
stabilization – as εeII > 0, cI > cII and yI > yII . The sign and magni-
tude of the change in the consumption-to-GDP ratio cannot be determined
analytically. However, for realistic parameter values (see appendix 4.7.3), the
inflation reduction generates a consumption increase in excess of output. This
is retained in assumption 1:
(A1) α, ν, σ, r, and εeII are such that period consumption in the post-stabilization
interval decreases more than output, relative to their respective values during
the stabilization-interval : cI
yI
> cII
yII
, that is,
(1+α(r+εeII))
σ
(1+αr)σ
> 1−νr
1−ν(r+εeII) .
This assumption ensures that the agent’s intertemporal substitution of con-
sumption exceeds his intertemporal substitution of production. In addition
to output, the agent receives interest income on his initial wealth holdings,
such that his total period income during the stabilization-interval equals
(yI + rE0) . In order to assess if the domestic agent incurs foreign debt during
the stabilization-interval, the magnitude of consumption relative to period in-
come must be considered. In what follows, it will be shown that cI exceeds
period income, which implies that a fraction of consumption is financed with
imported capital. The procedure is based on a ‘proof by contradiction’: I
will show that setting cI equal to or below period income conflicts with what
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is retained in assumption (A1). Consequently, assumption (A1) implies that
period consumption exceeds period income during the stabilization-interval.
In a first step, it is assumed that consumption equals income in each
period, that is,
cI = yI + rE0
and
cII = yII + rE0.
Under this assumption, the ratio of consumption during the stabilization and
the post-stabilization interval is given as
cI
cII
=
yI + rE0
yII + rE0
=
yI
yII
(
1 + y−1I rE0
1 + y−1II rE0
)
.
The last term of the above expression,
(
1+y−1I rE0
1+y−1II rE0
)
is smaller than one (by
first order condition (4.14), y−1I < y
−1
II ), contradicting assumption (A1 ), in
particular its implication that cI
cII
exceeds yI
yII
. Similarly, (A1 ) is violated if
cI is below period income yI + rE0: If the agent consumes less than his pe-
riod income during the stabilization-interval, his intertemporal budget con-
straint implies that period consumption exceeds period income during the
post-stabilization interval, that is, cII > yII + rE0. Now, cI is smaller and
cII greater than assumed in the first step of the derivation, and their ratio,
cI
cII
, smaller, which implies that, again, cI
cII
is smaller than yI
yII
. This violates
assumption (A1 ).
Thus, assumption (A1 ) implies that period consumption exceeds period
income during the stabilization-interval, and that a fraction of consumption
is financed with imported capital. Recall that this consumption profile can be
interpreted as the agent’s optimal response to intertemporal changes in con-
sumption costs: The agent lifts his consumption in periods where the inflation
rate is low – and consumption relatively less expensive – and incurs debt to fi-
nance the transitory consumption increase. When consuming becomes dearer
(in the post-stabilization interval), the agent lowers consumption and pays
back the debt.
What does this imply for government spending during the stabilization
interval? The government spending rule (4.22) states that net transfers are
zero if consumption exceeds permanent income. In the framework of non-
credible stabilization, the present value of permanent income can be expressed
as ∫ ∞
0
y¯e−rtdt ≡ E0 +
∫ T ∗
0
yIe
−rtdt+
∫ ∞
T ∗
yIIe
−rtdt.
156
This allows to solve for y¯ as
y¯ ≡ r
[
E0 + yI
∫ T ∗
0
e−rtdt+ yII
∫ ∞
T ∗
e−rtdt
]
=
= rE0 + yI − (yI − yII) e−rT ∗ ,
which shows that period income rE0 + yI exceeds permanent income during
the stabilization interval, as by first-order condition (4.14), yI − yII > 0.
This implies that period consumption exceeds permanent income during the
stabilization interval. No transfers are payed out and the government does
not issue debt nor money, that is, m˙t = b˙p,t = 0.
In a next step, the net foreign asset dynamics resulting from above con-
sumption and output paths are analyzed. Substituting gt = m˙t = b˙p,t =
bp,0 = 0 into the agent’s period budget constraint yields the private agent’s
foreign asset dynamics during the stabilization interval as
b˙∗p,t = r
(
b∗p,t + E0
)
+ yI − cI − E˙0. (4.34)
The above equation states that the home agent’s net foreign assets holdings
increase if his income, that is, production and interest income, exceeds con-
sumption, or if he sells (part of) his endowment to buy foreign bonds.
In a first step, it will be considered how foreign assets evolve as long as
the constraint on international borrowing is not binding. For these periods,
the change in private net foreign assets is given by
b˙∗p,t = r(b
∗
p,t + b
∗
CB,0) + yI − cI . (4.35)
Since the demand for foreign currency is satisfied with capital imports, central
bank reserves are constant at their initial level of b∗CB,0, which, by definition, is
equal to E0. The international borrowing constraint is defined in terms of the
level of private net foreign assets. Therefore, the above differential equation
must be solved for b∗p,t in order to derive if and when the constraint becomes
binding. This solution yields16
b∗p,T =
∫ T
0
(yI − cI + rE0)ertdt. (4.36)
yI − cI + rE0 is negative as the agent substitutes consumption into the low-
inflation period. A part of domestic demand is satisfied with imported goods,
which are financed with capital imports. What does this imply for the foreign
16A detailed derivation of the solution is presented in the appendix 4.7.2 to this chapter.
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exchange market? As long as imports of goods and capital are of equal mag-
nitude, the exchange rate remains constant: The demand for foreign currency
associated with goods imports is matched with supply of foreign currency via
capital imports, and the equilibrium ‘price’ on the foreign exchange market
– the exchange rate – does not move. As in each period, the private agent
incurs foreign debt, his total foreign liabilities approach the critical level of
b˜∗t . Once this is reached, in a period I denote with T
∗∗, capital inflows cease
and the central bank has to supply foreign currency in order to meet demand
– which still arises from goods imports – at the posted exchange rate. The
change in central bank reserves in some period T ∈ [0,∞[ is given by
b˙∗CB,T = yI − cI + r(b∗CB,T + b˜∗p,T ∗∗),
that is, by the sum of the trade balance deficit (yI − cI) and net capital
imports. The level of central bank reserves can be solved for as
b∗CB,T =
[
b∗CB,0 +
∫ T
T ∗∗
(yI − cI + rb˜∗T ∗∗)er(t−T )dt
]
er(T−T
∗∗) (4.37)
where T ∗∗ denotes the period in which capital inflows cease. A detailed deriva-
tion of this solution of the differential equation for b˙∗CB,T is presented in ap-
pendix 4.7.2. Equation (4.37) shows that central bank reserves will eventually
be exhausted. Furthermore, I have shown that consumption exceeds income
as long as the devaluation rate remains at zero, that is, yI−cI+rb˜∗T ∗∗ < 0. The
demand of imported goods is associated with demand for foreign currency.
Thus, in each period, the central bank must supply foreign currency in order
to prevent a devaluation. As its initial reserves, b∗CB,0, are finite, central bank
reserves will eventually reach the level Rmin = 0 in a period I denote with T
∗.
To recapitulate, table 4.1 states what happens in the model up to period T ∗.
Thus far, I have shown that reserves reach their minimum level if agents
expect stabilization to be temporary, that is, after period T ∗ the central bank
can no longer intervene in the foreign exchange market. What does this
imply for the exchange rate peg? To answer this question, nominal exchange
rate dynamics succeeding T ∗ must be assessed. The nominal exchange rate is
determined by demand for and supply of foreign relative to domestic currency.
The private sector’s demand for foreign currency equals its current account
balance less its borrowing from abroad. In periods following T ∗, the current
account exhibits a surplus: As the agent expects an increase in devaluation
(and inflation) rates in period T ∗, he lowers consumption to the level cII and
production to yII .
17 As retained in assumption (A1 ), consumption decreases
17This is shown by the first-order conditions (4.32) and (4.33).
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Periods Description
0 < t < T ∗∗ ε = pi = 0
c = cI and y = yI high, cI > yI
g = 0
Current account deficit financed with capital
imports
in T ∗∗ capital imports cease
T ∗∗ ≤ t < T ∗ ε = pi = 0
c = cI and y = yI high, cI > yI
g = 0
Current account deficits engender loss of cen-
tral bank foreign currency reserves
Table 4.1: The timing in the model
by more than output, such that cII < yII . The proceeds derived from goods
exports are used to pay back the foreign debt incurred prior to period T ∗.
In short, the domestic agent exports both goods, associated with demand for
domestic currency, and capital, which is associated with demand for foreign
currency. Thus, the private agent’s international transactions do not effect
changes in the nominal exchange rate. This, however, does not hold true
for the public sector’s actions: Its spending requirements can only be met if
devaluation and inflation rates are positive in the aftermath of period T ∗: The
government spending rule (4.19) requires positive net transfers to be payed
out whenever consumption falls short of permanent income. This is the case in
the post-stabilization interval, where agents reduce their consumption to cII
in expectation of a devaluation rate increase: Assumption (A1) implies that
cII < yII , and yII must be smaller than permanent income in order to fulfill
the agent’s intertemporal budget constraint. Therefore, cII < y¯. Since the
government transfer is financed with seignorage, inflation and devaluation
rates rise: The government budget constraint during the post-stabilization
intervals is given as
h(y¯ − cII) = m˙t + εtmt + b˙p,t − rbp,t. (4.38)
Net government transfers – which are given by the left hand side of the above
equation – are greater than zero. They must be financed with seignorage or
government debt, held by the private agent. The latter is not feasible during
the post-stabilization interval, where the private agent pays back his foreign
debt and is not willing to acquire new debt. Since real money demand is con-
stant at the level (αcII + νyII), an equilibrium on the money market requires
real money supply to be constant (m˙ = 0). Thus, inflation or devaluation tax
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proceeds (εtmt) are the only feasible source of government revenue. Setting
m˙ = b˙p,t = rbp,t = 0 and solving the government budget constraint for the
post-stabilization devaluation rate yields
εII =
h(y¯ − cII)
αcII + νyII
. (4.39)
As y¯ > cII , this equation evinces that the post-stabilization devaluation rate
is greater than zero. The agent’s ex ante arbitrary expectation of a currency
devaluation, as retained in equation (4.31), turns out to be true. Condition
(P.3) for a fixed exchange rate regime is violated: The central bank’s reserve
constraint (4.18) fails to hold, and the exchange rate does not remain constant,
but devalues in absence of central bank intervention.
Both the reserve depletion and the post-stabilization devaluation rate in-
crease ultimately result from the agent’s arbitrary belief that the peg will
be temporary: His expectation of a devaluation rate increase induces him to
consume more than his income, giving rise to the current account deficits and
accumulation of foreign debt which are at the root of the peg’s breakdown.
Thus, the agent’s expectations prove to be self-fulfilling.
The remainder of this section discusses some of the model’s assumptions
and possible extensions, with the aim of further clarifying how the model
works. Furthermore, some assumptions which might appear restrictive at
first sight can be shown to be easily modifiable without altering the model’s
main results.
First, the subject of foreign borrowing is addressed. The first-order con-
dition (4.16) shows that the shadow value of foreign borrowing, µ, which
enters the first-order conditions for optimal consumption and production, as-
sumes a positive value when the constraint on foreign borrowing is binding.
The reason why µ could be ignored in the above assessment of consumption
and output dynamics is that the foreign borrowing constraint never becomes
binding: When the critical level of foreign indebtedness is approached, agents
switch from foreign borrowing to running down their initial endowment (and
central bank foreign currency reserves) in order to finance consumption in
excess of income. As can be seen by means of equation (4.34), E˙0 < 0 allows
the agent to consume in excess of his period income without incurring foreign
debt. In period T ∗, the initial endowment is exhausted and the constraint on
international borrowing would become binding if the agent upheld his level
of consumption in the following periods. However, as the devaluation and in-
flation rates rise, period consumption is reduced below period income, which
implies that the private agent does not want to borrow abroad, but starts
paying back his foreign debt.
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Another assumption which might require some more explanation is the
constant real interest rate r. How can it be that the domestic real interest rate
is constant even when the domestic economy is locked out from international
asset markets? The answer to this question lies in the fact that the domestic
private agent can always fulfill his optimal consumption and output plans,
despite the constraint on international borrowing. As pointed out above,
when capital inflows cease in period T ∗, agents start running down their initial
endowment, implying that no excess demand for credit arises. When the
agent’s initial wealth is exhausted, financing further current account deficits
would indeed bid up the price of credit, that is, the interest rate. However,
this coincides with the peg’s collapse and a devaluation rate increase. As the
latter effects a reversal of the current account balance, domestic agents do
not demand foreign credit and domestic interest rates remain constant.
The constraint on international borrowing used in this model imposes a
ceiling on foreign borrowing by the private sector. Additionally, it is assumed
that debt issued by the domestic fiscal authority is held exclusively by the
domestic agent. One might suspect that the self-fulfilling breakdown of ERBS
could be prevented if the fiscal authority was allowed to borrow abroad. This
is not the case: Assuming a fiscal authority which can borrow abroad coupled
with an upper ceiling on the economy’s total foreign debt would not change
the model’s results: The fiscal authorities need to pay transfers – and thus
generate revenue – only in the post-stabilization interval. At the beginning of
this interval, the international borrowing constraint is binding already due to
the agent’s foreign indebtedness. Therefore, the initial government transfer
must necessarily be financed with seignorage.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter shows that both the consumption boom following ERBS and the
transitory nature of many stabilizations can be explained with self-fulfilling
expectations about the peg’s duration. With that, the model presents a
possible link between the initial dynamics of ERBS and balance-of-payment
crises.
What conclusions can be drawn from this? The empirical literature on
the real effects of inflation stabilization typically regards the expansion during
ERBS as a virtue of stabilization. The model here, however, shows that this
judgement might be a fallacy: The consumption boom accompanying ERBS
might be an indicator of the peg’s deficient credibility, and thus a sign of the
program’s failure.
A policymaker committed to permanent stabilization could, by restraining
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consumption, both lower reserve losses and signal his determination to uphold
the peg. One measure for reducing consumption consists in rising its cost.
This can, for instance, be achieved by increasing credit costs via restrictions on
capital inflows, a measure which has been gaining support in light of the East
Asian crisis (Bhagwati, 1998 and Rodrik, 1998 ). My model, however, also
points to a more fundamental issue: To avoid self-fulfilling currency crises,
a policymaker needs to convince the public ex ante of his determination to
follow an anti-inflationary stance. Therefore, a better understanding of how
agents assess the credibility of a stabilization effort should yield valuable
assistance for the design of effective stabilization policies.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Deriving the Consolidated Government Budget
Constraint
To clarify the linkage between the central bank’s and the fiscal authority’s
accounts, the analysis in the following explicitly spells out both authorities’
budget constraints. The analysis contained in the body of this paper pre-
sented both constraints in a consolidated manner: The government budget
constraint, equation (4.22), assumes that seignorage revenues are transferred
directly from the central bank to the government’s fiscal branch. In most
economies, the fiscal and the monetary branches of government are sepa-
rated. To realize seignorage finance, the fiscal authority issues debt, which is
then bought by the central bank with newly printed money. In this setting,
the budget constraint of the fiscal authority is given as
b˙p,t + b˙CB,t = gt + r (bp,t + bCB,t) (4.40)
where bCB,t denotes liabilities of the fiscal authority which are held by the
central bank. The above equation shows that net transfers g and interest
payments on debt held by either the private sector (bp,t) or the central bank
(bCB,t) are financed by issuing new bonds.
The balance sheet of my model’s central bank can be summarized as fol-
lows:
Assets Liabilities
Foreign bonds (=foreign currency
reserves)
(
b∗CB,t
) Currency in circulation (mt)
Domestic bonds, issued by the fis-
cal authority (bCB,t)
Indebtedness towards the private
sector (E0,t)
The period change in central bank assets can be expressed as:
b˙∗CB,t + b˙CB,t = r
(
b∗CB,t + bCB,t
)
+ m˙+ εtmt + E˙0,t − rE0,t (4.41)
The consolidated budget constraint of the fiscal and the monetary branches
of government can be derived by solving equation (4.40) for b˙CB,t and substi-
tuting the resulting expression into equation (4.41), and using the fact that,
by assumption, E0,t equals b
∗
CB,t. This yields
b˙p,t + m˙+ εtmt = gt + rbp,t
which is the consolidated government budget constraint (4.21) used in the
body of this chapter.
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4.7.2 Foreign Assets and Reserve Dynamics
Equation (4.9) gives the change in the private agent’s wealth as
m˙t + b˙
∗
p,t + b˙p,t + E˙0,t = yt + gt + r(b
∗
p,t + E0,t + bp,t)− ct − εetmt (4.42)
where I have used Fisher parity, that is, it = r + ε
e
t .
Substituting the government’s budget constraint, equation (4.21), into the
above equation yields aggregate foreign asset dynamics as
b˙∗p,t = yt + r(b
∗
p,t + E0,t)− ct − E˙0,t. (4.43)
The above equation states that the home agent’s net foreign assets holdings
increase if his income, that is, production and interest income, exceeds con-
sumption, or if he sells (part of) his endowment to buy foreign bonds.
First, it will be derived how foreign assets held by the domestic agent
evolve during period [0, T ∗∗], that is, before capital inflows cease. During this
interval, central bank reserves are constant at their initial level b∗CB,0 ≡ E0.
Thus, the change in private net foreign assets is given by
b˙∗p,t = yI − cI + r(b∗p,t + b∗CB,0) (4.44)
where yI , and cI denote period output and consumption during the stabili-
zation interval. The international borrowing constraint is defined in terms
of the level of private net foreign assets. In order to derive if and when the
borrowing constraint will be binding, above differential equation is solved for
b∗p,t. The solution of a differential equation is generally given as the sum of
the solution to the homogenous equation (the complementary solution) and
so-called particular solution, that is, one possible solution for the entire dif-
ferential equation.18 In a first step, the solution of the homogenous equation
is derived. Solving the differential equation
b˙∗p,t − rb∗p,t = 0
yields the complementary solution as
b∗p,t(c) = Ae
rt
where A denotes an undefined constant.
The particular solution for b˙∗p,t = 0 yields b
∗
p,t(p) as
b∗p,t(p) = r
−1(−yI + cI)− b∗CB,0.
18See for example Sydsaeter et al. (1999:62ff).
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The general solution is the sum of the complementary and the particular
solution:
b∗p,t = b
∗
p,t(c) + b
∗
p,t(p) = Ae
rt + r−1(−yI + cI)− b∗CB,0 (4.45)
In a next step, the value of the constant A can be determined by solving
above equation for a specific period. For t = 0, above equation yields
0 = A+ r−1
[−yI + cI − rb∗CB,0]
where I have used the fact that the private sector does not dispose of initial
foreign assets, that is, b∗p,0 = 0.
This can be solved for A to yield
A = r−1(yI − cI + rbp,0)
Thus, as long as the domestic economy receives net capital inflows, that is,
during periods 0 to T ∗∗, private sector net foreign assets are given as
b∗p,t = r
−1(yI − cI + rE0)ert + r−1 (−yI + cI − rE0) =
= r−1 [(yI − cI + rE0)]
(
ert − 1)
=
∫ t
s=0
(yI + rE0 − cI)ersdt
where I have used the assumption that b∗CB ≡ E0. The above equation is
identical to equation (4.36) used in the body of this chapter.
During periods T ∗∗ to T ∗, the current account deficit can no longer be
financed with capital inflows. Demand for foreign goods – and foreign cur-
rency – thus effects a depletion of central bank foreign currency reserves.
Their dynamics can be formulated as follows:
b˙∗CB,t = E˙0,t = yI − cI + r(b∗CB,t + b˜∗p,T ∗∗). (4.46)
Note that yI−cI+r(b∗CB,t+ b˜∗p,T ∗∗) is negative, since both b˜∗p,T ∗∗ and (yI−cI+
rb∗CB,t) are smaller than zero. Solving this differential equation for the level
of central bank reserves I proceed as above: The complementary solution of
the homogenous equation is
b∗CB,t(c) = Be
rt,
where B denotes an undefined constant.
A particular solution (for b˙CB,t = 0) is
b∗CB,t(p) = r
−1
(
cI − yI − rb˜∗T ∗∗
)
.
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This yields the general solution as
b∗CB,t = b
∗
CB,t(c) + b
∗
CB,t(p) = Be
rt + r−1
(
cI − yI − rb˜∗T ∗∗
)
. (4.47)
The value of B can be derived by solving above equation for t = T ∗∗. As the
central bank did not intervene in the foreign exchange market up to period
T ∗∗, its reserves are at their initial level, that is, b∗CB,T ∗∗ = b
∗
CB,0.
b∗CB,T ∗∗ = b
∗
CB,0 = Be
rT ∗∗ + r−1
(
cI − yI − rb˜∗T ∗∗
)
.
This yields B as
B =
[
b∗CB,0 − r−1
(
cI − yI − rb˜∗T ∗∗
)]
e−rT
∗∗
.
Substituting above expression for B into the general solution yields
b∗CB,T = b
∗
CB,0e
r(T−T ∗∗) + r−1
(
yI − cI + rb˜∗T ∗∗
) (
er(T−T
∗∗) − 1)
= b∗CB,0e
r(T−T ∗∗) +
∫ T
t=T ∗∗
(yI − cI + rb˜∗T ∗∗)er(t−T
∗∗)dt
=
[
b∗CB,0 +
∫ T
t=T ∗∗
(yI − cI + rb˜∗T ∗∗)er(t−T )dt
]
er(T−T
∗∗)
for T ∈ {T ∗∗, T ∗}, which is the equation (4.37) used in the body of this
chapter.
4.7.3 Parameter Values for which Stabilization-Period
Consumption Exceeds Stabilization-Period Out-
put
Reformulating the first-order conditions (4.13) and (4.14), the ratio of period
consumption and output during the stabilization-interval can be expressed as
cI
yI
=
(
1 + α(r + εeII)
1 + αr
)σ (
1− ν(r + εeII)
1− νr
)
cII
yII
. (4.48)
cI
yI
exceeds cII
yII
if
(
1+α(r+εeII)
1+αr
)σ (
1−ν(r+εeII)
1−νr
)
> 1. Assumption 1 states:
α, ν, σ, r, and εeII are such that
(
1+α(r+εeII)
1+αr
)σ
> 1−νr
1−ν(r+εeII) .
One set of realistic parameter values for which above inequality holds is
α = 0.7, ν = 0.3, σ = 0.6, r = 0.04 and ieII = 40 %. Recall that α is the
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fraction of consumer spending covered with cash, ν the fraction of output,
and r the real interest rate. σ denotes the agent’s intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, σ = − ∂u/∂c
∂2u/∂2c
= − ∂u/∂c
∂(∂u/∂c)
: c
∂c
. Empirical estimates for σ
based on Latin American data yield values in a range from -0.017 to 2.87 (see
Reinhart and Ve´gh, 1995a:366, and Ageno´r and Montiel, 1996:353); recent
estimates for industrial countries incorporating durable goods (Reinhard and
Ogaki, 1998) and households’ asset market participation (Vissing-Jorgensen,
2002) suggest that intertemporal elasticities of substitution are larger than
found previously. Therefore, the (relatively high) value of 0.6 was assumed.
Assuming an expected devaluation of 40 percent is in line with the magnitude
of devaluations witnessed after stabilization.
Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
This dissertation has explored empirical and theoretical aspects of ERBS in
developing economies. An assessment of the stylized facts of ERBS evinces
that these are typically accompanied by an initial boom in consumption and
output, a real appreciation, a current account deterioration, and portfolio in-
vestment inflows. A decomposition of the Brazilian-US real exchange rate re-
veals that exchange rate-adjusted prices of tradable goods and relative prices
of non-tradables in Brazil are of roughly equal importance for the real appre-
ciation.
The models developed in this dissertation emphasize that stabilizations
frequently lack credibility, and show how this engenders the observed real
and monetary dynamics: The real exchange rate appreciation during ERBS
is explained with forward-looking price setting during non-credible, transitory
stabilization. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that a stabilization’s collapse
can result from self-fulfilling expectations about its duration.
My research casts doubt on the effectiveness of ERBS: The empirical ev-
idence indicates that– contrary to what is commonly believed and modeled–
even relatively successful and long-lived exchange rate pegs are associated
with a late slowdown in consumption and output growth, as well as an only
temporary reduction in unemployment. More importantly, my study reveals
that rather few ERBS are successful. Why is that so? The answer suggested
here is that ERBS frequently lack credibility. This lack of credibility can give
rise to a consumption boom, current account deficits and foreign debt: A
self-fulfilling currency crisis is the result. I find the accumulation of foreign
debt the most troubling stylized fact of ERBS. It can potentially culminate
in the country’s default, locking it out from international credit markets for a
prolonged period. In terms of lost output growth, this is particularly painful
for developing economies with typically low saving rates.
If, in contrast, MBS is non-credible, agents’ holdings of domestic currency
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increase by less and the devaluation rate falls by less than during credible
stabilization. The recessionary impulse resulting from the associated further
contraction in real money balances counteracts a possible temporary demand
increase, which might occur as agents expect future inflation rate increases.
Thus, during MBS current account deficits and foreign debt increase by less
than during ERBS.
What consequences are to be drawn from the susceptibility of ERBS to
(self-fulfilling) currency crises? One wisdom which is increasingly becoming
consensus among economists is that the ‘middle ground’ of exchange rate ar-
rangements is to be avoided: Developing countries should either float or irre-
vocably peg their exchange rates. Therefore, currency boards were hailed as a
panacea for inflationary economies. As currency boards fell out of grace due to
the recent Argentinean crisis, disciples of the above wisdom now praise dollar-
ization. This neglects that, similarly to a currency board, dollarization is just
a promise to permanently replace the national currency with the US dollar.
Promises, however, can be broken – a government can decide to re-introduce
a national currency, for example by remunerating government employees with
the newly printed currency and by restricting the withdrawal of dollars. As
the Argentinean experience shows, such a scenario is not too far off: Recently,
the government of La Rioja, one of Argentina’s 24 provinces, started issuing a
provincial bond which is being used as a local currency. If a currency board or
dollarization is reversed, the loss of confidence of both the domestic popula-
tion and international investors is likely to leave a severely wounded economy.
Thus, fixing ever more might be the fix: Pegging or dollarizing without the
certitude that the necessary conditions for the arrangement’s medium to long
run sustainability can be met– and be met also in the presence of exter-
nal shocks and political changes– is dangerous. This certitude, however, can
only exist for countries whose governments have already achieved credibility
and stability by implementing and maintaining stabilization-oriented policies.
The surprising conclusion would thus be that only those countries meet the
requirements for a hard peg or dollarization which do not need it. Govern-
ments desperately longing for a boost of credibility through dollarization, in
contrast, would have to stay away from it.
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